




For many years, women who work (or who have tried to work) with law and in courts
have understood that their gender was relevant to that work, However, until recently,
those who run the courts to which women have sought entry have not been interested in
the effects of women on courts and of courts on women. Below, Professor Resnik ex-
plores the relationship between women and the federal courts and the role that gender
plays in the allocation of work between state and federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION: JURISDICTION AND GENDER
A. The Emergence of Gender as a Topic for Courts
Women have long organized around their participation in legal in-
stitutions-in groups such as the National Association of Women Law-
yers,' the National Conference of Women and the Law,2 the National
Conference of Women Bar Associations, 3 the National Association of
Women Judges, 4 and the Section on Women in Legal Education of the
I In 1899, women formed the National Association of Women Lawyers. See National
Association of Women Lawyers, 75 Year History of National Association of Women Lawyers,
1899-1974, at 7 (Mary H. Zimmerman ed. 1975). Exactly when women first began to practice
law in the United States is not known. In 1869, Mary E. Magoon was described as an attorney
in Iowa; in that same year, Arabella Babb Mansfield was admitted to the Iowa Bar. See Karen
Berger Morello, The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America, 1638 to the Present 11
(1986) (noting Mansfield officially recognized as first woman lawyer in United States).
2 This organization, started in 1970, sponsors annual conferences. See Herma Hill Kay &
Christine A. Littleton, Text Note: Feminist Jurisprudence: What Is It? When Did It Start?
Who Does It?, in Herma Hill Kay, Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination
884, 884 (3d ed. 1988).
3 This organization, started in 1981, provides a "clearinghouse" on information about
women's bar associations, which include some 10,000 lawyers. See Martha Middleton,
Women's Bars Form Coalition, B. Leader, Sept.-Oct., at 6 (1981).
4 Esther McGuigg Morris is described as the first woman to be a member of a judiciary;
although not a lawyer, she was a justice of the peace in South Pass City, Wyoming in 1870.
See K. Morello, supra note 1, at 219. By 1979, there were enough women judges to inspire the
creation of the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), formed in response to the
"very lonely, very isolated lives of those women judges who may be the only one on their
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American Association of Law Schools,5 and by means of several journals
that now exist at law schools around the United States.6 In the 1960s
and 1970s, as women litigated about their rights, they found that some of
the pain of discrimination came from the very places to which they
brought claims-courts.
In an effort to educate judges about the discrimination that was oc-
curring under their aegis, the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the
National Organization of Women founded the "National Judicial Educa-
tion Project" (NJEP), which worked in cooperation with the National
Association of Women Judges. 7 The shorthand for the issue became
"Gender Bias in the Courts," and the primary vehicle of expression be-
came the creation of "Gender Bias Task Forces.' 8 New Jersey led the
way in 1982 when Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz of that state's
Supreme Court created the first such Task Force.9 By the spring of 1990,
"task force activity at various stages of operation [was] underway in
some 30 jurisdictions" in the United States. 10 These task forces review
bench in that locale or state." Id. at 245 (quoting one of founders, Joan Dempsey Klein); see
also Gladys Kessler, Foreword, 14 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 473, 477-78 (1984) (Symposium
Issue: National Association of Women Judges) (stating that purpose of Association includes
formulating "solutions" to the "legal, educational, social and ethical problems mutually en-
countered by women judges").
5 The Section on Women in Legal Education was founded in 1970. See Herma Hill Kay
& Christine A. Littleton, Introductory Note: Women As Law Students and Professors, in H.
Kay, supra note 2, at 879-880.
6 These journals include: American University Journal of Gender and the Law (founded
1991), Berkeley Women's Law Journal (founded 1983), Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
(founded 1990), Harvard Women's Law Journal (founded 1977), Law & Sexuality: A Review
of Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues (Tulane University School of Law, founded 1990), Southern
California Review of Law & Women Studies (founded 1990), Texas Journal of Women and the
Law (founded 1990), UCLA Women's Law Journal (founded 1990), Wisconsin's Women's
Law Journal (founded 1985), Women and Law (Hofstra Law School, founded 1978), Women's
Law Forum of the Golden Gate Law Review (founded 1979), The Women's Rights Law Re-
porter (Rutgers Law School, founded 1971), and Yale Journal of Law and Feminism (founded
1987).
7 See Norma J. Wilder, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80's: Equal Treatment for Men
and Women in the Courts, 64 Judicature 202, 204-07 (1980) (founding director of NJEP, Dr.
Wikler, summarizing evidence of gender-based stereotypes and describing a new project to
educate judges); Norma J. Wikler, Water on Stone: A Perspective on the Movement to Elimi-
nate Gender Bias in the Courts, 26 Ct. Rev. 6, 14-16 (Fall 1989) (giving history of founding of
NJEP).
8 See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary about Gender Bias, 9 Women's Rts.
L. Rep. 109, 124 (1986) (current Director of NJEP describing its "dream" to establish a task
force in every state).
9 First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the
Courts 4 (June 1984) [hereinafter New Jersey Task Force Report]; see also Lynn Hecht Scha-
fran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 Judicature 280,
281 (1987) (advocating task force approaches as effective methods of eliminating gender bias in
courts).
10 Betty Weinberg Ellerin, Chair of the National Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts
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an array of topics, including the application of substantive legal doctrine,
courtroom interactions, and the role of the court as employer. The con-
clusions of the Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts are illustrative:
"[G]ender bias against women... is a pervasive problem with
grave consequences.... Cultural stereotypes of women's role in
marriage and in society daily distort courts' application of sub-
stantive law. Women uniquely, disproportionately and with un-
acceptable frequency must endure a climate of condescension,
indifference and hostility."'"
B. The Reluctant Federal Courts
From 1982 until 1990, these task forces on gender bias in the courts
were exclusively the domain of state courts. 12 The federal courts (either
acting circuit by circuit or as a whole by action of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States) neither took the lead nor followed suit in form-
ing committees to ask questions about the interaction between gender
and the federal court system.13 The question of what role, if any, the
federal courts as an institution might take in considering the effects of
gender has come to the fore recently because of actions by Congress and
of the National Association of Women Judges, Annual Report to the Board of Directors of the
National Association of Women Judges (Sept. 4, 1990) (on file with author); see also Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for Judicial Reform, 21 Ariz.
St. L.J. 237, 271 (1989) (discussing continuing need to educate judiciary on issues of gender
bias in courts).
II Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 Fordham Urb. L.J.
11, 17-18 (1986-1987) [hereinafter New York Task Force Report]. Other state task force re-
ports echo the New York Task Force's findings. One of the most recent is that of Connecticut,
which concluded that "women are treated differently from men in the justice system and,
because of it, many suffer from unfairness, embarrassment, emotional pain, professional depri-
vation and economic hardship." Report of the Connecticut Task Force, Gender, Justice and
the Courts 12 (1991) [hereinafter Connecticut Task Force Report].
12 See Schafran, supra note 10, at 247 (discussing efforts of several states' task forces on
gender bias).
13 A few programs relating to sex discrimination were conducted at federal judiciary con-
ferences. For example, in 1987, the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference organized a program
on women and the Constitution. See Women and the Constitution: Presentations from the
1987 Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference (Colorado Springs, Colorado, July 17, 1987), 6 Law
& Ineq. J. 1 (1988). In the Ninth Circuit, a workshop on sex discrimination and employment
was conducted for federal district court judges. See Schafran, supra note 10, at 254 n.66.
Programs on gender bias in the courts also have been conducted for bankruptcy judges. Tele-
phone Conversation with Lynn Hecht Schafran, Director of the National Judicial Education
Project (Aug. 16, 1991). Other evidence of federal awareness of gender comes from 1987
amendments to the Federal Rules of Procedure, which adopted gender-neutral language. See,
e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 1987 advisory committee's note (explaining that change in words from
"shall notify him" to "shall notify the defendant" is "technical. No substantive change is
intended.").
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by the federal judiciary.
In 1988, Congress created a specially chartered committee, empow-
ered to provide a comprehensive overview of the federal judicial system.
That group, the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC), with fifteen
members appointed by the Chief Justice, included several federal judges;
its charge was to think about the future of the federal courts. 14 Many
individuals and organizations saw the FCSC as having the potential to
make recommendations about how gender affects decisionmaking, em-
ployment, and work in the federal courts. The FCSC thus heard and
received testimony-including many requests that the federal courts, like
the state courts, convene gender bias task forces and begin other pro-
grams on gender bias.15
The April 1990 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee con-
cluded that "another study" was not needed, but that education was. In
support of its recommendations, the FCSC stated:
Studies in many state systems reflect the presence of bias-par-
ticularly gender bias-in state judicial proceedings. Although
we have confidence that the quality of the federal bench and the
nature of federal law keep such problems to a minimum, it is
unlikely that the federal judiciary is totally exempt from in-
stances of this general social problem. 16
The FCSC Report did note that education about, awareness of, and vigi-
14 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-109,
102 Stat. 4642, 4644-46 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 note (1988)) (creating committee to "ex-
amine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United States" and to "develop a
long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary").
Is The FCSC has created a microfiche database of all the materials that it received and
created. Included under the category "gender" are reports about task forces in New York,
Maryland, California, and New Jersey. Testimony also was submitted by many individuals,
including the Honorable Lisa Hill Fenning of the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Cen-
tral District of California; Professor Myrna Raeder, on behalf of the National Association of
Women Lawyers; Lynn Hecht Schafran, Director of the National Judicial Education Project;
and myself, in part on behalf of members of the Executive Committee of the Section on
Women in Education of the Association of American Law Schools (testimony and index of
data on file with author). In addition, Professor Richard Marcus, an Associate Reporter for
one of the FCSC subcommittees, prepared a memorandum, "Bias in the Federal Courts,"
which summarized the work about gender, racial, and ethnic bias that had been done or was
underway in the state courts. Marcus Memorandum to Workload Subcommittee (Oct. 16,
1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Marcus Memorandum]. My thanks to the office of the
Honorable Joseph Weis, Chair of the FCSC, to Charles Summers at the Administrative Office,
and to Professor Richard Marcus for providing me with data about the materials received by
the FCSC.
16 FCSC, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 169 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter
FCSC Report]. In contrast, Professor Marcus's memorandum concluded that state courts had
found gender bias and that "it seems likely that a [federal] study would reveal similar
problems, and therefore it is probably not sensible for the committee to recommend one."
Marcus Memorandum, supra note 15, at 1.
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lance against discrimination were always appropriate. 17
The second congressional action that raised the "gender question"
was proposed legislation, the Violence Against Women Act, now pend-
ing before Congress.18 As described by its sponsors, the Act responds to
the "national tragedy" that makes women the victims of violence in
homes, workplaces, and on the streets.1 9 The Act has several provisions
(such as a National Commission on Violent Crime against Women, fund-
ing of state programs on violence, and promoting safer college cam-
puses). But what has caught the attention of the federal judiciary are two
jurisdictional sections. One would provide a federal civil rights remedy
to a person who is the victim of a "crime of violence, motivated by gen-
der."' 20 Another section would create a federal crime when a person
travels across state lines to injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse or inti-
mate partner.2 1
In the fall of 1991, the Judicial Conference of the United States is-
sued a resolution opposing the enactment of the civil rights provisions of
the proposed act. As a report of the ad hoc committee appointed to
study the proposed legislation described, the Judicial Conference would
like to play a "constructive role in offering its assistance to Congress in
the effort to fashion an appropriate response to violence directed against
women."' 22 However, according to the Conference, changing federal ju-
risdiction would be a mistake, for it would "embroil the federal courts in
domestic relations disputes" 23 and "flood [the federal courts] with cases
that have been traditionally within the province of the state courts." 24
17 The Report explained, "Rather than another study, the committee proposes means of
preventing and dealing with bias in federal court proceedings and operations." FCSC Report,
supra note 16, at 169. The Report also called for education by the Federal Judicial Center and
the circuit conferences "in this important field." Id. To address "bias in the judicial branch,"
the FCSC recommended the courts "[e]stablish informal internal grievance procedures; pro-
vide independent review of formal internal grievance procedures; provide education about bias
and discrimination in courts and courtrooms; [s]elect qualified people with due regard for
heterogeneity of American people as support personnel; [c]onsider establishing grievance pro-
cedures for complaints by public alleging racial, ethnic, or gender bias." Id. at 174.
18 S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
19 See Committee on the Judiciary, The Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. Rep. No.
197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1991). The bill, introduced by Senator Joseph Biden, had 41
Democratic and 8 Republican cosponsors as of January 22, 1992. Bill Tracking Report, S. 15,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 22, 1992). As of January 28, 1992, a parallel bill, H.R. 1502, The
Violence Against Women Act of 1991, introduced by Representative Barbara Boxer, had 154
Democratic and 20 Republican cosponsors when it was introduced in the House. Bill Track-
ing Report, H.R. 1502, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992).
20 See S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301.
21 See id. § 2261.
22 Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence 6
(Sept. 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Report on Gender-Based Violence].
23 Id. at 1.
24 Id. at 7. The Report on Gender-Based Violence also allied itself with the opposition
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1687 1991
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In his 1991 "Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary," the Chief
Justice echoed these themes. Noting that the federal courts are a
precious national resource, the Chief Justice insisted that their role
should be "reserved for issues where important national interests
predominate. '25 Within a few paragraphs, he urged that Congress at-
tend to the Judicial Conference's opposition to the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the Violence Against Women Act.26 Nowhere did he or the
Judicial Conference endorse the provisions of the Act that would support
gender bias studies and education in the federal courts.
Atop these two legislative initiatives come two grants of certiorari
that require elucidation of the relationship between federal jurisdiction,
women, and families. In NOW v. Operation Rescue,27 the Fourth Circuit
held that women seeking access to health care facilities that provide
abortions can invoke federal jurisdiction.28 Joining in the request for
Supreme Court review, the Department of Justice argued that the federal
courts have no such power.29 While this case has attracted sustained
media attention as federal judges and Operation Rescue members face
authored by the Conference of Chief Justices of the States, which argued that, were a federal
cause of action available, litigants would "add a new count to many if not most divorce and
other domestic relations cases." Letter from Vincent L. McKusick, President of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices, to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Feb. 22, 1991) (on file with
author) (transmitting resolution of Chief Justices opposing creation of federal civil rights rem-
edy in Violence Against Women Act). In response, Senator Biden wrote that such a view was
"not only an improper reading of the statute, it also verges dangerously close to the kind of
stereotypes we condemn. To put the collective force of the federal judiciary behind the as-
sumption that women-unlike other groups-will file false and vindictive civil rights claims
suggests the very gender-biased stereotypes that my legislation was intended, in part, to dis-
pel." Letter from Senator Biden to the Honorable Thomas M. Reavely, Chairman of the Ad
Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence of the the Judicial Conference (Sept. 20, 1991)
(footnote omitted) (on file with author).
25 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
24 The Third Branch 1, 2 (1992) [hereinafter all Chief Justice's Reports will be referred to as
"Year-End Report" for the appropriate year].
26 See id. at 3 ("The broad definition of criminal conduct is so open-ended, and the new
private right of action so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a
whole host of domestic relations disputes."); see also Revised Judicial Impact Statement on
Violence Against Women Act, S. 15 as Reported 2 (Jan. 8, 1992) (on file with author) [herein-
after Judicial Impact Statement, S. 15] (prepared by Office of Judicial Impact Assessment, and
concluding that cost of Act would be "$62 million and 691 staff years").
27 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
28 See id. at 585. One of the questions before the Supreme Court is whether "gender-based
animus" suffices for the "purpose" element, required by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The brief filed by
the United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners' claims, asserted: "Treating women
differently because they seek an abortion is not a form of invidious discrimination based on the
basis of gender." Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 6,
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991) (No. 90-985) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States].
29 Brief for the United States, supra note 28, at 7-13.
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off,30 the other case the Supreme Court will hear is distinguished by the
absence of popular attention paid. In an unpublished opinion in Anken-
brandt v. Richards,31 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district judge's decision
to decline to hear a child abuse diversity tort action.32 The trial court
had relied on the so-called "domestic relations exception" 33 and dis-
missed a complaint that alleged that Richards (whose parental rights had
been terminated by a state court proceeding prior to the filing of the
federal lawsuit) and his companion Kesler had abused Richards' former
children.34 While acknowledging that tort actions did not fit "squarely
within the Domestic Relations Exception," the trial court noted that the
state court judgment could be modified and the issue of parental relation-
ship reexamined. 35 The trial court relied on the "state court interest in
the ongoing welfare of the minor plaintiffs" to conclude that the "possi-
bility of conflicting findings in this Court violates the basic principles of
comity and compels this Court to apply its discretion declining the exer-
cise of jurisdiction ... .,,36 This district court reading parallels the Judi-
cial Conference's opposition to a portion of the Violence Against Women
Act. Both are premised on a view that the federal courts should decline
jurisdiction over "domestic relations"-defined in Ankenbrandt as in-
cluding violence against children as well as against women-in favor of
state court authority.
30 See Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 260-61 (D.
Kan. 1991) (reciting recent case law); Judge Threatens Wichita Abortion Protestors, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1991, at A14 (describing efforts of a federal judge to end anti-abortion protes-
ters' blockade of a health care clinic).
31 934 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 855
(1992).
32 See id., aff'g L.R. & S.R. Minors ex rel. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17068 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1990). The trial court found that the case fell within the
federal courts' diversity jurisdiction, in that the plaintiff children and their mother lived in
Missouri, the defendants were from Louisiana, and more than nine million dollars in damages
were sought. Id. at *I n.1. After this essay was in press, the Supreme Court held in Anken-
brandt that, given the long history of the "domestic relations exception," it should remain as
an interpretation of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and be limited to cases "involving
the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree." 60 U.S.L.W. 4532, 4537 (June 15,
1992). Finding that other forms of abstention were also inapplicable, the Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit.
33 This "exception" has been used by federal courts to decline to decide cases jurisdiction-
ally properly before them. See text accompanying notes 301-84 infra (discussing this exception
and its ideological underpinnings).
34 See Ankenbrandt, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17068, at *3-*5. The complaint was dismissed
without prejudice. See id. at *4.
35 See id. at *4.
36 Id. at *6. The opinion does not address the impact of federal collateral estoppel rules.
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-37 (1979) (authorizing use of nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel).
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C. The Underlying Premises
Return to the language chosen by and the conclusions of the Federal
Courts Study Committee (FCSC) about gender bias in the federal courts:
[T]he quality of the federal bench and the nature of federal law
keep such problems to a minimum .... 37
Given recent attention paid to "natural law," one might be tempted to
tease the FCSC Report about its choice of words. Further, given the
absence in the record before it of any empirical information to support
such a conclusion and given testimony that argued the opposite, one
might be tempted to quarrel.
But rather than tease or quarrel, I think there is much to learn from
the words and assumptions imbedded therein. The phrases "the quality
of the federal bench" and "the nature of federal law" are useful, for they
provide insight into the rhetoric, ideology, doctrine, and workplaces of
the federal courts. Those who governed the state courts developed a
sense of urgency about the relationship of courts to women.38 After in-
quiry, many state task forces concluded that women were "denied credi-
bility" in courts and faced "a judiciary underinformed about matters
integral to many women's welfare."' 39 Yet that urgency to study bias
against women was not shared by those who governed the federal courts.
The implicit premises of the FCSC conclusion are that the people
who become federal judges and the work that they do somehow are
shielded from engaging in or being swayed by discrimination based on
gender.4° What in the selection of federal judges and in the subject mat-
37 FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 169.
38 In 1988, the Conference of Chief Justices enacted Resolution XVIII, "Task Forces on
Gender Bias and Minority Concerns," which urged "positive action by every chief justice to
address gender bias and minority concerns in the state courts; and... to establish separate task
forces devoted to the study of 1) gender bias in the court system and 2) minority concerns as
they relate to the judicial system." 26 S. Ct. Rev. 5 (Fall 1989); see also note 402 infra.
39 See, e.g., Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission 130,
197-99 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter Florida Task Force Report]; Report of the Maryland Special
Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts 20, 127 (May 1989) [hereinafter Maryland
Task Force Report]; New Jersey Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 12-13; New York Task
Force Report, supra note 11, at 27; Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice: Report of the
Utah Judicial Council 96-99 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter Utah Task Force Report].
40 An alternate explanation, suggested by Professor Marcus's Memorandum, supra note
15, is that federal courts, like state courts, would have similar problems of gender bias and that
additional research was unnecessary; education would suffice. The difficulties with this expla-
nation of the FCSC views are twofold. First, the federal courts so frequently distinguish them-
selves from state courts that it would be unusual for the federal judiciary to affiliate so
completely with the state courts and assume sameness. Indeed, the FCSC report itself states
that it believes that the federal courts do not share fully in the gender bias problems exper-
ienced by the states. FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 169. Second, if the federal judiciary
believed that the manifestations of gender bias in the federal courts were as substantial as those
in the state courts, then more than education and informed grievance procedures likely would
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ter and jurisdiction of the federal courts would help insulate that judicial
system from the disturbing conclusions reached in state jurisdictions
about the degree to which gender bias exists and affects adjudication and
other court-based processes? 41 What is it about either "gender bias" or
"the federal courts" that makes problems of discrimination against
women less troubling ones in federal as contrasted to state adjudication?
Responding to these questions is not an inquiry into the "original
intent" of the speakers but rather into the cultural and doctrinal milieu
that shaped their conclusions. Answers require examination of both
"gender" and "the federal courts." In this context, the word "gender"
masks the issue, for "women" are the relevant category here, as they are
in much of the work of Gender Bias Task Forces.42 Officially, court-
based task forces embrace concerns about discrimination against anyone
based on gender.43 In practice, "gender bias" task forces inquire princi-
have been recommended.
41 See, e.g., New York Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 15 (stating Task Force's con-
clusion that gender bias against women in courts is pervasive problem); see also Florida Task
Force Report, supra note 39, at 2 ("Gender bias is a reality for far too many people involved in
the legal system.... Gender bias is practiced to a disturbing degree... often in forms that
have become highly institutionalized."); Final Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Task
Force on Gender Issues in the Court 1 (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter Michigan Task Force Report]
("Perceptions of gender bias are rooted in reality. Gender bias adversely affects the interpreta-
tion and application of substantive laws, practices and procedures."); Final Report of the
Rhode Island Committe on Women in the Courts 22 (June 1987) [hereinafter Rhode Island
Task Force Report] (finding "substantial evidence that discrimination based on gender is a
serious problem in the Rhode Island courts").
42 Naming this work "gender bias" is itself a complex decision. During much of the 1970s,
lawyers, legislators, and judges spoke about "sex" discrimination against women. Concern
emerged with the use of that phrase. "Sex" could be used to explain differences identified
between women and men, and men would be the baseline against which women were to be
measured. See Barrie Thorne, Cheris Kramarae & Nancy Henley, Language, Gender, and
Society: Opening a Second Decade of Research, in Language, Gender and Society 7, 12-15
(Barrie Thorne, Cheris Kramarae & Nancy Henley eds. 1983). During the 1980s, "gender"
came to be used in lieu of "sex"-to underscore that "gender is not a unitary, or 'natural' fact,
but takes shape in concrete, historically changing social relationships." Id. at 16; see also Joan
Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History 2 (1988) ("[G]ender... means knowledge
about sexual differene ... produced by cultures and societies of human relationships .... ").
But "gender" also may shift attention away from the problems of women, and by its ambigu-
ity, shelter discrimination from view. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make
Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA Women's L.J. 15 (1991) (discussing problems of
relying on gender-neutral language).
43 See, e.g., Connecticut Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 6 ("the working definition of
gender bias... is: any unjustified, differential treatment of a woman or a man based on that
person's gender"); New Jersey Task Force Report, supra note 9, at I ("Gender bias is the
predisposition or tendency to think about and behave toward people mainly on the basis of
their sex."); New York Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 16 (quoting Chief Judge Law-
rence H. Cooke, defining gender bias as "decisions... made or actions taken because of weight
given to preconceived notions of sexual roles rather than upon a fair and unswayed appraisal of
the merit as to each person or situation"); see also Lynn Hecht Schafran & Norma Juliet
Wikler, Operating a Task Force On Gender Bias in the Courts: A Manual for Action 7 (1986)
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pally about and document discrimination against women in the legal sys-
tem.44 Once the words "gender bias" are translated as "discrimination
against women," then the perception is that something about "the qual-
ity of the federal bench" and "in the nature of federal law" keeps
problems of discrimination against women "to a minimum."
Different views might form the basis for this conclusion. A first is
either that federal judges, when appointed, are screened for attentiveness
to women's issues or that federal law is itself intrinsically egalitarian in
statement and application and thus without discrimination against
women. The argument might run that because of federal legislation like
Title VII and constitutional antidiscrimination premises, federal judges
are specially situated, already attuned to the problems women face and
enforcing laws to prevent discrimination. Were it true that federal judges
were so chosen or performed work that insulated them from bias, federal
judges might well have welcomed gender bias task forces to confirm their
inclusion of women and to alert them to any ways in which their in-
("Bias against men as well as bias against women undermines justice.").
44 See generally L. Schafran & N. Wikler, supra note 43, at 7 ("There is overwhelming
evidence, however, that the negative impact of gender bias operates much more frequently and
seriously against women."); see also Connecticut Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 6-8
(reviewing history of discrimination against women); New York Task Force Report, supra
note 11, at 16 (stating Task Force's "mandate" was to review all "aspects" of court system to
learn if" 'there are statutes, rules, practices, or conduct that work unfairness or undue hard-
ship on women in our courts'" (quoting Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke)).
While discrimination against women is at the core of all reports, fifteen task forces did
address the question of discrimination against men. For example, the New York Report ex-
amined "stereotypes that disadvantage fathers," see New York Task Force Report, supra note
11, at 102-04, as well as "mothers." See id. at 105-11; see also Connecticut Task Force Report,
supra note 11, at 8 (noting that stereotypic views of men may cause "judges unjustifiably to
apply differential standards to men especially in areas of custody and sentencing"); Maryland
Task Force Report, supra note 39, at iii ("committee carefully investigated allegations of bias
from men and from women, and found that gender bias affects both sexes."); Minnesota
Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, Gender Fairness Report, 15
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 825, 857 (1989) [hereinafter Minnesota Task Force Report] ("stereo-
types [about caretaking of children] work to the disadvantage of both fathers and mothers");
Utah Task Force Report, supra note 39, at S-4 ("gender-based stereotypes about proper roles
for men and women serve to disadvantage mothers in some situations and fathers in others").
The California Task Force stated that while recognizing "that bias based on gender in-
cludes bias against both men and women, virtually no testimony was received in the area of
courtroom demeanor and civil litigation that reported bias against men." Achieving Equal
Justice for Women and Men in the Courts, Draft Report of the Judicial Council Advisory
Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts § 4, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter Draft California Task
Force Report]. On November 16, 1990, the Judicial Council of California approved the recom-
mendations, as modified by the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in the
Courts, of the California Task Force's Report. See Minutes of Judicial Council Meeting of
Nov. 16, 1990 (on file with author). The publication of a final California report awaits addi-
tional funding. Conversation with stafflof the Judicial Council, Mar. 26, 1992. For complaints
about task forces' focus on women, see Fredric Hayward, Gender Bias has an Import on Men,
Also, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 14.
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tended egalitarianism failed in practice. However, given the controversy
over the Violence Against Women Act, sketched above, and the
demographics and ideology of the federal judiciary, detailed below, 45
claims of deep egalitarianism are difficult to sustain. Similarly, while
controversial recent appointments to the federal courts indicate that a
candidate's attitudes towards women's rights have become relevant to
appointment, there is little evidence that commitment to women's rights
is a "litmus test" for nomination or confirmation.
46
In my view, the diminished sense of "gender" comes not from the
complete implementation of egalitarian principles, but rather from a per-
ception that the world of the federal courts is populated by and is about
men. The fact of women's invisibility (documented by the very possibil-
ity of seeing the federal courts as places with little to do with gender bias)
provides the basis for this inquiry about how the federal courts as a sys-
tem could be perceived as not having much to do with women and their
problems. The questions are several. Are women absent in fact or pres-
ent but paid no attention? Absent and present in what roles? Pursuant
to what jurisdictional rules? Why is state law understood as the arena
more relevant to women than federal law? Based on what normative and
doctrinal claims about the appropriate divisions between state and fed-
eral courts of the tasks of dispute resolution, law enforcement, and law
creation?
Happily, I am not alone in asking these questions. In addition to a
growing body of law review literature considering the gendered nature of
federal laws and rules, two federal circuits have expressed willingness to
consider the impact of gender on their work.47 In June of 1990, the gov-
erning body of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
created a committee to review court activities and consider racial and
gender bias.48 In August of 1990, the Judicial Conference of the Ninth
Circuit approved a resolution calling for a study of gender bias in its
courts. 49 This resolution will result in the first report of a task force
45 See notes 85-145, 269-351 and accompanying text infra.
46 See generally Judith Resnik, Hearing Women, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1333 (1992) (in Sympo-
sium: Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the
Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings).
47 With the addition of these federal efforts, as of the summer of 1991, 33 states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and two federal circuit courts had put gender bias on their agendas. See
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Update: Gender Bias in the Courts, Trial 112 (July 1991).
48 Conversation with Linda Finkelstein, Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia (Aug. 1991). Appointed as Chair was the Honorable Clarence
Thomas; also appointed were Judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Joyce Hens Green, and Charles
Richey. Id. After Justice Thomas's confirmation, Judge Joyce Green became the chair and
Judge Jack Penn joined the Committee. Id.
49 Resolution No. 9 (Amended) states: "Create an Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in
the Courts. Requests the Ninth Circuit to establish an Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in
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charged with addressing gender bias issues in the context of the federal
courts.5 0 As noted above, Congress is also considering legislation that
would encourage circuits to study gender bias and would request that the
Federal Judicial Center provide training and education 1 Thus, from a
variety of places and using a range of methods, including surveys, data
collection, reviews of case law, reports on office policies, and focus group
discussions, people are thinking about the extent to which gender affects
the federal courts and the federal courts affect our understanding of gen-
der distinctions.
These efforts are made especially complex by the subtleties of all the
elements of the topic-gender, the federal courts, and the state courts.
While it is both tempting and appropriate upon occasion to speak of
"women" and of "men" as distinct categories, it is imperative to be sensi-
tive to the limits of this distinction. One cannot assume that all women
or men share the same experiences. Factors other than gender-such as
class, race, religion, and sexual orientation-create important differences
within the categories of "women" and "men."952
the Courts to conduct hearings and prepare a written report with recommendations to elimi-
nate gender bias in the courts." Mark Mendenhall, 1990 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
Report, 132 F.R.D. 83, 115 (1990). The Resolution passed with 63 judges voting yes, 38 no,
and 8 abstaining and with 61 attorneys voting yes, 16 no, and none abstaining. Id.
50 See Christine E. Sherry, Ninth Circuit Undertakes Pioneering Study as Federal Courts
Aim at Thwarting Gender Bias, 17 Litig. Sec. 11, 11 (1991). The Executive Committee of the
Ninth Circuit appointed the Honorable John Coughenour of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington (chair), the Honorable Proctor Hug of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Honorable Marilyn Patel of the United States District
Court of the Northern District of California, and lawyers Terry Bird (Los Angeles), Margaret
McKeown (Seattle), Henry Shields (Los Angeles), and myself. The Task Force plans to pres-
ent a report at the August 1992 Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit.
I cannot forecast what the Task Force's knowledge or conclusions will be. I speak here in
no way on behalf of that group, but write as a law professor who teaches about feminism and
about the law and jurisdiction of the federal courts-and as a New York University Law
School graduate who is delighted to participate in this symposium in honor of "100 years of
Women at NYU."
51 See S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 521-523 (1991); notes 18-26 and accompanying text
supra.
52 See generally Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Experience, in
Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose, 1979-1985, at 23 (1986) ("erasure of lesbian exist-
ence from so much of scholarly feminist literature"); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential
Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1988) (discussing interrelationship be-
tween gender and race and noting that attempts to isolate gender from other elements of iden-
tity such as race and class has helped preserve the white middle-class privilege in feminist
theory); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 140 (noting neither feminist theory nor antiracist theory "accu-
rately reflect[s] the interaction of race and gender"); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990) (discussing failure of feminist legal
theory to attend to different experiences of "women"); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on
the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights
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Similarly, "the federal courts" are not themselves fixed or easily de-
scribed. Within the national system, the circuits provide substantial vari-
ation in custom, practice, and tone. Moreover, little attention is paid to
many of those who sit as "federal judges" but lack life tenure, as well as
to the lawyers and staff who also populate "the federal courts" and shape
the culture. Some 750 individuals hold life-tenured article III judge-
ships.5 3 Another 745 judges, named "magistrate judges" and "bank-
ruptcy judges," do not have life tenure but do make first-tier adjudicatory
decisions within the federal courts and are key participants in the interre-
lationship between trial court and litigants.54 In the shadows are law
clerks, court clerks, and staff attorneys who influence both decisionmak-
ing and the working environment. Standing outside the federal courts
are another set of federal judges-administrative law judges-who may
be the "federal judge" for many litigants who experience the system and
who make the records reviewed by judges inside the courts. 55
State courts also are difficult to characterize. By definition each
state system is insular, with its own judiciary, rules, doctrine, and ideol-
ogy. The need to look at the specific context and to accept responsibility
drives the request for state-by-state gender bias task forces. Yet, for cer-
tain purposes, all state courts stand in similar relationship to the federal
courts. In short, although "essentialist" claims are made about women,
the federal courts, and state courts (e.g., women are "essentially" wives
and mothers; the experiences of heterosexual white middle class women
Act of 1990, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 775 (1991) (describing civil rights law's inadequate consideration
of distinct discrimination faced by women of color). For discussion of these issues in the
context of the Violence Against Women Act, see Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Vio-
lence against Women of Color: The Intersections of Racism and Misogyny 36-39 (Nov. 10,
1991) (on file with author) (arguments in support of this proposed legislation often have sub-
text that "our"--i.e., white-women are affected and that problem of violence is not only one
for "'othered' women").
According to the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), eight states (Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington) and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have established task forces on racial and ethnic bias in the courts.
Conversation with NCSC staff (Feb. 26, 1992); Racial/Ethnic Bias in the Courts, Bibliography
I, compiled by Jeremy Blank and Phillip Lattimore (NCSC, Jan. 16, 1991) (on file with au-
thor). In addition, the American Bar Association has passed a resolution calling for the study
of race and gender in the federal court system. See ABA House of Delegates, Daily J., Report
of Action Taken at 1991 Annual Meeting I (Aug. 12-13, 1991) ("Resolved that the American
Bar Association supports enactment of federal legislation, or other authoritative measures,
requiring a study of the existence, if any, of racial, ethnic and gender bias in the federal judicial
system. .. "); see also text accompanying note 402 infra (discussing whether state task forces
address issues related to women of color).
53 As of April 1, 1990, 753 people were article III trial judges. See note 88 infra.
54 As of April 1, 1990, 743 people were magistrate and bankruptcy judges. See notes 114-
16 and accompanying text infra.
55 See generally Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in the
Federal Trial Courts, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 909 (1990).
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are "women's experiences"; there are "essential attributes" of judicial
power; family law is governed "essentially" by the states), attention to
the distinctions within all categories is crucial, even as one simultane-
ously invokes the generics of gender, states, and the federal courts.
D. Challenging the Assumptions
Below, I explore empirical information, doctrine, and the jurispru-
dential and ideological assumptions about women in the federal courts to
understand how perceptions about "the quality of the federal bench" and
"the nature of federal law," on the one hand, and how the nature of the
legal problems presumably faced by women, on the other, work together
to support a belief of women's relative absence from the federal courts.
The examination of the interaction of women, the federal courts, and the
state courts is a vast undertaking. Here, I begin by trying to explain the
differing attitudes toward the topic of "gender bias." At first glance, the
disinterest of the federal judiciary in gender bias is puzzling. Some of the
most visible federal litigation of the past decade were "women's" cases, 56
involving reproductive freedom, sexual harassment, and injuries caused
by the interuterine device, the Dalkon Shield.
What underlies both this lack of interest in and opposition to juris-
diction over gender-related injuries is the usually unstated and widely
shared assumption that women are not relevant to the federal courts.
This assumption, in turn, is fueled by an association of women with roles
traditionally governed by state law (marriage, childbearing, and family
care-oversimplified, a "private" world) and a corresponding associa-
tion of the federal courts not with such "domestic" concerns but rather
with commerce, constitutional law, federal statutory enforcement (over-
simplified, a "public" world) in which men predominate. The 1873 deci-
sion in Bradwell v. lllinois57 (which upheld a state law barring women
from practicing law)58 is a classic statement also invoking "nature," of
these divisions. According to one of the concurring Bradwell justices,
women need not be given the right to practice law, for the "paramount
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.... In the nature of things it is not every citizen of
every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and posi-
tion." 59 The dichotomy drawn, between a commercial arena that in-
56 See, e.g., Susan Gluck Mezey, In Pursuit of Equality: Women, Public Policy, and the
Federal Courts vii (1992) (book's purpose is to "expand the literature on women and public
policy by discussing the role of the federal courts, primarily the Supreme Court, in determining
the status of women in America").
57 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
58 See id. at 139.
59 Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). There is irony in the Court's implicit depiction
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1682
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696 1991
December 1991] WOMEN, JURISDICTION, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 1697
cludes law practice and the domestic scene in which women perform
"the offices of wife and mother," roughly parallels assumptions about
state and federal jurisdictional lines. Traditionally, family law (including
the violence done to women in families) has been described as a topic for
state law.
While Bradwell is well-known and often cited, there is another case
deserving of equally close attention that, were it to be read, would under-
cut the assumption of state courts' dominion over family life. In 1859, in
Barber v. Barber,60 the United States Supreme Court upheld the claim of
a woman, invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction and seeking to ob-
tain payment of alimony from the husband from whom she was sepa-
rated.61 Finding a woman capable of having a separate domicile, Barber
is an early juridicial recognition of women's rights and of federal court
jurisdiction over interspousal disputes.62 But Barber has been reinter-
preted in subsequent cases, 63 both to narrow its legal scope and to align it
with the ideological assumptions of Bradwell-that women's roles in the
family are not much a part of the national issues to which federal court
resources should be dedicated.
Below, I map the sources of this ideology of the absence of families
and of women from the federal courts to examine how it is both true and
false. First, women's presumed absence from the federal courts has a
material basis. In several respects, we women are in the federal courts in
smaller, less visible and less powerful roles than are men. The
demographics of this workplace, detailed below, 64 demonstrate dense
concentrations of women as staff, but few as judges and lawyers. As of
the spring of 1990, four of the thirteen appellate courts and sixty of the
ninety-four district courts had no article III judges who were women.65
In contrast to the higher echelons of the federal court work force, a re-
view of federal jurisdiction suggests that women are frequent litigants in
of Myra Colby Bradwell as a homebody. During her efforts to be admitted, Bradwell was also
the publisher of the Chicago Legal News, the first legal newspaper in the West, and a promi-
nent member of the legal establishment. In 1890, the Illinois Supreme Court licensed her to
practice law. K. Morello, supra note 1, at 14-21. For analysis of Bradwell's and other
women's efforts to enter the bar, see Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: "First
Woman," 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 673, 700-15 (1988); see also Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything That Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819, 840-50
(discussing case and Bradwell's efforts "to challenge prevailing legal rules").
60 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
61 See id. at 599-600.
62 See Rogers Smith, "One United People": Second Class Female Citizenship and the
American Quest for Community, 1 Yale J.L. & Human. 229, 254 (1989) ("[T]his relatively
minor case remains the closest the Supreme Court came to enunciating a liberal egalitarian
view of the status of women during the antebellum years.").
63 See text accompanying notes 314-17 infra.
64 See text accompanying notes 85-145 infra.
65 See text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
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the federal courts. However, the dominance of the professionals, who are
overwhelmingly male, coupled with the ways in which federal litigation
is conducted, the low visibility of certain kinds of cases, and the imagined
irrelevance of gender, reinforce the impression of an absence of women.
Although actually present in the federal courts, women are paid little
attention.
Second, this less visible relationship between women and the federal
courts is supported by pervasive ideological, legal, and sociological as-
sumptions and actions. Women, seen as actors in private rather than
public life, are assumed primarily to interact with law as wives, mothers,
and victims of violence, some of which occurs inside homes but does not
deserve the gloss of the word "domestic." Family, in turn, is assumed
not to be much a part of federal jurisdiction or a topic of federal jurispru-
dence. Federal judges repeatedly claim that family law is the "province
of the state," and now disclaim a willingness to understand that claims of
violence motivated by gender are "civil rights" cases appropriate for
their jurisdiction.66 The disowning of family law and of violence directed
against women on the federal side is echoed by the visible presence of
these topics on the state side. Much of the work on gender bias in state
courts, thus far, has looked at women in families, as divorcing parents
disputing custody, as mothers in search of child support awards, and as
victims of violence. 67
Both the equation of women with the family and the reduction of
the law of the family to matters of marriage, divorce, and custody derive
from nineteenth-century images.68 These equations lead to another nine-
teenth-century claim about the relationship between federal and state
court jurisdiction-that family life is governed by the law of the states,
and that the federal courts "ought" not to get involved. But there is no
intrinsic "ought" and nothing "natural" about this jurisdictional rela-
66 For discussion of how this public/private delineation is reproduced in the labor market
and in unions' disinterest in organizing women, see Marian Crain, Feminizing Unions: Chal-
lenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1171-84 (1991). For
discussion of feminist overrejection of public/private distinctions, see Ruth Gavison, Femi-
nism and the Public/Private Distinction (Sept. 1991) (on file with author).
67 Of the 19 state gender bias task force reports reviewed, all addressed family life and
violence against women. See Appendix I (Topics Addressed by State Gender Bias Task Forces)
and Appendix II (Portions of Reports Devoted to Specific Topics in State Gender Bias Task
Forces). See also Joan Entmacher, Dissonant Discourses: Legal Ideology and Feminist The-
ory in the Work of Task Forces on Gender Bias in the Courts 3 (1990) (on file with author,
cited with permission) (of 22 states reporting about "major areas of study" to National Center
on State Courts, 21 "listed domestic violence and 20 listed family law" (footnote omitted)). As
Entmacher comments, taking "the concerns of women-at least, the concerns of some
women" is a "starting point" that is "feminist." Id.
68 The role of the family in creating gender distinctions remains. See Susan Moller Okin,
Justice, Gender, and the Family 170-71 (1989) ("The family is the linchpin of gender, repro-
ducing it from one generation to the next .... ).
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tionship; indeed, some federated systems place family law within the na-
tional sphere.6 9
Two elements are missing from this ideological construction: ac-
knowledgement of the deliberate construction of jurisdictional rules and
doctrine to exclude "domestic relations" from federal court authority70
and acknowledgement of the wealth of federal law that implicitly and
explicitly regulates many aspects of family life. These federal laws of the
family come occassionally from the imposition of constitutional obliga-
tions on state lawmaking and more often from federal statutory regula-
tions on reproduction, welfare, social security and pension benefits, tax
laws, immigration, and bankruptcy, and by virtue of federal governance
of some aspects of the lives of those in the military, in federal territories,
and over Indian tribes.71
Court systems are workplaces, administrative bureaucracies, and
buildings. Court systems are also ideas, constructed from jurisdictional
grants, jurisprudence, histories, and self-made images. From the under-
standing, sketched above, about how state and federal courts see them-
selves in relation to women comes need for changes in practice, rhetoric,
and ideology. Women must press harder to be a part of the federal
courts because of the ideology of the federal courts as well as of the na-
tion, which identifies women with domestic life and then ignores the
needs of that life. The assumption that the federal courts are doing work
central to the nation reiterates the marginalization of the lives and work
of women in national culture. Because the federal courts claim to be and
are understood as the place in which the national agenda is debated and
enforced, women must insist that our presence be recorded and that we
not be summarily sent elsewhere. The "law of the federal courts" needs
to be rewritten to take our presence into account and to examine, criti-
cally, what kinds of family law decisions federal courts do and should
make, how authority over family life is and should be shared among
court systems, and whether both court systems should respond to vio-
lence against women. Simultaneously, federal law must disentangle
women from the net of family life and recognize us as actors in the full
69 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States,
55 Law & Contemp. Probs. -, - (1992) (forthcoming; 1991 manuscript on file with author)
("marriage and divorce and criminal law... are governed by the central government in Can-
ada but by the state governments in the United States").
70 See text accompanying notes 301-51 infra.
71 Several facets of federal court work bring federal judges into family life. Federal courts
are the equivalents of state courts in the lives of those who live in federal territories (a small
percentage of the federal docket). More generally, federal law governs a host of economic
relations that in turn affect family law and sometimes require federal definitions of the family
itself. In addition, federal law sometimes enforces state law decisions on family life and other
times preempts those judgments. See text accompanying notes 198-246 infra.
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range of disputes that are the bases for federal adjudication.
However, the sense of the federal courts as important places for
women to inhabit should not be translated into a presumption that fed-
eral courts are to be preferred to state courts as institutions willing to
attend to women's claims. Here is another place to reject the essentialist
claim that in the very being of one or the other court system lies em-
pathic understanding of women's injuries. Rather, it is the lesson of the
thirty gender bias task forces already underway that bias knows no juris-
dictional boundaries. The diminution of discrimination against women
awaits commitment, conscious decisionmaking, appointment and selec-
tion of judges who have demonstrated concern about the existence of
discrimination, ongoing education, and willingness to uncover new un-
derstandings of how endemic-in the "nature" of law as constituted in
the United States-are injuries done to women.
II
WOMEN'S PLACES IN "THE FEDERAL COURTS"
Women could be in the federal courts as full-time and part-time
employees, specially appointed members of auxiliary committees, wit-
nesses, jurors, spectators, lawyers, and litigants. Women also can be dis-
cussed when the federal courts, as institutions, describe themselves and
report to Congress. Further, women may be the focus of attention in
federal courts' jurisprudence, as topics of opinions, treatises, and
casebooks. It might seem that these statements are so obvious that the
unpacking of the roles and spaces possibly occupied by women in the
federal courts and their literature would be a bizarre and unnecessary
undertaking. But the burden of proof seems to be on us-women-to
document our presence, to justify the need for gender studies in the con-
text of the federal courts, to reframe the domestic/nondomestic distinc-
tions made along state/federal jurisdictional lines, and to challenge the
reduction of women to their roles in families. As a consequence, below I
sketch what is known about the roles women occupy in the federal
courts. This section is devoted to understanding the contemporary con-
tours of federal courts as institutions to learn about the material bases for
women's invisibility. Thereafter, I turn to the conceptual predicates-
the history, doctrine, and commentary-that hide our presence and pro-
vide arguments for further exclusion.
A. The Possible Roles
In many ways, courthouses belong to the people who come to them
daily-as workers. Women might be article III life-tenured appellate
and trial judges; hold term judgeships, such as those of bankruptcy and
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magistrate judges; serve as jurors; work as court interpreters, courtroom
deputies, court reporters, court clerks, bailiffs, probation officers, mar-
shals, law clerks, law librarians, staff attorneys, custodians, janitors, se-
curity guards, and in other staff positions; and be lawyers employed by
federal offices, including the United States Attorneys' Office, the Federal
Public Defenders' Office, and the federal agencies, all of which frequently
litigate in the federal courts.
Not always working literally "in" the federal courts but working in
affiliated roles are yet other individuals, some of whom might be women.
These are individuals who are the specially appointed ad hoc masters,
experts, and monitors; 72 who serve on special committees 73 or on the
Criminal Justice Act panel of appointed lawyers for indigent defen-
dants;74 and who sit as arbitrators or as other providers of alternative
dispute resolution. 75 Also connected, but yet further away, may be the
administrative law judges, whose findings and conclusions are reviewed
by judges in the federal courts. In addition, hundreds of thousands of
lawyers go to the federal courts on behalf of their clients. Those lawyers,
in turn, present witnesses, both lay and expert. Listening to those wit-
nesses may also be women-either as jurors or as spectators who sit in
the courtroom, as part of the press and the public audience.
Prompting all of this work are litigants. The role of litigant can be
parsed to reveal several strands relevant to women. First, laws can ad-
dress a category "women" and endow us with rights or disabilities, make
assumptions about status and work, and create incentives for particular
kinds of behavior. Second, law might not address women directly but
instead the categories of activity that are exclusively or predominantly
done by women or are historically associated with women-due to
biology, political and social practices, or a combination thereof. Third,
laws may neither address women nor women's issues but have a particu-
lar impact on women because, for example, women as a group live longer
than men and have or are given more responsibilities for caretaking than
men. Fourth, gender may not be relevant to the rights sought but may
72 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters); Fed. R. Evid. 706 (court-appointed experts).
73 See, e.g., the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Groups created pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. § 478 (West Supp. 1991).
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988).
75 As of 1988, Congress authorized arbitration in selected district courts. Judicial Im-
provements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IX, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-64
(1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988)). In 1990, the first year in which data were
kept, "3970 cases were referred to arbitration in the 10 participating districts." 1990 Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, at 9. Each
annual report is printed as a second section to the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of
the United States. Hereinafter, each report will be referred to by its year, e.g., "1990 Annual
Report."
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have impact on the remedies provided. On the civil side, for example, to
the extent that damages are keyed to the capacity to earn wages outside
the home, women as a group will be disadvantaged.76 On the criminal
side, if incarcerated women may face different conditions of confinement,
some of them more punitive.77 Women also may be litigants in cases in
which gender plays less easily identified roles, such as in environmental
and in antitrust cases.78 Further, "women" itself may be an insufficient
category to explore, because gender as it intersects with class, race,
ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation may bring distinct legal treat-
ment and harms. All of these roles as litigants rely, in turn, on grants of
jurisdiction to the federal courts.
Before reviewing the eligibility requirements for being a federal
court litigant, one caveat about that status is needed. To be a litigant
"in" the federal courts should not be taken at too literal a level. Some of
women's invisibility in the federal court system may come from the fact
that most litigants "in" the federal courts often are not "in" a building
with that name. A substantial number of all federal cases (women's and
men's, individual and institutional) end without any litigant ever being
seen by any federal judge.79 Decisions based on the papers may diminish
76 See 1990 Report of the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts 190 [hereinafter
Illinois Task Force Report] ("Damage awards based on market notions of future income ig-
nore the substantial amount of nonmarket labor which women perform in our economy");
Minnesota Task Force Report, supra note 44, at 914 ("There is a clear consensus... that
homemakers receive less than the economic value of their services"); Gender and Justice,
Report of the Vermont Task Force on Gender Bias in the Legal System 150-52 (Jan. 1991)
[hereinafter Vermont Task Force Report] (evidence that economic experts use "outmoded sta-
tistics" to calculate lost earning capacity and worklife expectancy "which do not reflect the
increase in the number of women in the paid labor force during the past two decades"). But
see New York Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 81 (noting testimony that in recent years
women and men receive comparable damage awards).
See also Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender, and "The Right to Die," 18
Geriatrics 85, 85 (1990) ("Judicial reasoning about profoundly ill, incompetent men accepts
evidence of mens' treatment preferences to define... personal autonomy .... Judicial reason-
ing about women .. reject[s] or fail[s] to consider evidence of womens' preferences with
regard to life-sustaining treatment.").
77 See, e.g., Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 184 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (stating that
many "privileges" for which prisoners at Kentucky Institution for Women were not eligible
were "available as a matter of course, and in some instances as a matter of right, at all male
institutions in the Kentucky penal system." Included was prohibition on some women's dis-
playing pictures of family on walls of cells), vacated after opinion amended to include federal
constitutional grounds, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989).
78 See Anne E. Simon, Ecofeminism: Information and Activism, 13 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
35, 37 (1991) (providing feminist consideration of National Environmental Policy Act); see
also Lin Nelson, The Place of Women in Polluted Places, in Reweaving the World: The Emer-
gence of Ecofeminism 173 (Irene Diamond & Gloria Feman Orenstein eds., 1990) (discussing
ecofeminist concerns, including impact of health policies on workplaces and communities).
79 Almost 27% of federal civil litigation concludes with "no court action." 1990 Annual
Report, supra note 75, at 157 (table C-5) (46,628 of 173,834 civil cases pending terminated
with "no court action"). Note that these figures exclude "land condemnation, prisoner peti-
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a sense of the presence of litigants, in general, and of their gender in
particular.8 0 The low visibility of litigants in the visual landscape and in
the consciousness of those who work in the federal courts may further
diminish appreciation of the relationship between women and the federal
courts.
Finally, women can be "in" the federal courts by being a topic of
discussion in the written documents created by or written to describe the
courts. While the federal courts have issued opinions since their incep-
tion, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that they
became the object of scholarship and empiricism. Beginning shortly
before the Civil War and blooming in this century, a burgeoning litera-
ture has grown that delineates this legal field, teaches students, and sets
the boundaries of conversations about it. During the twentieth century,
Congress created the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and with it has come reports on caseload and employees.81 This litera-
ture also might record women's presence, might take the question of fed-
eral court jurisdiction over the "private" relations of family members as
an interesting problem to be addressed, or might substantiate our
tions and deportation reviews" as well as data on bankruptcy filings. Another 54% end before
the "pretrial" conference. Id. (94,485 of 173,834 cases). In under 5% of the civil cases and
some 20% of the criminal cases are trials held. Id. at 133 (table C) (in period ending June 30,
1990, 242,346 pending civil cases); id. at 161 (table C-7) (11,502 civil trials completed); id. at
174 (table D) (total criminal cases terminated 43,364); id. at 161 (table C-7) (8931 criminal
jury and nonjury trials completed).
80 Indeed, structurally the article III federal judiciary has created and is increasingly mov-
ing toward a system in which oral evidentiary hearings are not much a part of its system, and a
good deal of adjudicatory work is delegated to magistrate judges and staff. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 631-639 (1988) (authorizing appointment of magistrates). See generally Carroll Seron, The
Roles of Magistrates: Nine Case Studies (1985) (providing in-depth case studies on use of
magistrates by nine districts); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations
to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 3 (critiquing procedural innovations and delegation tech-
niques adopted by article III judges to deal with caseload pressure). Moreover, proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would permit direct testimony to be
written, instead of orally presented. See Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 135-36 (1991) (Proposed Amendment to Rule 43).
81 See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 601, 604 (West Supp. 1991) (duties of Director of Administrative
Office of United States Courts include examining "the state of the dockets of the courts" and
reporting on "business of the courts"). In addition, in 1967, the Federal Judicial Center was
established; its charge includes research on the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1988).
Before the creation in 1939 of the Administrative Office, the Attorney General of the United
States provided reports to Congress. See, e.g., 1935 Annual Report of the Attorney General of
the United States for the Fiscal Year (1935); An Act to Provide for the Administration of the
U.S. Courts and for Other Purposes, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223, 1223 (1939).
In addition to these governmental bodies, groups such as the American Law Institute, the
Institute for Civil Justice (RAND), and the American Bar Research Foundation have spon-
sored research on the federal courts. See, e.g., ALI, Study of the Business of the Federal
Courts (1934); Terence Dunworth, The Institute for Civil Justice, Statistical Overview of Civil
Litigation in Federal Courts (RAND 1990).
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absence.
B. The Workplace
I turn now to fill in the picture by exploring the categories
previewed above. Some of the most readily accessible data are statistics
on employment, provided by a variety of sources.82 Because comprehen-
sive information about race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion is
not available, "women" and "men" become the categories for most of the
jobs described below.83 Further, the composition of the judiciary and its
staff changes with each appointment, retirement, and death. What fol-
lows is a quick sketch, obsolete in its specifics as soon as it is written but
82 The United States Court Directory (Spring 1990), issued by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, provides information on article III active and senior judges, judges in
article I and article III specialized courts (except for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Court and the Court of Veterans Appeals), bankruptcy judges, and on full-time and part-time
magistrates. Very limited information is given about nonjudicial employees. When gender
neutral names appeared, those names were checked against other published sources about
judges, or telephone calls were made.
Upon reaching a specific age or serving a specific time, article III judges may take "senior
status" and continue to sit, but free an "authorized" judgeship for a new appointment. See 28
U.S.C. § 371(a),(d) (1988). Since many senior judges sit at both trial and appellate level and
are a visible part of the decisionmaking, I include them in the numbers that follow. Thus, my
numbers are those of sitting judges, which are not the same as the number of authorized federal
article III judicial positions.
To obtain detailed information on court employees and some information on race, I used
the Annual Report of the Judicial Equal Employment Opportunity Program Administrative
Office of the United States Courts for the Twelve Month Period ending September 30, 1990
(preliminary ed.) [herinafter Preliminary EEO Report]. One problem with using two sources
is that their databases do not cover the identical time periods. However, because the United
States Court Directory data are current as of April 1, 1990, and the Preliminary EEO Report
data are current as of September 30, 1990, the time periods are relatively close.
What follows does not include information on the composition, by gender, of juries. Inso-
far as I am aware, no such information is published.
83 Gender (but not race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religion) can be inferred from the
United States Court Directory, supra note 82. The Preliminary EEO Report does include
statistics on minorities for court employees and for "all active appeals, district, and bankruptcy
judges, and United States magistrates" but not for senior judges. Preliminary EEO Report,
supra note 82, at 7 (the EEO program itself "does not cover judges."). However, no data
identify the percentages of women within these categories. For example, as of September 30,
1990, there were 1481 "judicial officers," of whom 1357 (91.6%) were "white," 70 (4.7%) were
"black," 43 (2.9%) were "Hispanic," 10 (0.7%) were "Asian," 1 (0.1%) was "American In-
dian," and 33 (2.2%) were "handicapped." Id. at 8 (table 1); see also id. at 9 (table 2) (com-
paring "the percentages of women and minorities" but providing no information on women
who are minorities).
One can glean a bit of information on gender and race from other sources. For example,
as of 1985, of 12,093 sitting state judges, 55 were black women. See Nina Burleigh, Black
Women Lawyers: Coping with Dual Discrimination, 74 A.B.A. J. 64, 67 (1988). As of 1985,
5 black women (two on the appellate courts and three on the district courts) were article III
judges. Id. Some federal judges have protested the provision of information about their hiring
practices. See Garry Sturgess, Five Judges Won't Report on Clerks' Race, Gender: Affirma-
tive-Action Rebellion in D.C. Circuit, Legal Times, Aug. 5, 1991, at 1.
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As of April 1, 1990, senior and active article III judges-on all
levels of the federal courts-numbered 978.85 Of the 9 who serve on the
United States Supreme Court, 1 was a woman (11.1%). Of the 216 who
served at the appellate level, 198 (91.7%) were men and 18 (8.3%)
women.86 All 69 of the senior appellate judges were men.3 7 At the trial
level, there were 753 article III judges, of whom 702 (93.2%) were men
and 51 (6.8%) women.88 Of the 223 senior trial judges, 219 (98.2%)
were men and 4 (1.8%) women. 89 Twelve (92.3%) of the 13 judges who
sit on the Court of International Trade were men; 1 (7.7%) was a
woman. 90 Data from state courts may produce a helpful context in
which to read these numbers. Women are estimated to be about 8% of
all state court judges.91
The aggregate data show small percentages of women, but may ob-
84 Time may not alter these numbers substantially. See generally Carl Tobias, The Gender
Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 171, 172-73 (1990) (examining current adminis-
tration's record of appointing women to federal bench).
85 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 3-42, 56-338. The data in the United
States Court Directory are divided by circuit and by district. Each circuit section contains
information on active circuit judges, senior circuit judges, circuit executives, clerks, senior staff
attorneys, and librarians. Each district section contains information on active district judges,
senior district judges, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, district court executives, district clerks,
bankruptcy clerks, chief probation officers, chief pretrial services officers, and federal public
defenders.
The data we were interested in were spread throughout the directory. Rather than list
every page we used to compile our data, we footnote to the sections that contain all of the
relevant circuit data or district data. The data for the special courts, which appear at limited
pages, are referenced to specific page numbers.
Article III courts include the courts of appeals, district courts, and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. Some of these judges also sit on special courts, such as the Multidistrict Litiga-
tion Panel. See notes 99-106 infra.
86 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 3-42.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 56-338. This number includes active and senior status judges.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 48-49. See Appendix III (Gender and the Article III Judiciary).
91 According to the National Center for State Courts, as of December, 1991, an "estimated
8.7% of the 28,713 state court judges (2,498) [were] women." Phillip A. Lattimore, III, Mem-
orandum (Dec. 4, 1991) (on file with author). Gender Bias Task Force Reports provide spe-
cific information. For example, in 1990, the Florida judiciary was 10% women, but women
were "concentrated disproportionately in two urban areas." Florida Task Force Report, supra
note 39, at 211. As of 1989, 9% of Maryland's judges were women. Maryland Task Force
Report, supra note 39, at 97. Five years earlier, in 1985, New York State had 1097 judges, of
whom 9.7% were women-14.3% on the highest court, and 13.6% on the intermediate court
were women. New York Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 151. See Appendix IV (Gender
and the State Judiciary).
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scure that in some appellate and trial courts no women are on the bench.
As of April 1, 1990, in the 13 appellate courts, 4 (30.8%) had no
women;92 of the 94 federal district courts, 60 (63.8%) had no women
article III trial judges.93 Twelve (92.3%) of the 13 chief judges of the
appellate courts were men, and 1 was a woman. 94 At the district court
level, 87 (95.6%)95 chief judges were men, and 4 (4.4%) women. 96 The
Judicial Conference of the United States is comprised of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, as convener, and the chief judge of each circuit,
the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge
from each circuit.97 As of March 13, 1990, this group numbered 27, 2
(7.4%) of whom were women.98
In addition to the layers set forth above, there are specialized courts,
some of which consist of judges appointed specifically to that court and
only to that court (the United States Claims Court,99 the United States
Tax Court,100 the United States Court of Veterans Appeals,10 1 and the
United States Court of Military Appeals 0 2) and others that consist of
already appointed article III judges sitting by appointment on a special
court (the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 10 3 the Judicial Panel
92 The First Circuit had 8 men, the Fourth Circuit 12 men, the Seventh Circuit 14 men,
and the Eighth Circuit 14 men. United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 5, 13, 23-24,
26-27.
93 Id. at 56-338. With the exception of the District of Columbia, which has a single dis-
trict court within it, each of the other circuits has at least one district in which no women sit as
article III trial judges.
94 A woman was the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 3.
95 The districts of Guam, Virgin Islands, and Northern Mariana Islands did not have chief
judges.
96 The districts with women chief judges were the District of Connecticut, the Western
District of Wisconsin, the Western District of Washington, and the Middle District of Florida.
United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 97, 107, 325, 335.
97 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
98 See 1990 Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 1
[hereinafter 1990 Judicial Conference Report]. Seniority plays a role in appointment.
99 After the Supreme Court interpreted the Claims Court as having article III status, see
Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962), Congress amended its legislation to provide
for an article I court with 16 judges, nominated by the President with "advice and consent of
the Senate," and serving for 15-year terms. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 171, 172 (1988).
100 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7443(a),(b),(e) (1988) (article I court with 19 judges, nominated
by the President with the "advice and consent of the Senate" and serving 15-year terms).
101 See 38 U.S.C. § 4053 (1988) (one chief judge, and from two to six associate judges,
holding presidential appointments with "advice and consent" of Senate, sit for 15-year terms).
102 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 941, 942 (Supp. 111990) (President appoints, with "advice and consent
of Senate," from "civilian life" five judges who hold 15-year terms.) Article III judges may sit
by designation as well. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(f) (Supp. I 1989).
103 See Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 21 l(b)(1),
85 Stat. 743, 749 (creating Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals to be selected by Chief
Justice of United States Supreme Court "from the judges of the United States district courts
and the circuit courts of appeals").
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on Multidistrict Litigation,104 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Court,1 05 and the Special Court Regional Rail Reorganization Act' 0 6).
As of April 1, 1990, the United States Claims Court had 16 (94.1%) men
judges and 1 (5.9%) woman judge. 107 Of the 41 judges who served on
the United States Tax Court, 35 (85.4%) were men and 6 (14.6%) were
women. 0 8 No women served on either the United States Court of Veter-
ans Appeals or the United States Court of Military Appeals.' 0 9 All of
the judges who sat on 2 of the special courts comprised of already ap-
pointed article III judges-the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation-were men.110 One
woman was on the Special Court for the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act' I and, as of March of 1992, one woman was on the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act court.1 12
Turning to those who sit within the article III judiciary as designees
or "units," the percentage of women increases, although unevenly. 113 As
of April 1, 1990, the 286 bankruptcy judges included 248 (86.7%) men
and 38 (13.3%) women.' 14 Full-time magistrate judges numbered 301,
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (Chief Justice designates "seven circuit and district judges"
to sit on panel, which determines whether to transfer "civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact" pending in different districts to single judge for "pretrial
proceedings").
105 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1988) (Chief Justice designates seven district judges to "hear ap-
plications for... electronic surveillance;" three district or appellate judges act as "court of
review").
106 See Rules of the Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Rule 4 (codi-
fied at 45 U.S.C. § 719 (1988)). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation appoints two
panels, comprised of six judges, three on a "General Panel" and three on the "Northeast Rail
Service Act of 1981 Panel" (also called the § 1152 panel).
107 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 46-47.
108 Id. at 54-55.
109 Id. at 53; Telephone Conversation with staff at the Court of Veteran Appeals Adminis-
trative Office (Sept. 10, 1991).
110 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 44-45, 51.
M Id. at 50.
112 Unlike the other special article III panels, this court's membership is not listed in the
United States Court Directory. Six men and one woman sit at the trial level; the court of
review is comprised of three men. Telephone Conversation with court personnel (Mar. 4,
1992).
113 Another issue-not explored here-is whether and how gender affects the allocation of
work among bankruptcy judges, administrative law judges, arbitrators, magistrates, article III
trial judges, and appellate judges. Are cases that involve women disproportionately assigned
to "lower echelon" decisionmakers? Such a concern was raised by the National Association of
Women Lawyers that criticized a draft proposal of the FCSC, which had suggested sending
Title VII wrongful discharge cases to arbitration (as "fact specific and seldom implicat[ing]
broader issues of federal law") while not suggesting that black-lung litigation similarly be sent
to arbitration. NAWL testimony, presented by Myrna Raeder, Hearings on the FCSC, San
Diego, Cal. (Jan. 29, 1990) (on file with author).
114 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 56-338. With the caveat that the EEO
data are as of September 30, 1990 and have minor variations in numbers, according to the
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of whom 49 (16.2%) were women;1 15 part-time magistrates numbered
156, of whom 12 (7.7%) were women." 16 Again, the picture looks differ-
ent in the aggregate than it does when individual district courts are con-
sidered. For example, the District of Maine, the Northern District of
New York, the Southern District of Illinois, and the Eastern District of
Washington had no women in any judicial position.117 Hawaii and the
Eastern District of North Carolina each had one woman-serving as a
part-time magistrate.1 18
In contrast to those non-article III judges employed directly by the
judiciary, administrative law judges are governed by civil service rules.
As of April 1991, 1090 people were administrative law judges (ALJs) in
the Social Security Administration; 59 (5.4%) were women.1 19 Here, the
use of the "veteran's preference," approved by the Supreme Court in the
context of a state system, 120 by which veterans are given preferences in
appointment, explains in part the small number of women.121 Since
Preliminary EEO Report, the 296 bankruptcy judges included 282 (95.3%) whites, 9 (3.0%)
blacks, 4 (1.4%) Hispanics, 1 (0.3%) Asian, and no one who was an American Indian or
handicapped. Preliminary EEO Report, supra note 82, at 8 (table I).
115 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 56-338. Of the 309 full-time magis-
trates, 285 (92.2%) were white, 16 (5.2%) black, 6 (1.9%) Hispanic, 2 (0.6%) Asian, 0 Ameri-
can Indian, and 8 (2.6%) handicapped. Preliminary EEO Report, supra note 82, at 8 (table I).
116 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 56-338. According to the Preliminary
EEO Report, whites numbered 152 (96.8%). There were no blacks or American Indians; 3
(1.9%) were Hispanic, 2 (1.3%) were Asian, and 2 (1.3%) were handicapped. Preliminary
EEO Report, supra note 82, at 8 (table I).
117 United States Court Directory, supra note 82, at 138-39, 170-71, 220-21, 323.
118 Id. at 125-26, 236-37.
119 Joan Schaffner Memorandum (Apr. 30, 1991) (on file with author). Compare the data
provided by the Honorable John C. Holmes, ALU Update, A Review of the Current Role,
Status, and Demographics of the Corps of Administrative Law Judges, 38 Fed. B. News & J.
202, 203 (1991) ("Only 5.2 percent of the federal ALJ's are women." While applications of
women are rising, and "women score higher than men on the exam, the Veteran's preference
which adds five or ten points to the applicant's final score... causes men to be ranked higher
overall."). Other judges also are based in administrative agencies. For example, there are 95
authorized Immigration Law Judges, with 3 vacancies as of April, 1991; of that group, 76 were
men and 16 were women. Telephone Conversation with staff at Executive Office of Immigra-
tion Review (Apr. 26, 1991).
120 See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979).
121 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988) authorizes agencies to appoint AIs. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 to .216
(1991) sets forth the procedures. Tests are given, and then, under § 930.203(d), "[a]s many of
the applicants with the highest basic ratings, augmented by veteran preference if applicable"
are to participate in additional hiring processes. "For applicants entitled thereto, the final
passing score will include 5 or 10 veteran preference points." Id. Apparently, before 1984, a
person had to first pass the test, and then received the preference points. Thereafter, the sec-
tion has been interpreted to permit individuals who have not passed the test to pass-via the
veterans' preference-but, as of February 1991, passing the test first once again was required.
See 56 Fed. Reg. 6208-09 (Feb. 14, 1991); Joan Schaffner Memorandum (Mar. 19, 1991) (on
file with author). Layoffs and tenure are also affected by the preference. See 5 C.F.R.
§ 351.501 (1991).
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1984, some 300 ALJs have been appointed, of whom 215 (71.9%) have
had the veteran's preference, and 2(0.9%) were women veterans.1 22
Returning to federal court employees, as of September 30, 1990,
19,188 "full-time permanent and full-time temporary indefinite employ-
ees" served in the federal courts. 123 Of those almost 20,000 workers,
men were 31.2% of the workforce and women 68.8%.124 Employees are
listed under six classifications.1 25 The first, professional (legal), included
all staff attorneys, law clerks, federal public defenders, and research as-
sistants. Of some 3200 people in this category, 53.5% were men and
46.5% women. 126 The next three professional categories (general, ad-
ministrative, and technical) include probation officers, librarians, court
executives, and systems managers. Some 7,550 workers fell into these
classifications, of whom 45.9% were men and 54.1% women.1 27 An-
other group, legal secretaries, numbered about 2,100, of whom almost
99% were women.128 A final grouping, office/clerical, has some 6,300
workers, of whom 87.6% were women.1 29 No information was provided
about custodial, janitorial, and security staff.
These demographic data enable a first understanding of the roles
women play. Many members of the article III judiciary could sit on
panels with other judges, visit with other judges at lunch, ride judges'
elevators and never or rarely see a woman judge. Such "acute occupa-
tional segregation"130 may engender a sense that "women's issues" do
not have much to do with article III courts. The absence of women at
122 See Schaffner Memorandum, supra note 119.
123 Preliminary EEO Report, supra note 82, at 9. What role "worklife policies" play in the
number of women and men in the federal courts is not clear. According to an April 30, 1991
memorandum from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, entitled, "Basic
Administrative Work Schedule for Court Employees," employees are expected to work 40-
hour weeks. Special provisions are made for military and court leave, but no mention is made
of any provisions for child birth or parental leaves or for accomodation of work schedules
because of caretaking obligations. Memorandum from Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Apr. 30, 1991) (on file with author).
124 Preliminary EEO Report, supra note 82, at 10. Of these workers, 76.5% were white,
12.7% black, 8.1% Hispanic, 2.3% Asian, 0.4% American Indian, and 1.0% handicapped.
Id.
125 Id. at 11.
126 Id. at 12 (table 4). Of these, 2930 (91.2%) were white, 122 (3.8%) black, 95 (3.0%)
Hispanic, 58 (1.8%) Asian, 6 (0.2%) American Indian, and 18 (0.6%) handicapped. Id.
127 Id. at 13 (table 5). Of these 7550, 5842 (77.4%) were white, 863 (11.4%) black, 666
(8.8%) Hispanic, 146 (1.9%) Asian, 34 (0.5%) American Indian, and 84 (1.1%) handicapped.
Id.
128 Id. at 14. Of these, 1,793 (83.7%) were white, 193 (9.0%) black, 109 (5.1%) Hispanic,
44 (2.1%) Asian, 4 (0.2%) American Indian, and 16 (0.7%) handicapped. Id. at 14 (table 6).
129 Id. at 15 (table 7). Whites were 4,108 (65.4%), blacks 1,267 (20.2%), Hispanics 693
( 1.0%), Asians 187 (3.0%), American Indian 25 (0.4%), and handicapped 76 (1.2%).
130 This phrase is borrowed from the New York Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 155-
59 (finding "unequal opportunity for women in the court personnel system" in New York).
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high levels of the federal judiciary also may distinguish it from other
public work forces. Recent summaries on women employees of state and
local agencies noted that women "held only 31.3 percent of high-level
state and local government jobs nationwide in 1990, while women in
lower-level jobs acounted for 43.5 percent of the work force."' 131 The
"only" in the press report suggests an expectation that women should by
now have received greater parity. In contrast to the "only 31%" in such
jobs, women in the article III judiciary numbered under 8%.132
2. Affiliated Workers
Federal courts also appoint individuals to do work for and with
them. Exemplary of such appointments are individuals who serve as spe-
cial masters to the United States Supreme Court, as members of advisory
groups at the district court level, and as members of Committees of the
Judicial Conference of the United States. These examples skim the sur-
face of the many affiliations that individuals can have with the federal
courts. 
133
During a sixty-year period from 1930 to 1990, the United States
Supreme Court appointed special masters (who sit as ad hoe adjudicators
in particular cases and whose findings are then reviewed by the Court) in
sixty-one published cases for which eighty-two special masters were des-
ignated.1 34 All were men.13 5 By virtue of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
131 Few Women Found in Top Public Jobs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1992, at A12 (emphasis
added). The underlying information comes from Women Face Barriers in Top Management,
Women in Public Service, Winter 1991-92, at 1, 1. The data are provided by race and gender;
white men are 60.4% of the officials and administrators; black men 5.1%, Hispanic men 2.1%,
Asian men 0.8%, native American men, 0.2%; white women 24.4%, black women 5.1%, His-
panic women 1.2%, Asian women 0.4%, and native American women 0.1%. Id.; see also
Report Finds Women Lag in Senate Roles, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1991, at A29 (citing study
which found that women were 62% of Senate's personal office staff, were "31 percent of the
four highest-paying jobs among Senate aides," but, on average, were "paid 78 percent as much
as male Senate aides were, largely because they remained under-represented in higher-paying
jobs and over-represented in lower-paying jobs").
132 As of April 1, 1990, 8% of the article III appellate judges were women; 7% at the trial
level. See text accompanying notes 86, 88-90 supra, and Appendix III (Gender and the Article
III Judiciary).
133 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988) (appointment of arbitrators in 10 districts in which
court-annexed arbitrations occur); 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 22 (Office of Special
Masters of United States Court of Claims, which decides cases under National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program); id. at 22 (noting 71,853 appointments of indigent defense counsel
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)).
134 A LEXIS search was done using the Supreme Court file and the search terms "special
master" and date ("aft 1979"); "special master" or "special monitor" and date ("aft 1979");
"special master" and date ("aft 1929 and bef 1980"); and "special master" or "special moni-
tor" and date ("aft 1929 and bef 1980"). These searches located hundreds of cases, 61 of
which were relevant. The gender of the special masters was determined by that person's
names, found in the orders appointing the special masters or in the text of the cases themselves.
135 Lee Seltman Memorandum, with the assistance of William Davisson (Feb. 11, 1992) (on
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1990,136 chief judges of all of the district courts appointed "Advisory
Groups" to assist in the creation of district-by-district delay and expense
reduction plans; these new committees were formed by March 1, 1991.
Of the 1,721 people appointed nationwide, 277 (16.1%) were women. 137
The Advisory Groups ranged in size from five to fifty-four members.
While women on the average constituted 16% of the members, there
were four districts in which no women were appointed,1 38 and only seven
in which women comprised 30% of the membership or more.139 When
the appointments were made, women were the chief judges of five district
courts.140 In those five districts, the average percentage of women on
Advisory Groups was 28.6%. The group with the largest percentage of
women in the country--40%-was appointed by a woman chiefjudge.141
The committees of the Judicial Conference provide a final example.
As of the spring of 1991, the Judicial Conference had twenty-nine com-
mittees, including standing committees on issues such as federal
rulemaking and ad hoc committees about concerns such as asbestos and
"cameras in the courts." While some of these committees included only
judges, several had lawyers, administrators, and law professors as well.
Twelve of those committees had no women.142 Only one committee, that
for the International Appellate Judges Conference, had a membership of
more than 40% women, and on the remaining sixteen committees,
women on average were under 13% of the membership.143
file with author). While 82 appointments were made, several were of "repeat players." As a
consequence, 67 men have served as masters in the Supreme Court.
136 28 U.S.C.A. § 478 (West Supp. 1991).
137 Veronica Gentilli Memorandum (Feb. 10, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Advi-
sory Group Membership]. These numbers are derived from lists of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts and of the American Bar Association (all on fie with author).
138 The courts were the Western District of Arkansas, the Southern District of Georgia, the
District of Oregon, and the District of the Northern Mariana Islands. Advisory Group Mem-
bership, supra note 137.
139 The courts were the District of Connecticut, the Central District of Illinois, the District
of Louisiana, the District of New Hampshire, the Southern District of New York, the Western
District of Washington, and the Western District of Wisconsin. Id.
140 Those courts were the Southern District of California (women as 20% of Advisory
Group), the District of Connecticut (women as 30%), the Middle District of Florida (women
as 23%), the Western District of Washington (women as 40%), and the Western District of
Wisconsin (women as 30%). Id.
141 Advisory Group from the Western District of Washington. Id.
142 Those committees were: the Committee on the Administrative Office, the Committee on
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, the Committee on the Budget, the Committee
on Courtroom Security, the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction, the Committee on In-
tercircuit Assignments, the Committee on Long Range Planning, the Committee to Review
Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, the
Committee on Space and Facilities, the Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom,
and the National State-Federal Judicial Council (lists on file with author).
143 The Committees were: the Executive Committee (6 men, I woman), the Committee on
Automation and Technology (13 men, 1 woman), the Committee on the Bicentennial of the
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Of course, were one to want to use these numbers to evaluate the
question of discrimination in selection, a host of additional data would be
needed.144 My purpose here is not to undertake such an evaluation but
to use these data to glimpse the working spaces of "the federal courts."
The many Advisory Groups with small percentages of women corre-
spond to the impression, reported anecdotally, that there are fewer
women lawyers in the federal courts than in the state courts. 145 In com-
mittee work and in the pretrial process (including alternative dispute res-
olution, judicial case management, and settlement conferences), as well
as during trial, judges may interact with relatively few women lawyers.
C. Federal Jurisdictional Boundaries
The small number of article III judges who are women and the rela-
tive absence of women lawyers in the federal courts enable an atmos-
Constitution (11 men, 1 woman), the Committee on the Codes of Conduct (14 men, 1 woman),
the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management (12 men, 3 women), the Com-
mittee on Criminal and Probation Administration (10 men, 3 women), the Committee on De-
fender Services (9 men, 1 woman), the Committee on the Judicial Branch (11 men, 2 women),
the Committee on Judicial Ethics (13 men, 1 woman), the Committee on Judicial Resources
(13 men, 3 women), the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate System (11 men, 4
women), the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (11 men, 2 women), the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules (8 men, 1 woman), the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules (14 men, 1 woman), the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (11 men, 2 women), and
the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos (6 men, 1 woman). Id.
144 Relevant to this discussion is information about criteria for selection, the age of those
selected, the role played by law firms and the private sector in putting forth names, the number
of women in the relevant pools, and the like. For example, women as a percentage of law
school classes has grown over the past decades, from 23.5% in 1975, to 34% in 1980, to 42%
in 1989. Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, A Review of Legal Education
in the United States, Law Schools and Bar Admissions Requirements (ABA, 1990; 1981;
1976). But percentages of law students are insufficient for the analysis. See Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1750,
1816-39 (1990) (discussing way in which "pools" are constructed and influenced by under-
standing of jobs as belonging to men or women).
145 In September of 1991, the California Bar announced a survey of the profession: women
comprised 26% of the state's bar. Susan H. Russell & Cynthia L. Williamson, Demographic
Study of the State Bar of California (Aug. 1991). In addition, 26% of all the White bar mem-
bers were women; 31% of Hispanics, 41% of Blacks, and 37% of Asian bar members were
women. Id. at 9. See also Philip Hager, Minority Mix Expanding in Legal Profession, L.A.
Times, Sept. 14, 1991, at A21. To my knowledge, no comparable data are yet available for
federal courts. Some evidence of either the absence of women or the absence of attention to
the fact of women's presence comes from a recent report of the Seventh Circuit. See Interim
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit [hereinafter In-
terim Report on Civility of the Seventh Circuit] (Apr. 1991) (on file with author). While
detailing and decrying the absence of civility, no discussion is provided about whether
women's experience of incivility (including gender bias) is different from that of men. See
Catherine Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 Md. L. Rev. 945 (1991); Karen
Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics I
(1990).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1682
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1712 1991
December 1991] WOMEN, JURISDICTION, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 1713
phere in which little attention may be paid to the impact of gender on the
federal courts. 146 But the absence of women in the higher echelons of the
work force could be offset by the presence of women as litigants. The
possible roles for women litigants are bounded by interpretation and ap-
plication of jurisdictional rules that delineate the federal courts from
other adjudicatory bodies, and particularly from the state court systems.
Thus, the next step is to examine federal jurisdiction to learn whether
any assumptions about women's presence or absence might flow from the
grants of authority and their exercise. Below, I detail what current fed-
eral court jurisdiction rules are and what, as a consequence, the federal
caseload looks like. Given pending legislation to alter jurisdiction and
the contemporary controversy about a claimed caseload "crisis," many
commentators and legislators have urged restructuring federal court ju-
risdiction. Understanding the jurisdictional structures is a necessary
predicate to considering where women as litigants might fit, in theory,
and how federal courts ideology might either reaffirm our presence or
anticipate our absence.
Article III of the United States Constitution sets the boundaries of
the federal courts' authority. As is more than familiar, under the Consti-
tution, federal courts can hear a range of matters, including all cases
"arising under" the Constitution and federal law; all cases "affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;" all cases "of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction;" and "controversies" to which the
United States is a party, between two or more states, between a state and
citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citi-
zens and foreigners, and between citizens claiming land in other states. 147
146 Should one want to know whether employees experience gender bias, information avail-
able provides little insight. In 1980, Congress enacted the Judicial Disability and Discipline
Act, which permits complaints to be filed against judges who act in a manner "prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration" ofjustice. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1988). Liti-
gants as well as employees may file such complaints. In 1990, 310 complaints were filed na-
tionwide, 94 of which were for "prejudice/bias." See 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at
34 (table 23). However, no information is available recording whether gender bias was alleged.
Employees and prospective employees also may fie complaints against the judiciary as an
employer. According to public data, for the year ending in September of 1990, 20 complaints
were filed, 8 of which alleged sex discrimination. See Preliminary EEO Report, supra note 82,
at 24-25. While the fact of resolution is reported, no information about either the nature of the
problem or the response is provided.
147 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Extensive literature exists about both the meaning of these
phrases and of congressional control over federal court jurisdiction. See generally Akhil R.
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,
65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985) (interpreting article III); Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitu-
tional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 17 (1981) (analyzing constitutional limits on Congress's attempts to restrict
federal court jurisdiction).
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Congressional statutes have flowed from these jurisdictional fonts,148
and, on occasion, federal judges decline to exercise some of the jurisdic-
tion that they are permitted by the Constitution and Congress.
Both the volume and the type of case are relevant to the search for
women litigants and the implications of their presence. The largest set of
filings are in bankruptcy; in 1990, 725,484 bankruptcies were filed. 149
While bankruptcy filings far outstrip the rest of the federal civil docket
(roughly 220,000 cases annually1 50), bankruptcy cases occupy a special
place in the docket--dominant yet discrete, sometimes considered not
fully "cases," and adjudicated, at the first instance, by specialized bank-
ruptcy judges. Looking at the rest of the civil filings, cases fied by "pri-
vate" parties who raised federal questions, including claims of violation
of constitutional rights or of federal statutory rights such as those pro-
tected by federal environmental, tax, social security, patent, and copy-
right laws, were 48% of the docket.151 In some 57,000 cases (about 26%
of the civil cases), the jurisdictional basis was diversity jurisdiction.152
The United States was a party to another 56,300 cases.1 53 On the crimi-
nal side, some 50,000 filings represented a growing criminal caseload, as
the federal government prosecuted more drug-related activity. 154
Juxtaposed against the current caseload are proposals from those
who urge revision, including reallocating work to state courts155 and to
148 As many have pointed out, some of the jurisdictional grants relate to the nature of the
case (e.g., admiralty, federal question cases), while other jurisdictional grants depend upon the
identity of a party (e.g., ambassadors, citizens of different states). See Amar, supra note 147, at
229. For discussion of the history of article III, see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132
U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984); Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of
1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421.
149 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 22.
150 1990 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 98, at 5 (number of civil filings in 1989 was
223,112, declining 7% overall from the year before); 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 6
(217,879 cases in 1990).
151 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 8 (table 6) (103,938 federal question "private"
cases out of 217,879 total filings.) These cases can be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)
(federal question jurisdictional grant) or under special jurisdictional statutes provided for cer-
tain kinds of cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988) (civil rights claims).
152 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 8 (table 6) (57,183 (26%) of 217,879 civil filings);
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (requiring citizens from different states and amount in controversy
in excess of $50,000).
153 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 8 (table 6) (United States, or sub-entities thereof,
was a plaintiff in 31,763 cases, a defendant in 24,537 cases).
154 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 10-11 (table 8) (48,904 cases filed in 1990; prose-
cutions of drug offenses increased 6% in 1990, and 15% in 1989).
155 See, e.g., FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 35-54 ("Reallocating Business Between the
State and the Federal Systems"). A central issue of federal courts jurisprudence is what should
be the respective roles of the federal and state courts. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story:
Book Review of Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 102 Harv.
L. Rev. 688 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L.
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non-article III judges. 156 I take from a large literature two proposals as
exemplary of the efforts to draw lines between court systems. The first,
by Richard Posner, seeks to create "a theory of federalism" 157 from
which to determine state/federal jurisdictional lines. According to his
view, "optimal" allocations recognize both the desirability and limits of
decentralization. 158 Federal power is needed to take into account both
the need for substantive lawmaking by the federal courts and the lack of
structural independence of the state judges, who are elected and thus
may be more dependent on popular approval than those federal judges
who have life tenure.15 9 On the other hand, state authority is desirable to
enable "political competition" and to avoid the threat of "monopoly." 
160
Attentive to what he labels "costs," "benefits," and "externalities, '1 61
Posner seeks both to explain current jurisdictional lines and to advocate
others. Key to his line-drawing is the determination of whether federal
law imposes "interstate externalities" 162 that Posner believes state judges
will interpret narrowly to avoid harms to their own states.1 63 In his view,
federal jurisdiction is needed, for example, when one state can impose an
externality on another by permitting misbehavior that causes harm
outside its borders, or by failing to protect against political corruption in
states,164 or when "economies of standardization" exist. 1 65 Unrelated to
externalities, Posner also would give his presumptively independent fed-
eral judges "responsibility for enforcing such federal rights as are likely
Rev. 1141 (1988). In contrast, relatively little attention is paid to the relationship among fed-
eral courts, tribal courts, and state courts. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1989).
156 See, e.g., FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 55-69 ("Creating Non-Judicial Branch Forums
for Business Currently in the Federal Courts").
157 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 172 (1985).
158 See id. at 175-81.
159 See id. at 172-75. Posner, who assumes that judges "act in accordance with their ra-
tional self-interest," id. at 172, argues not only that life tenure protects judges from "retribu-
tion" but also that its guarantee of employment-until-death makes other jobs less attractive.
See id. Posner's analysis of the incentives of federal judges does not include the impact of
magistrate and bankruptcy judges, neither of which have life tenure, on federal adjudication.
160 Id. at 173.
161 Id. at 174-75.
162 Id. at 175.
163 For example, Posner would constrict but not eliminate diversity jurisdiction. He argues
that when local residents are tied economically to nonresidents, state court protection of its
own residents will result in equal law application to nonresidents but, when tort victims are
nonresidents and the "parties were strangers before the accident, the theory predicts that the
resident will receive favored treatment from the courts of his state." Id. at 176. Posner argues
that the local identification of state judges also may justify retaining federal court authority
over cases in which the United States is a defendant under the Federal Torts Claims Act. See
id. at 177.
164 See id. at 177-78 ("federal authorities will be less corruptible").
165 Id. at 178 (using admiralty as example).
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to be asserted by people who are politically disfavored in state courts...
because they lack effective political power in the state." 166
Erwin Chemerinsky and Larry Kramer offer a different approach-
what they have called "a minimal model" of federal court jurisdiction,
crafted to respond to those who call for narrowing federal jurisdictional
lines. 167 Chemerinsky and Kramer identify the "six major functions" of
the federal courts to include the enforcement of the United States Consti-
tution, "protecting the interests of the federal government as a sover-
eign," umpiring "interstate disputes," "assuring uniform interpretation
and application of federal law," "developing federal common law," and
overseeing federal administrative adjudication. 168 Unlike Posner, who
links most federal jurisdictional needs to economic analyses about the
imposition of externalities, Chemerinsky and Kramer start with an as-
sumption of "value choices" and of the needs of the federal government
to pursue its agenda through its courts. 169
Given the current and proposed federal jurisdictional lines, I return
again to the central question: is there anything in the quality of adjudica-
tors or in the "nature" of the cases presented to them-either in the cur-
rent federal docket or in proposed dockets-that would lead one to
conclude that bias against women is kept to a minimum in the federal
judicial system? The first obvious answer is that nothing in these lines a
priori either screens women out or protects against bias operating against
women. Indeed, within these jurisdictional parameters have come major
cases involving women-including constitutionally-claimed reproductive
freedom, statutorily-based antidiscrimination claims, and the massive
Dalkon Shield bankruptcy. Further, these cases could remain federal
cases were either Posner's or Chemerinsky's and Kramer's proposals to
become law. Moreover, under both theories, some of the jurisdictional
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act might be welcome, either
to enforce federal law or to provide protection for those with less polit-
166 Id. at 180.
167 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L.Rev. 67, 77-94; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary's Bicentennial, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 423, 433 (1989) ("What this small portion of adjudicators [article III judges] should do
is a painful but critical question."); Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal
Courts, 7 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 115, 134 (1991) (discussing FCSC's "controversial argu-
ment" of "disfavoring increasing the number of judges in the future as a long-term solution in
favor of reducing the number of cases allowed in federal court").
168 See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 167, at 77-87.
169 See id. at 74-77; 93-95. According to Kramer, "Posner's analysis suggests leaving most
civil rights cases to state courts." Larry Kramer (Reporter), A Minimal Model and Some
Priorities for Federal Jurisdiction, in 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and
Subcommitee Reports 134 (July 1, 1990).
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ical power. 170 Below, I amplify the areas in which women are litigants in
the federal courts.
D. Women as the Category
Women qua women (in the essentialist sense) are a topic of federal
law, thus bringing women within the "federal question" jurisdictional
grants, either in the Posnerian sense, in need of federal rights protection,
or 6 la Chemerinsky and Kramer,'falling within the interests of the fed-
eral courts in uniform federal law interpretation. Federal statutes men-
tion the category "women" in hundreds of instances, 171 including
banning discrimination against women, delineating behaviors for women,
protecting women against violence, and monitoring women who are con-
victed of crimes.
Women have struggled to obtain recognition as holders of federal
constitutional rights, and they have achieved some, but by no means
comprehensive, constitutional protection from discrimination based on
sex. 172 In addition to the constitutional regime, many federal statutes
specifically outlaw discrimination against "women." 1 73 Examples in-
clude prohibitions on discrimination in employment, 74 in immigra-
170 How Posner would decide the costs and benefits is not clear. If a man crossed a state
line to do harm to a former spouse 'and then returned to his home state, the home state might
have little incentive (and no jurisdiction) to pursue him. The state in which the injury oc-
curred has Posnerian incentives but may lack resources or be subject to corruption, described
by Posner as conditions that prompt the need for federal jurisdiction. See R. Posner, supra
note 157, at 177-78.
171 A LEXIS search using the U.S. Code file and the words woman/women/girl/mother/
wife/wives/sister/widow/pregnant/pregnancy/daughter/female/sex/sexual/gender located
more than 500 documents. Narrowing the search to ask only for these words in the headings
of statutes provided a list of 239 statutes, some of which were duplications. Note that this
search does not provide any information on the relative frequency of women in federal law,
since I have counted neither the number of federal statutes nor the time those statutes refer to
men/boys/father/sons/brother/widowers. The purpose of the search was to consider whether
women were present at all, in their capacity as "women," in federal law.
172 See Symposium, Women and the Constitution, 6 Law & Ineq. J. 1 (1988); H. Kay, supra
note 2, at 20-49. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (holding
federal statute denying comparable benefits to women and men in violation of fifth amend-
ment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (finding preferential treatment of men by state
probate code unconstitutional). But see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-81
(1979) (upholding veterans' preference despite disparate impact on women).
173 Again trying to scan to get a sense of the volume, a LEXIS search of the U.S. Code file
and the words woman/women/female/gender/sex/sexual within 25 words of discriminate/
discrimination retrieved 222 sections. Some of the statutes address other groups as well; none
currently, to my knowledge, attempt to respond to the specific forms of discrimination suffered
by women of color.
174 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-16 (1988) (Title VII); see also 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (1988) (prohibiting government employees from discriminating in civil
service employment on basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 29 U.S.C. § 206
(d)(1) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination "between employees on the basis of sex by paying
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tion,175 in educational programs receiving federal funds, 176 in the
development of energy programs, 17 7 in the composition of the boards of
directors of the Federal Reserve System, 178 and in the provision of
credit. 179
Federal statutes not only ban discrimination against women. Some
federal legislation explicitly recognizes groups of women, including "The
National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution,"180 and
the "Blue Star Mothers of America."""1 While many of these statutes
provide only federal acknowledgment for such groups, a few describe
roles for women. The statute recognizing the Girl Scouts of America
states that girls will learn "the qualities of truth, loyalty, helpfulness,
friendliness, courtesy, purity, kindness, obedience, cheerfulness, thrifti-
wages" unequally). One aspect of employment discrimination law that has received a good
deal of public attention is prohibitions on sexual harassment and the need to understand this
problem from the perspective of the person harassed. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
879 (9th Cir. 1991) (relying on "reasonable woman" standard); Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-10 (M.D. Fla. 1991), appeal pending (viewing harassment
from vantage point of woman).
175 See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1988 & West Supp. 1991)
(issuing of visas, with some exceptions, not to be based on "race, sex, nationality, place of
birth, or place of residence, except as specifically provided" elsewhere). For an example of an
immigration rule that granted citizenship to "foreign-born offspring of male American citizens
but denied citizenship to the foreign-born offspring of female American citizens," see
Wauchope v. Department of State, 756 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
176 See Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a)(1988) ("No
person... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."); Women's Educational Equity Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3041(b) (1988) ("The
Congress finds.., that educational programs... are frequently inequitable as such programs
relate to women .... "). Title IX was amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 28, 28-29 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)), to define
programs more broadly than the Supreme Court had in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555, 570-74 (1984) (limiting Title IX coverage to programs receiving funds rather than to
institutions receiving funds). See also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 112 S. Ct.
1028, 1034 (1992) (allowing damages); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703
(1979) (finding implied cause of action under Title IX).
177 See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1988) (stating congressional
policy to coordinate development of energy programs and use); id. § 5891 ("No person shall
on the ground of sex be excluded from participation in, be denied a license under, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity carried on or
receiving Federal assistance . . ").
178 See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) (directors shall be chosen "without
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, or national origin").
179 See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1988) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation on "basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age").
180 36 U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (recognizing organization "for patriotic, historical, and educa-
tional purposes").
181 36 U.S.C. §§ 941-958 (1988) (creating and organizing corporation); see also 36 U.S.C.
§§ 91-105 (1988) (American War Mothers); 36 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2415 (1988) (American Gold
Star Mothers); 36 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2815 (1988) (Navy Wives Clubs of America); 36 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2916 (1988) (National Society, Daughters of the American Colonists).
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ness, and kindred virtues... as a preparation for their responsibilities in
the home and for service to the community." 18 2 Women are not only
treated as a category by federal law in their work in such voluntary as-
sociations. Federal military law also makes distinctions on the basis of
sex and sexual orientation, thereby constructing and enforcing certain
gendered roles for both women and men.183
Other federal legislation is directed at protecting women from eco-
nomic or physical violence or at controlling women who are themselves
the perpetrators of such violence. Since 1910, federal law has prohibited
the interstate transportation of women for "any immoral purpose." 1 84 In
governance of both Indian tribal territories"1 5 and the federal military
enclaves, federal law proscribes violent crime, including rape,186
although such protection does not extend to women who are victims of
but married to persons governed by military law. 187 The Federal Rules
182 36 U.S.C. § 33 (1988). The statute about the Boy Scouts of America prescribes different
attributes for men-to-be-specifically to "do things for themselves and others, .... [and to
learn] patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues." 36 U.S.C. § 23 (1988).
183 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 499 (1991); see also Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge,
Military Women in Nontraditional Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on
Homosexuals, 13 Harv. Women's L.J. 215, 220 (1990) (discussing how women and lesbians
were "special targets for discharge" in 1980s).
184 White Slave Traffic Act ch. 395, §§ 1, 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421 (1988)) ("any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported... any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose
... shall be deemed guilty of a felony"). In 1986, Congress amended the section to substitute
the word "individual" rather than "woman or girl," or "female." Child Sexual Abuse and
Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5, 100 Stat. 3510, 3511 (1986). For earlier
federal regulation of sexuality and reproduction, see Comstock Act of 1873, 17 U.S. Stat. 598
(felony offense to transport "obscene, lewd, or lascivious book... designed or intended for the
prevention of conception or procuring of abortion").
185 Prior to the 1986 amendments, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 provided: "Any Indian who commits
against the person... rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained
the age of sixteen years .... shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982). Section 1153 was amended in 1986 to incorporate provisions of the
Sexual Abuse Act of 1986. See Pub. L. 99-646, § 87, 100 Stat. 3620 and Pub. L. 99-654, 100
Stat. 438, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2241-2245 (1988). 18 U.S.C. § 2241 now states that
"[w]hoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States... know-
ingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act.., by fore ... or by threatening" shall
be guilty of an offense." See also Pub. L. No. 99-654, § 3(a)(5), 100 Stat. 3660, 3663. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1988) ("Any Indian who commits against the person... a felony under chapter 109A
... shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the
above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States").
186 According to the Judicial Impact Statement, S. 15, supra note 26, at 5, in 1990, there
were some 48,000 criminal cases filed: "562 involved assault, 433 involved sex offenses ... and
65 involved kidnapping."
187 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1988) provides: "Any person subject to this chapter who commits
an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, by force and without her consent, is
guilty of rape .... ." See United States v. Wilhite, 28 M.J. 884, 885 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989) ("Car-
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of Evidence regulate the inquiry during trial about a victim's prior sexual
history. 188 Federal sentencing guidelines provide punishments for both
"rape" and "aggravated rape."' 189 Federal legislation directs the Na-
tional Center for the Prevention and Control of Sex Offenses to study and
investigate "the effectiveness of existing Federal, State, and local laws
dealing with sex offenses." 190 The regulation of pornography is also a
topic of federal adjudication; federal constitutional law has been used to
preempt local legislation aimed at protecting women subjected to
pornography. 191
Federal statutes address women as convicted criminals. While fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines state that the sex of a defendant is "not rele-
vant in the determination of a sentence," 192 case law currently debates
the relevance of women's childcare responsibilities to sentencing, 193 as
well as what role gender plays in prosecutorial charges and as a mitigat-
nal knowledge under... 10 U.S.C. § 920, requires, as an essential element, proof that the
victim is not the accused's wife."); United States v. Carver, 12 M.J. 581, 583 (A.F.C.M.R.
198 1) ("The non-marital status between the victim and the accused at the time of the act is an
essential element of rape.") (citation omitted).
188 Fed. R. Evid. 412 ("Sex Offense Cases: Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior"). The
Violence Against Women Act would modify this rule. See S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 151
(1991) ("Sexual History in All Criminal Cases"); see also Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered,
1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 413 (discussing relationship between gender and Federal Rules of
Evidence).
189 Some women's advocacy groups criticize the guidelines for punishing rape relatively less
harshly than other offenses, and then providing for "enhancements" if an "abduction" is in-
cluded. See United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual §§ 2A3.1, IBLI
(Nov. 1990) [hereinafter U.S. Sentencing Guidelines]; Analysis of Federal Rape Sentences, by
the Violence Against Women Act Task Force, convened by the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund (on file with author).
190 42 U.S.C. § 9511(a)(1)(A) (1988).
191 See American Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330-32 (7th Cir. 1985) (in-
validating Indianapolis antipornography ordinance on first amendment grounds), afl'd 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
192 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 189, § 5H1.10.
193 Compare id. § 5H1.4 (permitting sentencing court to take into account "extraordinary
physical impairment") with United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 136-39 (1st Cir. 1990) (re-
versing district court that, relying on "defendant's relationship with her husband ... and her
present physical condition" of pregnancy, had granted downward departure from prescribed
guideline range; "pregnancy of convicted female felons is neither atypical nor unusual"), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 353 (1990). Compare U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 189, § 5HI.6
(stating that family responsibilities are not "ordinarily relevant" to application of guidelines)
with United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that district court deci-
sion to consider defendant's young children was error; "Mrs. Brand's situation [two children
ages seven and one and a half, one to be sent to foster care, the other to her grandmother],
though unfortunate, is simply not out of the ordinary"--at least not for women), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 585 (1990); United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (al-
lowing departure from guidelines for risk of loss of child custody grounds); and United States
v. Gerard, 782 F. Supp. 913, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that "aggravating or mitigating
circumstances," such as defendant being "sole care provider for her two teenage children" and
defendant's voluntary efforts at restitution and cooperation justify departure from guidelines).
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ing factor in sentencing. 194 Once incarcerated, women are sent to one of
nine federal prisons that house approximately five thousand women pris-
oners in the federal system; 195 these women constitute 7.6% of the fed-
eral prison population.' 96 A special "Board of Advisors" provides
assistance to the director of the Federal Prison System on how to "rec-
ommend ways and means for the discipline and training" of women
prisoners.1 9 7
E. Federal Laws of the Family
In addition to addressing women as a class, many federal statutes
relate to women in family settings as mothers, as caregivers, as pregnant
or possibly pregnant, as individuals seeking abortions, as users or aspir-
ing users of reproductive technology, as dependents, and as heads of
households. 198 Supreme Court case law has spread a layer of federal con-
stitutional requirements atop state family laws 99 and resulted in discus-
sion of the "constitutionalization" of family law. Less emphasis has been
placed on identifying the extensive federal statutory regime that ad-
dresses family issues. While federal law thus far has not regulated di-
rectly either the marriage, divorce, or custodial relations of divorcing
parents, federal law does govern a host of legal and economic relations
that do affect and sometimes define family life.
Several federal statutes speak specifically to family life, and some of
these statutes involve the federal courts in enforcement and implementa-
194 See, e.g., United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that district court's observation that male defendant charged more harshly than female defen-
dant established prima facie showing of prosecutorial gender-based discrimination and re-
manding for fact-finding); United States v. Johnson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1510, at *4-*27
(9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1992) (holding that battered woman's fears may be grounds for reduction of
sentence).
195 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Facilities 1990, Federal Bureau of Prisons, at 7, 16, 19, 32, 37, 54,
55, 57, 71. In addition, there are four federal facilities that house women pretrial detainees.
196 Bureau of Prisons, BOP Research, 10/11/91 (data as of August, 1991) (on file with
author).
197 See 18 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (1988) (providing for custody of
convicted persons).
198 Once again, technology provides a window into the number of times federal statutes
mention the words abortion, reproduction, pregnancy, childbearing, and parenting. A LEXIS
search stopped after it retrieved more than 500 documents. When narrowed to look only for
the word pregnant/pregnancy, 135 sections were found.
199 See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92 (1982) (declaring a year-from-birth statute
of limitations on paternity suits unconstitutional); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755
(1982) (holding New York standard of proof in termination of parental rights unconstitutional
under due process clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 274-84 (1979) (holding sex-specific ali-
mony statute unconstitutional); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 (1978) (striking down
Wisconsin statute restricting marriages of people with child support obligations under equal
protection clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (ruling that equal protection and
due process prohibit state from banning interracial marriage).
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tion of the policies set forth. For example, Congress has regulated rela-
tions among parents and children in legislation such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC),2°° the Child Protection Act of
1984,201 the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Re-
form Act of 1978,202 the Federal Child Support Enforcement Act,20 3 the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980,204 and the Sexual Abuse
Act of 1986.205 Other statutes, such as the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act,206 regulate issues unique to women.
Federal law also provides particular definitions and regulation of
families by its rules on taxation, pensions, bankruptcy, and social welfare
programs, as well as when members of those families are in the military,
in Indian tribes, or subject to immigration law. Federal tax and social
welfare laws define households, how many people can "head" them, and
who can be "dependents. '20 7 The literature on federal taxation has long
200 Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & West Supp. 1989) ("encouraging the care of dependent chil-
dren in their own homes or in the homes of relatives").
201 Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2255, 2516
(1988)). Section 2251 states, "[A]ny person who employs... any minor to engage in... any
sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished."
202 Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5105 (1988 &
Supp. 1 1989). Section 5202, repealed Pub. L. No. 100-707, tit. I, § 108(c), 102 Stat. 4708
(1988), called for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect; § 5111 calls for federal development of "model adoption legisla-
tion" and of a "national adoption and foster care information data gathering and analysis
system."
203 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988 & West Supp. 1989) (developing federal standards to assist
states in obtaining parental support from absent parents).
204 Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-73 (1980).
205 Pub. L. No. 99-654, § 2, 100 Stat. 3660, 3660-64 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
2245 (1988)).
206 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988))
(defining discrimination "because of sex" to include but not be limited to "because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"); see also California Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286-87 (1987) (referring interchangeably to both "preg-
nant women" and "pregnant workers").
207 See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 49-51 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding "marriage
penalty" on two-wage earning married couple and relying on "wide latitude" of Congress to
regulate taxes in manner that affects family), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 947 (1983); Deborah H.
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 Tax L. Rev. 121,
130-35 (1989) (describing federal Tax Code rules for individuals-specifically with respect to
dependency exemptions and urging revised simplified tests); id. at 135-39 (describing federal
Tax Code rule on marital status and on "abandoned spouse"); id. at 139 (discussing "head of
household" test); see also Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 374 (1988) (upholding
1981 amendment to Food Stamp Act that prohibited any household in which member was on
strike from becoming eligible for food stamps or receiving increase in allotment for stamps);
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608-09 (1987) (upholding statutory scheme that linked Aid to
Families of Dependent Children to the number of members of a household); Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U.S. 635, 642-43 (1986) (upholding eligibility for food stamps based on "household" unit
against equal protection challenge); Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law,
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debated how tax law affects families and how families affect tax law; as
Boris Bittker put it, the Internal Revenue Code is full of answers about
the "status of marriage and the family. '20 8 Federal law regulates pen-
sions, and many of those regulations "preempt state law divorce divi-
sions. '' 20 9 State courts also have concluded that federal social security
benefits are similarly beyond the reach of state law when determining
property divisions in divorce. 210 The 1984 amendments to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) give surviving spouses a
forced share of pension rights.2 " Federal law governs the division of
48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 491, 492-94, 534-37 (1987) (discussing eligibility of "stepchildren" for
federal benefits under Immigration and Nationality Act and Old-Age Survivors and Disability
Insurance Program under Social Security Act and that some, but not all, federal definitions of
stepfamilies expressly refer to state law). Federal constitutional law also affects state regula-
tions of these issues. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (hold-
ing unconstitutional city ordinance limiting occupancy of dwelling to family members).
208 Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389, 1392
(1975); see also Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective,
28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125, 1157-59 (1981) (discussing taxation of unmarried cohabitants); Grace
Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives
and Mothers, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49 (1972) (comparing United States tax policy on working wives
and mothers with those of other nations); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a
Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1980) (arguing for marriage-
neutral tax system); James A. Nitsche, Income Taxation of the Family After the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 26 J. Fam. L. 715 (1987-88) (criticizing provisions of 1986 Act relating to family
income tax planning); Schenck, supra note 207, at 143-49 (outlining child care deductions); id.
at 159-66 (discussing deductibility of child support and alimony payments); Laura A. Davis,
Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 197 (1988) (examining problems raised by Tax Code's aggregation of working wife's in-
come with that of her husband); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh
Look (Feb. 1, 1992) (examining incentives of Tax Code that affect working parents) (on file
with author).
209 Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 264, 288 & n.125
(1989) (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581-91 (1979)). In Hisquierdo, the
Court described the states' "guiding hand" in the "'whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child ... ' See Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)), but relying on prior case law that had invalidated state
property divisions of Railroad Retirement Act funds to "forestall... injury to federal rights")
Id. at 582. Concluding that Congress, and not the state courts, was to decide whether the
divorced worker benefitted "alone" or whether the benefits accrued to the former spouse as
well, the Court overruled the state division of property. See id. at 589-91.
210 See Becker, supra note 209, at 288 n.125 (citing, inter alia, Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d
115, 120-21 (Ariz. 1981)).
211 Congress amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988), to "provide for greater equity ... for workers and their spouses and
dependents." The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426, 1426, is
codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C. While the 1984 amendments also
provided that "qualified domestic relations orders" (QDRA) are exempt from general ERISA
preemption rules, some federal preemption remains. See, e.g., Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d
1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA preempts "any state community property law
which arguably provides a predeceasing nonemployee spouse with a testamentary interest in a
fully vested surviving employee spouse's pension benefits"); John H. Langbein & Bruce A.
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assets of those in the military.2 1 2 In addition, federal law structures some
of the family relationships within Indian tribes in the United States.
213
Federal benefits law provides an additional example of federal stat-
utes that not only structure family life but also have distinct effects on
women.214 Given that women live longer than men and a greater per-
centage of the poor are women, 215 they comprise a majority of the pool of
social security claimants, 216 are possible recipients of targeted aid pro-
grams to families, and are among those with disabilities. 217 According to
Mary Becker, in "every category, whether collecting as independent cov-
ered workers or as dependents of male workers, women received, on av-
erage, less than male workers. ' 218  Becker concludes that the system
Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 33-443 (1990) (reviewing federal pension laws).
212 In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the Supreme Court held that military
retirement pay, governed by federal law, could not be treated by states as community property.
See id. at 232-36. While once again stating that the "'whole subject of the domestic relations
of husband and wife'" belongs to the states, see id. at 220 (citation omitted), the Court held
that federal law created a "personal entitlement" and that state community property laws were
preempted. See id. at 224-32. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stewart, argued for finding federal preemption in cases involving issues of marriage law only
when expressly provided by Congress. See id. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Congress
responded by enacting the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act to permit such
designation by states. Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 718, 730-38 (1982) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. (1988)).
213 For example, in 1897, Congress legislated that the children of women who are members
of federally defined Indian tribes and who marry "white" men are given the same rights and
privileges as that of other members of the mother's tribe. See Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, § 1,
30 Stat. 90 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 184 (1988)). More recently, the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA), Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903, 1911-
1923, 1931-1934, 1951-1952 (1988)), has "federalized to a large extent the law of adoption,
guardianship, and foster care of Indian children." Letter from Professor Barbara Atwood to
author (June 14, 1991) (on file with author); see, e.g., Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 36 (1989) (holding that "domicile" of child under ICWA is question of federal law). See
generally Barbara A. Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Juris-
dictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 1051 (1989) (exploring jurisdictional complexities of
custody disputes involving Indian children).
214 See William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Linda A. Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1363,
1385 (1967) ("The Social Security Act, indeed, sets up the federal courts as 'domestic relations
tribunals.' ") (quoting Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 676 (2d Cir. 1965)
(Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966)).
215 According to Mary Becker, in 1986, elderly women had a poverty rate of 15.2%, as
contrasted with an overall poverty rate of 12.4% for those 65 and over. Becker, supra note
209, at 277. Because "women live longer than men, 60% of elderly social security beneficiaries
are women... [but] elderly women.., receive less.., than elderly men." Becker, supra note
209, at 277-78.
216 "Women receive about 52% of social security benefits paid to the elderly." Id. at 277.
217 See Deborah Maranville, Welfare and Federalism, 36 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 10-27 (1990)
(summarizing historical development of AFDC program).
218 Becker, supra note 209, at 278. On the other hand, "[w]omen make only about 28% of
contributions to the social security system, yet they collect about 54% of benefits." Id. at 278.
Becker argues that this figure should not be the basis for a conclusion that women are greater
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exerts pressure on homemakers to remain dependent on their husbands
until old age and also discredits the work of maintaining a home.219
Nancy Morawetz observes that women are "disadvantaged (1) because
they are less likely to meet the wage work criteria, (2) because they have
lower earnings even when they have engaged in sufficient wage work, and
(3) because the conditions for receipt of benefits as the dependent of a
wage earner are very strict." 220
The different effects of social welfare laws on women are not limited
to those who turn to social security in old age. Mary Becker also de-
scribes unemployment benefits as more generous safety nets than AFDC
benefits-reflecting a lower evaluation of "women's work" in the
home. 221 Further, work requirements in welfare statutes apply only to
one-parent families; two-parent families with one at work are not subject
to those requirements. 222 As a consequence, the law creates an incentive
for two adults to divide work so that one works outside the home and the
other (typically the female) works in the home. Moreover, federal law
also may focus on the needs of disabled men more than on those of
beneficiaries. "[O]n an individual basis, men receive more than women, despite the greater
need women have due to their greater longevity." Id. at 279. Several aspects of the Social
Security system's structure disadvantage women. For example, married homemaker claims
for social security, which are based on living with a wage earner, may not be used in combina-
tion with the homemaker's own wage-labor credits. See id. at 279.
Women who have done some wage work and also work at home must choose between
claiming as a wage earner or claiming as a dependent-thus losing either the benefits that
accrued directly through their wage work contributions or the benefits that accrued because of
their work in the home. See id. at 280-81. Further, a wage earner at 65 can have one "full
draw" (or the 100% Primary Insurance Amount), while a spouse at age 65 gets 50% of the full
draw during the lifetime of the wage earner and a 100% after the wage earner dies. See id. at
281. If a homemaker/dependent remarries before the age of 50, the claim is lost absent an-
other divorce and renewed dependency upon the first wage earner. See id. at 281-83. Home-
makers' claims vest only if the marriage lasts 10 years; the homemaker must also wait until
both she and the wage earner reach retirement age before obtaining the benefit. See id. at 281-
33.
219 See id. at 280-83. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Women Have Always Worked: A Histori-
cal Overview (1981). Yet another issue in obtaining benefits is how one's testimony is credited.
Many women have some history of interrupted work in the wage market and many women's
work history includes uninterrupted household work, neither of which may be given the
weight of a man's wage market work. For discussion of how gender and racial stereotypes
affect women who give testimony, see Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 6-19 (1990).
220 Letter from Professor Nancy Morawetz to author (Apr. 29, 1991) (on file with author).
"For example, a woman who has spent much of her life working in the home, and then works
outside the home for ten years before becoming disabled might not be given the same presump-
tion of being a hard worker as someone who has done wage work for the entire time period."
Letter from Professor Nancy Morawetz to author (Oct. 14, 1992) (on file with author).
221 Letter from Mary Becker to author (Apr. 30, 1991) (on file with author).
222 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 250.33 (1991) (state AFDC implementation plans must require at
least one parent in AFDC family, where principle earner is unemployed, to participate in work
program).
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women.223 As Sylvia Law put it, "present federal labor and welfare pol-
icy 'resolve' the conflict between the traditional assumption that women
cannot and should not work outside the home and the reality that they
do, in ways that are systematically injurious to women and families. ' 224
Growing awareness of the distinct problems facing women in the Social
Security System has led to the recent creation of an Internal Social Secur-
ity Administration Task Force on Women,225 but not to the inclusion of
women on a recently chartered task force to review the administrative
judiciary.226
Several scholars, lawyers, and judges have begun to explore the rela-
tionship between federal bankruptcy law and women. 227 One of the most
223 Applicants for disability benefits obtain them more readily when their "disability" is
listed in applicable federal regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.931-416.934 (1990) (listing im-
pairments that may create presumption of disability). These regulations, in turn, are based on
diseases, listed by the Federal Center for Disease Control. Included are illnesses caused by
AIDS and by HIV-infection. Id. § 416.934(k). The definitions were developed on the assump-
tion that those primarily afflicted were gay men. For ten years, gynecological disorders often
associated with AIDS and HIV-infection were not listed impairments. In December of 1991,
after lawsuits were filed in Philadelphia and New York, the Health and Human Services
Agency revised the list to take women into account. See Mireya Navarro, Dated AIDS Defini-
tion Keeps Benefits from Many Patients, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1991, at Al.
224 Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of the Patriarchy, 131 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1249, 1249 (1983); see also Michael J. Boskin & Douglas J. Puffert, Social Security
and the American Family, in I Tax Policy and the Economy 139, 140 (Lawrence H. Summers
ed., 1987) (discussing how, as of 1983 Social Security amendments, Social Security offered
"very different ex ante 'deals' and marginal returns for incremental taxes paid to persons of
different income, family status, age, sex, and income").
225 See Joan Schaffner Memorandum (June 19, 1991) (on file with author).
226 In 1991, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) requested that the Administrative
Conference of the United States provide a report reviewing the administrative judiciary. The
Administrative Conference selected a five person panel to prepare a report, The Federal Ad-
ministrative Judiciary: Problems and Prospects (scheduled for release in May 1992). The
chair, the three law professor members, and the one staff member are all men. See Conference
Materials, Issues in Administrative Adjudication, UCLA Law School (Nov. 1, 1991) (on file
with author).
227 According to Bankruptcy Judge Lisa Hill Fenning's April 30th memo, "scratch the sur-
face" of bankruptcy law and a "variety of potential issues" relating to bankruptcy and gender
appear. Fenning Memorandum of Apr. 30, 1991 (on file with author); see also Teresa A.
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bank-
ruptcy and Consumer Credit in America 147-65 (1989) (discussing women in bankruptcy);
Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 1506 (1990) (evaluating impact of bankruptcy laws on women); Zipporah B.
Wiseman, Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond, 65 Ind. L.J. 107 (1989) (examining economic
marginalization of women debtors as delineated in As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra); Jana
B. Singer, Divorce, Obligations and Bankruptcy Discharge: Rethinking the Support/Property
Distinction (analysis of Bankruptcy Code distinction between dischargeable spousal awards
and nondischargeable property divisions) (on file with author). Professor Gross's essay consid-
ers whether bankruptcy law not only "mirrors" the conditions of women outside of bank-
ruptcy but also "contributes" to that condition. See Gross, supra, at 1533 ("If the bankruptcy
laws are premised on a male model, then the Bankruptcy Code may reinforce the condition in
which women debtors find themselves."). Further, she notes the limited definitions of "fam-
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ambitious and complex recent bankruptcies involved A.H. Robins Co.,
the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, an interuterine device that in-
jured hundreds of thousands of women.228 Robins sought federal protec-
tion by claiming that tort damage suits would overwhelm its assets.229
Almost 200,000 women who used that interuterine device are now claim-
ants, seeking some of the 2.3 billion dollars set aside in a trust fund.230 In
addition to that vivid case, women may be creditors or debtors in bank-
ruptcy filings in which injuries to women's bodies are less directly at is-
sue. According to survey research on consumer bankruptcies, 74% of
the cases sampled involved a woman debtor,231 either filing jointly with a
husband or filing singly.23 2
Bankruptcy intersects with family law in a variety of ways. For ex-
ample, if one spouse files for bankruptcy without the other, the assets
(including community assets) come under the exclusive control of either
the debtor in possession or the bankruptcy trustee.233 In contrast, under
some state laws, community assets are either under the joint control of
both spouses or both partners have equal access to them. Thus, filing
bankruptcy can be a technique for ousting a spouse from control. Fur-
ther, whichever spouse files first may claim the one and only homestead
exemption.234 Yet another issue, obliquely addressed recently by the
Supreme Court, is whether a debtor spouse can avoid a judicial lien when
that lien is intended to finance the division of property under a divorce
decree.235 Federal law forbids spousal and child support from being dis-
ily" under federal bankruptcy law: one either has a spouse or is the head of a household, but a
variety of other householding arrangements do not fall within these confines. See id. at 1512-
23, 1554-56.
228 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 Bankr. 742, 747 (E.D. Va. 1988), afr'd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
229 See id.
230 See Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the Dalkon Shield Bankruptcy ix
(1991). For further description of the Dalkon litigation, see In re A.H. Robins, Inc., 880 F.2d
694, 697-700 (4th Cir. 1989); In re A. H. Robins, 862 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins, 110 S. Ct. 331, 376 (1989).
231 See T. Sullivan, E. Warren, & J. Westbrook, supra note 227, at 149-51. The sample
included a total of 2359 petitioners (some whom filed jointly, some singly). Of the 2359, 53%
were men and 47% were women. Id.
232 Id. Single-filing women debtors are "predominately unmarried," with incomes lower
than those of single filing males ($10,600 as compared to $18,000). See Gross, supra note 227,
at 1526-28. "Single-filing women had a higher ratio of medical debts to income than any other
category of debtor." Id. at 1528.
233 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(2), 542(a)-(b) (1988).
234 See id. § 522(b). "[A] particularly ruthless spouse (usually the husband) who buys a
fancy new condominium with separate assets before the divorce is final, can claim the full
$75,000 homestead in his bankruptcy filing, leaving the family home available for forced sale to
satisfy debts. .. ." Fenning Memorandum, supra note 227, at 1.
235 See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1827-31 (1991). A former husband, Gerald
Sanderfoot, was awarded the house in a divorce decree; the former wife, Jeanne Farrey, was
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charged in bankruptcy. Federal statutes do not dictate, however, the or-
der in which spouses and children, in contrast to other creditors, are to
be paid during bankruptcy. 236
Federal law also affects family life by way of immigration laws,
which define family units.237 Categories of "children" recognized for im-
migration include stepchildren, legitimated children, and adopted chil-
dren, but only if they have achieved such status by a certain age.238
Being a member of a family unit has relevance for reunification, amnesty,
refugee status, asylum, visas, and suspension of deportation. 239 For ex-
ample, aliens who wish to obtain visas because they have married citizens
or residents of the United States are given two years as conditional resi-
dents.24° Before the two years end, the spouses must file a joint petition
to end the conditional status and make it permanent. The Immigration
Service may waive the required "jointness" of that petition if alien
spouses or children are battered. 241 Federal law thus determines when
one spouse has imposed "extreme mental cruelty" on another, has "bat-
tered," or has "psychological[ly] or sexual[ly] abuse[d]" another, so as to
supposed to receive proceeds from the sale of marital property ($29,208.44) and was supposed
to be paid from her former husband in two installments. Id. at 1827. The divorce decree
awarded her a lien on the property as security. Id. Gerald Sanderfood neither paid nor com-
plied with the court order, but instead filed for bankruptcy and listed the house as his home-
stead exemption. Id. at 1827-28. He sought to have her lien voided as impairing his
homestead exemption under the bankruptcy law. Id. The Court held that section 522(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code could not be used to void the lien because the debtor was deemed to have
obtained the property interest before the lien attached. See id. at 1831. This holding did not
address the question of how bankruptcy law should apply when property divisions are man-
dated by divorce decrees; as Justice Kennedy's dissent, joined by Justice Souter noted, "the
Bankruptcy Code may be used in some... case[s] to allow a spouse to avoid otherwise valid
obligations under a divorce court decree." Id. at 1832 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
236 The issue is one of "unfair discrimination" against creditors in chapter 13 cases. See 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988). Good faith involves, inter alia, equitable distribution to creditors.
See, e.g., In re Pacana, 125 Bankr. 19, 25 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) ("Obligations relating to
support and alimony, intractable though they may be, are insulated from mandatory-inclusion
in a Chapter 13 plan .... "); In re Warner, 115 Bankr. 233, 244-45 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989)
(denying confirmation of debtor's plan in which he proposed to pay child support arrearages
before other unsecured creditors); Michaela M. White, Spousal and Child Support Payment
Provisions in Chapter 13 Plans, 16 Cap. U.L. Rev. 369, 388-97 (1987) (arguing that federal
courts have common-law authority to include provisions for past due spousal and child sup-
port payments in Chapter 13).
237 Special thanks to Myrna Raeder, Abby Liebman, and Evangiline Abrile for their insight
into this area.
238 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(A)-(C), (E) (1988).
239 See, e.g., The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (to
be codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2) (1988) (grant-
ing refugee status to spouse or child of refugee); id. § 1158(c) (granting asylum status to spouse
or child of alien); id. § 1153(a) (detailing categories of preference for receiving visas).
240 See 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a).
241 See 8 U.S.C. § 1186(c)-(d); 56 Fed. Reg. 22,637 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 216.5).
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decide whether to release the alien spouse from needing the other
spouse's signature.242
While state law retains enormous power over the status of individu-
als as married, divorced, parent, and child, federal law sometimes allo-
cates authority among states243 and interacts with that authority in a
variety of ways. The results can be described fairly as a regime of joint
governance, with varying degrees of jointness depending on the issue.244
Legislation over the course of this century, and particularly since the
New Deal, has brought federal courts into an array of family life issues.
Yet despite this federal involvement, federal courts have been reluctant
to acknowledge their place in shaping family life.2 45 The above review of
federal regulations that affect and sometimes define families is a neces-
sary antidote to ideology and to case law, summarized below,2 46 that
claim that the federal courts have no role in shaping the world of
families.
242 Id. Interim Rule, Conditional Basis of Lawful Permanent Residence for Certain Alien
Spouses and Sons and Daugthers, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,635 (1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 216.5) ("Waiver of requirement to file petition to remove conditions"); Martha F. Davis &
Janet M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for Abused Spouses and Children,
68 Interpreter Releases 665, 668-70 (1991) (arguing that INS interim rule imposes too high
burden of proof).
243 This allocation occurs: through rulings on what "full faith and credit" is to be awarded
to decisions in state courts, see, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953); Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355-56 (1948); and under federal legislation, see, e.g., the Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988); the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901-1963 (1988) (establishing federal standards for removal of Indian children from their
families, for placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes, and for provision of assist-
ance to Indian tribes in operation of child and family service programs). Interstate compacts
also allocate authority among states. See, e.g., Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A.
116 (1988) (adopted in all states and District of Columbia).
Some have urged a greater role for the federal government in enforcing interstate child
support orders. See A Bill to Impose Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrear-
ages in Child Support, S. 1002, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Senator Shelby); A
Bill to Impose Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support,
H.R. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Representative Hyde); William L.
Reynolds, Conflicts and Child Support: A Working Paper for the Commission on Interstate
Child Support 12-13 (1990) (on file with author) (proposing to "make the federal government
responsible for the interstate enforcement of child-support orders" and predicting that rela-
tively few cases would be added to federal court docket).
244 For example, while state law sets terms of divorce, federal law prohibits states from
conditioning divorce on the capacity to pay filing fees. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 382-83 (1971).
245 For a review of the breadth of the claim that federal courts decline "domestic relations"
jurisdiction and a refutation of it, see Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800-12 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (Weinstein, J.); see text accompanying notes 302-350 infra. For discussion of the rheto-
ric of "nonintervention" by states in the idealized "private family" and the fact of state inter-
vention, see Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.L.
Ref. 835 (1985).
246 See text accompanying notes 316-17, 327-35 infra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1729 1991
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
III
PRESENT YET ABSENT
Given the many places-both outside and in families-in which
women form the subject of discussion of federal law, return again to the
puzzling statement that "the quality of the federal bench and the nature
of federal law" render gender bias problems minimal.247 Consider also
the lobbying against the jurisdictional provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act. Proponents of the Act seek the creation of a federal civil
rights remedy; opponents claim that federal jurisdiction would enmesh
federal judges in a domestic world foreign to them.248 With all of this
documentation of the presence of women and of the plentiful involve-
ment by the federal courts with family life, how can the argument in
opposition to the Violence Against Women Act be framed in terms of the
absence of family life issues from the federal courts? Why is the refusal
to propose gender bias studies linked to the "nature of the federal law"
and the "quality of the federal bench"?
In general, women suffer discrimination and the issues that concern
us are ignored or trivialized. 249 In addition to these general attitudes, the
answers lie in the ideology of federal courts jurisprudence, to which I
now turn. Before beginning that discussion, I must pause to consider the
methodological problems of embarking on such an inquiry. The difficul-
ties are, obviously, about sources and assessment of "ideology." Trying
to trace women's presence and absence in the materials about the federal
courts is a daunting task, at the end of which one cannot claim to have
found definite "proof." The "federal courts" have been a discrete topic
for legal inquiry-at least insofar as contemporary law libraries reveal-
from shortly before the Civil War, when practitioners and scholars began
to write books, treatises, and eventually teaching materials on the sub-
ject. Looking for women in this body of literature demands that one
explore what is said, what is not said, and the contemporary cultural
meanings of both speech and silence.250
Below, I use three approaches (in no way claimed to be comprehen-
sive) as a window into what those who delineated the canon of federal
courts jurisprudence took to be the place of women. First, I examine the
247 FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 169.
248 See text accompanying notes 18-26 supra.
249 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges
and Cultural Change, 100 Yale L.J. 1731, 1734-35 (1991) ("sex-based disparities have often
appeared natural, functional, and in large measure, unalterable" and thus lead to "[d]enials of
a 'woman problem' ").
250 Silence "is a presence/it has a history a form Do not confuse it with any kind of
absence." Adrienne Rich, Cartographies of Silence, in The Dream of a Common Language,
Poems, 1974-77, at 17 (1978).
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official reports provided by the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts-looking at if, how, and when women appear.
Second, I review early treatises and casebooks as well as contemporary
casebooks about the federal courts to see when women are a topic of
discussion. Third, I consider the rules by which federal courts have de-
clined to exercise jurisdiction over "domestic relations." These last two
approaches are interrelated as the domestic relations exception is some-
times the place in which women (in their capacity as wives or aspiring ex-
wives) are mentioned in books about the federal courts.
A. The Chronicles of the Courts
Listening to self-description is an important method of feminist in-
quiry. Law professors and political scientists write about the federal
courts. Judges write for the federal courts. But the federal courts also
describe themselves through reports authored either by employees of the
federal courts or by those affiliated with the federal courts. Since
1940,251 the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts has filed an "Annual Report" which describes the "business" of
the courts. 252 More recently, as a result of the Civil Justice Reform Act
251 Prior to 1940, the Attorney General provided such reports. Because these reports were
from the Department of Justice rather than the judiciary, those materials are not a part of the
description provided here.
252 See 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3) (1988) (creating duty of director to submit report prior to
annual meeting). Reports are not available in law libraries for 1943 and 1944; apparently,
publication was suspended during the Second World War. Conversation with the staff of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Feb. 27, 1992).
In addition to the Annual Reports, Chief Justice Warren Burger began a practice of giv-
ing annual "State of the Judiciary" addresses. A review of the speeches from 1970 to 1985
finds women or family law mentioned in six of the 15 speeches. One speech, that given in
1983, noted that women's litigation was a part of the challenge posed by new and complex
cases on the federal docket. See Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judici-
ary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 443 (1983) ("difficult and complex cases arising out of long overdue
recognition of the rights of women and of minorities"). His 1982 speech argued that alterna-
tive methods of dispute resolution were needed; "[d]ivorce, child custody, adoptions, personal
injury, landlord-and-tenant cases, and probate of estates are prime candidates for some form of
administrative or arbitration processes." Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68
A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982). In two other speeches, women were linked to their role as crime
victims. See Warren E. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief
Justice of the United States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 290 (1981) (discussing survey results that "46
percent of women and 48 percent of blacks are 'significiantly frightened' by pervasive crime");
Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A. J. 295, 299
(1980) (discussing commission of murder of woman allegedly by two men on bail). In another
speech, women were the addressees; "[r]easonable men and women can disagree" about pro-
posed changes in the intermediate appellate structure. See Warren E. Burger, Report on the
Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A. J. 1125, 1129 (1973). That same issue-the inter-
mediate appellate court-brought another reference to women, this time as a wife aspiring for
prestige for her husband. Attempting to assuage concerns about the impact of a new interme-
diate appellate court, the Chief Justice described a conversation in which a judge complains
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of 1990,253 individual district courts have begun to issue their own re-
ports about the state of their dockets and their plans for civil justice re-
form. These documents are impressive in their silences. Women are
sometimes utterly absent and only on rare occasion implicitly or explic-
itly present. Ironically, from the vantage point of a reader of Annual
Reports, women as members of judges' families are the most visible set of
women in the federal courts.
The Administrative Office's Annual Reports are comprised of both
descriptive information and detailed statistical tables. From 1940 until
1990, women were not frequently a topic directly addressed.254 One can
imply women's presence from some of the categories of litigation listed.
For example, from 1942 until 1960, "divorce and maintenance" was a
reported classification of cases under the "local jurisdiction" of the dis-
trict courts. 255 Beginning in 1961 and continuing to the present, "domes-
tic relations" has become the categorization and accounted for a tiny
percentage of the federal civil docket.256
Turning to criminal litigation, women appeared sporadically as pro-
bationers. During the first year of reporting, probation tables classified
that his wife, active in volunteer work, wanted to describe him as on the "second highest
court" in the nation. See Warren E. Burger, The Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, 71
A.B.A. J. 86, 91 (1985). None of the speeches addresses issues of gender bias, equal employ-
ment efforts by the federal judiciary, or the small number of women judges on the federal
bench.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also provided "year-end" reports from 1986 to 1991. These re-
ports mention women in only a few instances, the most important being in 1991, when the
Chief Justice questioned congressional proposals to confer federal jurisdiction in the Violence
Against Women Act. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra. Women are not men-
tioned in the 1987, 1988, and 1989 Reports. In 1990, the Chief Justice singled out Judge
Cynthia Holcomb Hall of the Ninth Circuit as the chair of a special committee that organized
the "Fifth International Appellate Judges Conference." See 1990 Year-End Report at 8. In
1991, the Chief Justice also referred twice to the "men and women" who comprise the judicial
branch. See 1991 Year-End Report, supra note 25, at introduction; see also 1986 Year-End
Report at 12 (stating "men and women available to fill vacancies").
253 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1990)). Plans
are required by 28 U.S.C. § 472 (1990).
254 See Memorandum of Sheri Porath (as amended Feb. 11, 1992) (on file with author). I
have been told that the Office does not keep data on civil litigants by gender and race. Conver-
sation with staff of the Statistic Analysis Divison of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Jan. 21, 1992).
255 See, e.g., 1960 Annual Report at 233; 1955 Annual Report at 161; 1950 Annual Report
at 143; 1945 Annual Report at 83; 1942 Annual Report at appendix, table 3; all Annual Re-
ports, supra note 75.
256 See, e.g., 1990 Annual Report at 140; 1986 Annual Report at 177; 1981 Annual Report
at 368; 1976 Annual Report at 295; 1971 Annual Report at 265; 1966 Annual Report at 173;
1961 Annual Report at 239. All Annual Reports, supra note 75. In 1970, federal courts
stopped being the "local" courts for the District of Columbia. See District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 11-101-2501 (1989).
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probationers by sex;257 during the second year of reporting, classifica-
tions also included "race and nativity. ' 258 The sex and race delineations
were resumed from 1955 to 1962, and then disappeared. 259 Women do
appear, implicitly, as victims of crime; rape is one of the offenses found in
most of the lists of crimes, although it has been categorized differently
over the years.260 From a research point of view, the absence of specific
information on women is regrettable. For example, while women make
their way into the pictorial graphics (black and white silhouettes of those
selected and challenged for jury service), neither text nor table provides a
breakdown by race and gender of those who served.261
No mention is made of women as article III judges. While data are
provided on vacancies, appointments, and authorized positions, the
demographics of the judiciary are not. Women are implicitly present as
wives, widows, and daughters of federal judges. Beginning in 1955, each
Annual Report contains a discussion, sometimes relatively lengthy, of
the Judicial Survivors' Annuity Fund.262 In light of the workplace
demographics, women are heavily represented in this group. Our pres-
ence is recorded by the only use of the pronoun "she" found in the text of
the Annual Reports.263
Women as workers in non-article III positions do come into focus,
temporarily, in the 1980s. In 1980, the Judicial Conference established
257 See 1940 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 130.
258 See 1941 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 157.
259 See 1961 Annual Report at 250; 1960 Annual Report at 322; 1959 Annual Report at
298; 1958 Annual Report at 218; 1957 Annual Report at 230; 1956 Annual Report at 266;
1955 Annual Report at 218; all Annual Reports, supra note 75. In addition, the text of the
1956 Annual Report discussed women as 11% of the probationer population. See 1956 An-
nual Report, supra note 75, at 151.
260 From 1940 through 1960, "rape" was listed as a separate category. See 1960 Annual
Report at 279; 1940 Annual Report at 130. In 1961, rape appeared under the general heading
of "sex offenses," grouping it with "white slave traffic" and "other sex offenses." See 1961
Annual Report at 273. This categorization continues through 1978 when "white slave traffic"
was dropped. See 1978 Annual Report at 370. In 1988, "rape" was deleted and replaced with
the current category, "sexual abuse." See 1988 Annual Report at 256. In the text of the
Reports from 1960 to 1991, no mention of "rape" was made; when changes in the number of
such cases occurred, the discussion was about changes in cases involving "sexual offenses."
See, e.g., 1989 Annual Report at 257-61 ("sex offenses" delineated into two subcategories,
"sexual abuse" and "others"); 1988 Annual Report at 14; 1984 Annual Report at 170; 1977
Annual Report at 251; all Annual Reports, supra note 75.
261 See, e.g., 1990 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 18; 1985 Annual Report, supra note 75,
at 13; 1982 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 8; 1979 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 132.
262 The 1955 Annual Report had a brief description of the introduction of legislation to
provide benefits to judges' survivors. See 1955 Annual Report at 23. In 1956, the Annual
Report detailed the program, and thereafter, each report contains textual discussion of the
fund. See, e.g., 1990 Annual Report at 43; 1986 Annual Report at 74; 1981 Annual Report at
153; 1976 Annual Report at 112; 1971 Annual Report at 209; 1966 Annual Report at 114;
1961 Annual Report at 193; 1956 Annual Report at 75; all Annual Reports, supra note 75.
263 See 1956 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 76.
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Program (EEOP), aimed at devel-
oping programs for more inclusive hiring (save judicial appointments). 264
From 1981 to 1983, each Annual Report included a description of the
mandate of EEOP and referred the reader to a separately published re-
port.265 From 1984 to 1986, such data moved into the report itself, and
lists of the numbers of women and minorities (but not of the intersecting
categories of women who are also members of other minorities) ap-
peared.266 In 1987, these data collections disappear; and in 1988, the
explanation provided is that the Judicial Conference changed the require-
ments so that the EEOP information no longer had to appear in the An-
nual Reports.267
Another possible source of discussions about women is the newly
issued Civil Justice Delay Reduction Plans, written by district court
committees and promulgated by district courts by virtue of the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act. In the thirty-three lengthy documents (available as of
this writing) from districts in twenty-four states and the Virgin Islands,
no mention is made of any distinct issues or problems that women, as
litigants, lawyers, employees, judges, or jurors, have in the federal
courts.
2 6 8
264 Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 5 (Mar. 5-6,
1980).
265 See 1983 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 86; 1982 Annual Report, supra note 75, at
63; 1981 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 180.
266 See 1986 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 97; 1985 Annual Report, supra note 75, at
103 (women not included); 1984 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 98.
267 See 1988 Annual Report, supra note 75, at 86. The Director of the Administrative
Office was still required to report such findings to the Judicial Conference yearly and to pub-
lish, under separate cover, information on the EEOP. See note 82 supra. Since 1988, the
Annual Reports make no mention of the EEOP. According to the staff at the Administrative
Office (AO), Special Projects Division, as of March 24, 1992, the AO has never published a
final report on EEOP data.
268 Out of the 33 plans and reports reviewed, women appeared only by way of an occasional
pronoun. A few use the alternative "his/her" or "s/he" terminology when discussing the
judiciary. See Cost and Delay Reduction Plans for: Southern District of Texas 3 (Oct. 24,
1991); Southern District of Illinois 3 (Dec. 27, 1991) (however, uses "he" and "his" in discus-
sion of expert witness); Southern District of Indiana 10 (Dec. 31, 1991); Southern District of
California 2 (Oct. 7, 1991); District of Kansas 2 (Dec. 16, 1991); Southern District of New
York 52 (Dec. 12, 1991); Northern District of West Virginia 21 (Dec. 18, 1991). See also the
Report of the Advisory Group for the Western District of Michigan 122, 213 (Dec. 18, 1991).
Most reports and plans do not use pronouns at all. See Reports of the Advisory Group
and Cost and Delay Reduction Plans for: the Eastern District of Arkansas (Report: Nov. 20,
1991; Plan: Dec. 30, 1991); Eastern District of California (Report: Nov. 21, 1991; Plan: Dec.
31, 1991); Northern District of California (Report and Plan: Dec. 31, 1991); District of Dela-
ware (Report: Oct. 1, 1991; Plan: Dec. 31, 1991); Southern District of Florida (Report and
Plan: Nov. 21, 1991); Northern District of Georgia (Report: Dec. 17, 1991; Plan: Dec. 30,
1991); District of Idaho (Report: Dec. 1, 1991; Plan: Dec. 19, 1991); Northern District of
Indiana (Report and Plan: Dec. 31, 1991); District of Massachusetts (Report and Plan: Nov.
18, 1991); District of Montana (Report: Oct. 1991; Plan: Dec. 1991); District of New Jersey
(Report and Plan: Dec. 19, 1991); Eastern District of New York (Report: Dec. 9, 1991; Plan:
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B. The Jurisprudence of the Federal Courts
Other sources to explore are books written by those who describe
the federal courts from the perspectives of scholarship and education.
Several of us who teach and write about the federal courts have tried to
uncover some of the underlying assumptions of that discipline.269 Some
scholars tell a story of the federal courts as a nationalizing force, with
key events being the Civil War and the civil rights activity of the
1960s;270 others rely on the role of state courts at the founding of the
nation and seek to describe those institutions as central.271 The jurisdic-
tional analyses of Posner, Chemerinsky, and Kramer provide other win-
dows into federal court ideology.2 7 2 The federal courts are claimed to be
the means by which to create uniform interpretation of federal law,273 to
minimize "diseconomies" of difference, 274 to lessen the imposition by
self-interested states of externalities on other states,275 and to protect the
vulnerable. 276 All theories and descriptions of "the federal courts" take
as part of their subject matter the division of responsibilities between
state and federal court systems.
What role do women, in and out of families, play in these ideological
constructions and jurisdictional descriptions? Contemporary literature,
such as the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee,277 does not
much discuss women as a topic. In contrast, some of the early federal
courts literature did mention women, often when reviewing women's dis-
Dec. 17, 1991); Northern District of New York (preliminary Oct. 20, 1991); Southern District
of New York (Report: Dec. 2, 1991; Plan: Dec. 12, 1991); Northern District of Ohio (Report
and Plan: Nov. 27, 1991); Western District of Oklahoma (Report: Oct. 31, 1991; Plan: Dec.
31, 1991); District of Oregon (Report and Plan: Dec. 20, 1991); District Court of the Virgin
Islands (Report and Plan: Dec. 23, 1991); Southern District of West Virginia (Report: Aug.
29, 1991; Plan: Dec. 30, 1991); Eastern District of Wisconsin (Report: Dec. 23, 1991; Plan:
Jan. 2, 1992); Western District of Wisconsin (Report: Nov. 15, 1991; Plan: Dec. 31, 1991);
District of Wyoming (Report and Plan: Dec. 31, 1991).
Only one report refers to judges exclusively with male pronouns. See Report of the Advi-
sory Group for the District of Utah 36 (Dec. 1991). The Cost and Delay Reduction Plan for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 15, 20, 21 (Dec. 31, 1991) alternates between using "his or
her," or "he/she" including for arbitrators and mediators except that only "he" or "his" is
used when referring to judges. Id. at 31, 37. (All reports on file with author); see also, The
Interim Report on Civility of the Seventh Circuit, supra note 145 (making no mention of role
in civility of gender or differing experiences of persons of color or white women).
269 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 155; Fallon, supra note 155; Resnik, supra note 155.
270 See Fallon, supra note 155, at 1144-45.
271 See id. at 1143-44.
272 See text accompanying notes 157-69 supra.
273 See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 167, at 83-85.
274 See R. Posner, supra note 157, at 178-79.
275 See id. at 175-77.
276 See id. at 179-81.
277 See note 16 supra.
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abilities as juridical actors.278 When early casebook writers considered
the topic of the relationship between federal and state courts, some of
them used "domestic relations" and "probate" as illustrations ofjurisdic-
tion reserved to the states.
As women's legal disabilities diminished and we gained recognition
as officially eligible to participate in the federal courts, 2 7 9 women became
less visibly a category to consider in books about the federal courts.
Moreover, despite the role of federal courts in enforcing statutory and
constitutional equality rights and the growth of federal court authority
over family life, contemporary casebook authors have not returned to the
topic of the powers of state and federal courts over family life. Gains in
official legal recognition as participants have obscured interest in the con-
tinuing effects of being a part of the category "women. '280
L Women as Citizens and Litigants
Those who took as their task to explain federal court jurisdiction 281
sometimes paid attention to the legal disabilities that constrained
women282 who sought to be juridical actors, as citizens, witnesses, jurors,
278 See text accompanying notes 282-300 infra.
279 For example, women were once not able to practice law before the United States
Supreme Court. See 2 A.H. Garland & Robert Ralston, A Treatise on the Constitution and
Jurisdiction of the United States Courts Vol. 11 1280 (1898) (stating that "women may be
admitted to practice" in the Supreme Court). It is not clear that the standards for admission
to the Court were the same for men and women. See Samuel T. Spear, The Law of the Federal
Judiciary: A Treatise 344-45 (1883). Spear stated that the general rule for admission to the
Supreme Court was that "attorneys... have been such for three years past in the Supreme
Courts of the States to which they respectively belong, and that their private and professional
character shall appear to be fair." Id. at 344 (Rule No. 2 "Attorneys"). A separate rule,
entitled "Admission of Women," stated that, by the Act of February 15th, 1879 ("An Act to
Relieve Certain Legal Disabilities of Women," 20 Stat. 292), women who have been attorneys
in the highest courts of "any State or Territory, or of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia [for three years], and... have maintained a good standing before such court, and
who [are] ... of good moral character shall, on motion and the production of such record be
admitted." Id. at 345 (Rule No. 2.3 "Admission of Women"); see Revised Statutes of the
United States 1874-1891, 217 chap. 81 (1891). According to Spear, any "gentleman of the
bar" could use the Court's library. See S. Spear, supra, at 347.
The Act of February 15th, 1879 was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 353 (1928). By 1925, when
Supreme Court rules were revised, Rule 2 ("Attorneys and Counsellors") made no mention of
women as having any distinct admission rules. See Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 266 U.S. 653, 653 (1925). However, not until the 1948 recodification of Title 28
was § 353 omitted. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 4646, 62 Stat. 869.
280 See Minow, supra note 59, at 822-23 (suggesting that legal reforms could disempower
women "by removing an external focal point for political action, and making remaining ine-
qualities seem attributable to the fault of individual women").
281 See, e.g., A.J. Peeler, A Treatise on Law and Equity as Distinguished and Enforced in
the Courts of the United States iv (1883) (aspirating to treat "with more than ordinary fullness
of the relations of the Federal and State courts to each other").
282 Women appear as a category for law itself by the late nineteenth century. For example,
the first Index of Legal Periodicals, which was published in 1888, included "women," see
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and lawyers. For example, some early commentators discuss that mar-
ried women were deemed citizens and residents of the states in which
their husbands were domiciled. 2 3 Others address the limited authority
of married women to sue on their own behalf,284 the roles of guardians ad
litem,285 and the mode of examining married women who attempted to
convey property.286 Yet others discuss the impact of such disabilities.28 7
By dipping into "old" books on the federal courts, one can sometimes
find "women" as a group among the specially disabled.288
Leonard A. Jones, An Index to Legal Periodicals Literature 588 (1888), along with "married
women," id. at 578, "wives," id. at 587, "woman convicts," id. at 587, the "woman question,"
id. at 588, "woman's law," id. at 588, "woman's right," id. at 588, "woman suffrage," id. at
588, "woman suffrage convention," id. at 588, "women jurors," id. at 589, "women lawyers,"
id. at 589, "women ratepayers," id. at 589, "women's rights," id. at 589, "women voters," id.
at 589, "wife-whipping," id. at 578, and "wife-beating." Id. at 578.
283 See, e.g., C.L. Bates, Federal Procedure at Law: A Treatise on the Procedure in Suits at
Common Law in the Circuit Courts of the United States 210-11 (1908); John W. Dwyer, The
Law and Procedure of the United States Courts 205-06 (1901); Robert M. Hughes, Handbook
of Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts 246 (1913); Alfred John Schweppe,
Simkins Federal Practice 337-38 (rev. ed. 1934).
The general caveat was that, if "abandoned," a married woman gained her own domicile.
See A. Schweppe, supra, § 416, at 338; see also MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 307, 311
(1915) (applying language of Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228-that "any Ameri-
can woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband" and "ancient
principle of our jurisprudence" that equated women's domicile with her husband's-to require
that California woman who married British subject lost both franchise and citizenship); Cheely
v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 705 (1884) ("if a wife is living apart from her husband without
sufficient cause, his domicil is in law her domicil").
284 See, e.g., 1 Roger Foster, Federal Practice in Civil Cases 91-92 (1892) ("In the courts of
the United States.... the rule [in equity] was early laid down as follows: 'Where the wife
complains of the husband and asks relief against him she must use the name of some other
person in prosecuting the suit; but where the acts of the husband are not complained of, he
would seem to be the most suitable person to unite with her in the suit. This is a matter of
practice within the discretion of the court.'" (quoting Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228,
240 (1848)). According to Schweppe, at "law" federal courts followed state practice, while in
equity, federal courts relied on their own rules. A. Schweppe, supra note 283, § 510, at 471.
285 See, e.g., Howard M. Carter, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts 132-33 (1899) (noting
that in these cases citizenship of married woman and of infant, not of next friend, governs).
226 See, e.g., A. Schweppe, supra note 283, § 340, at 247 (federal courts to follow "form and
manner of the examination of married women... as prescribed by State law").
287 See, e.g., John C. Rose, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts 180 (3d ed.
1926) ("Suits against the United States must be brought within six years after the cause of
action arose. [But] [m]arried women and infants ... idiots, lunatics, insane persons and per-
sons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued, may bring suit within three years after the
disability has ceased.").
288 For example, in Benjamin Vaughan Abbott's A Treatise upon the United States Courts,
and Their Practice (1871) (two volumes), women were not in its index but were present in at
least three quiet instances. First, in equity, the Supreme Court recognized a "bill of revivor."
Such bills provided that, when suits abated because of a party's death "or by any other event,"
that suit could be "revived" under certain circumstances, if the underlying cause of action
survives the death/change in circumstances. The rules on revivorship applied "where the mar-
riage of a female complainant intervenes pending her action." 2 B. Abbott, supra, at 69-70
(emphasis in original). Second, federal jurisdiction over some issues that today might be called
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Moving from treatises to the early casebooks, women appear as they
struggle for recognition as citizens and thus raise the question of who is a
"natural person" for purposes of diversity of citizenship.28 9 For exam-
ple, George W. Rightmire's Cases and Readings on the Jurisdiction and
Procedure of the Federal Courts, published in 1917, was one of the first
casebooks designed specifically to teach students about the federal courts
and included the case of Minor v. Happersett.290 The issue in Minor was
whether a Missouri law, providing only men with the right to vote, vio-
lated the then recently adopted fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.291 The Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice
Morrison Waite, concluded that there was "no doubt that women may be
citizens" 292 and that that possibility predated the fourteenth amendment,
for such right adhered in being part of "the people"-either by birth or
naturalization. 293 As the case reasoned, because "females are included"
as part of "the people," women were also to be included as part of "all
children" who can gain citizenship by virtue of being born in a country in
which the parents are citizens. 294 Support for its conclusion of women as
"family law" is a topic of discussion. As part of federal jurisdiction over "crimes," Abbott
described the crime of "bigamy," a federal crime delineated in the Act of July 1, 1862, to apply
to "every person having a husband or wife living, and marrying any other, in a Territory, or
other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy." I B.
Abbott, supra, at 427. Third, in the description of habeas corpus jurisdiction, Abbott invoked
the language of the 1867 statute, which provided that a federal judge could not award a writ of
habeas corpus unless, from the petition itself, it appeared that the party was deprived of "his or
her liberty in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id. at 94.
289 See, e.g., George W. Rightmire, Cases and Readings on the Jurisdiction and Procedure
of the Federal Courts 265-77 (1917) (discussing diversity jurisdiction as part of subsection B,
"Original Jurisdiction" of federal courts).
290 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
291 See G. Rightmire, supra note 289, at 266.
292 Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165. The opinion is not actually addressed to all "women"
but only to a subset. According to the syllabus of the case, "Mrs. Virginia Minor, a native
born, free, white citizen of the United States, and of the State of Missouri, and over the age of
twenty-one years," wished to vote in the federal presidential election. Id. at 163; see also Act
of Feb. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604 ("any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen").
293 See Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 169. For an explanation of the political ideology that
enabled United States leaders to oppose women's full citizenship, see Smith, supra note 62.
For discussion of the complexity of the question of citizenship, see Peter H. Schuck & Rogers
M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity 9-41 (1985)
(contrasting "ascriptive" citizenship arising from circumstances such as birth to "consensual"
citizenship founded on agreement); Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for
Inclusion 49-61 (1991) (discussing movements to include those without property, slaves,
women, and persons of young age under the rubric of "citizens"); Peter H. Schuck, Member-
ship in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 1
(1989) (discussing the effects of equality and due process principles on the meaning of United
States citizenship).
294 See Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 168.
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citizens was drawn from court records, which were "full of cases in
which the [diversity] jurisdiction depends upon the citizenship of women
.... Certainly none can be found in which it has been held that women
could not sue or be sued in the courts of the United States.1295 From
there, the Court reasoned that, as citizens, women were "entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens" 296 and thus the question was
whether voting was such a right. Recognition as citizens, however, did
not lead to the right to vote as the Court held that not all citizens were
"necessarily" voters nor all voters necessarily citizens.2 97
Rogers Smith has described Minor as "reinforcing the privatistic
orientation of American political thought. ' 298 The opinion continued
the relegation of women to a separate, legally disabled sphere. Under its
aegis, women were in a familiar double bind-told we were citizens but
citizens of a special sort, possessing not all of the attributes of citizenship
that men had. Contemporary legal scholars have compared the right to
litigate with the right to vote.299 Women were disabled in both respects.
While constitutional amendment has been able to overturn the rule of
Minor,3° ° its intellectual premises-women as suspect participants in full
political citizenship-remain.
2. Domestic Relations Excepted
Rightmire's initial inclusion of the debate about women's citizenship
is not followed by subsequent writers of books for students of the federal
courts. While "citizenship" in the context of diversity litigation remains
a subject of inquiry,3 0 1 women's citizenship was and is not much ex-
plored.30 2 However, in one arena, women (in their capacity as wives,
struggling to exit one version of the family) persist in federal courts juris-
prudence. Several contemporary casebooks refer to the series of cases in
295 Id. at 169.
296 Id. at 174.
297 See id. at 177-78 ("the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of
suffrage upon any one").
298 Smith, supra note 62, at 262.
299 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One's Rights-Part II, 1974 Duke L.J. 527, 534-40.
30 See U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
301 See, e.g., Armistead M. Dobie & Mason Ladd, Cases and Materials on Federal Jurisdic-
tion and Procedure 163 -70 (1940); Howard P. Fink & Mark V. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction:
Policy and Practice 436-41 (2d ed. 1987); Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz, Cases and
Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 240-48 (1931); Henry M. Hart, Jr. &
Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 891-907 (1953); Charles T.
McCormick & James H. Chadbourn, Cases and Materials on Federal Courts 130-46 (1946);
Harold R. Medina, Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 262-90 (1926).
302 None of the books set forth in note 301 supra mention Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1874), or women's struggles to be counted as "citizens."
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which the federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of
what has become known as the "domestic relations" exception 30 3 to fed-
eral court jurisdiction.3°4 While often explained as an exception to diver-
sity jurisdiction, 30 5 the domestic relations exception also has been used to
oust the federal courts of jurisdiction in domestic relations cases involv-
ing foreign officials and to prevent federal courts from hearing tort
cases.
30 6
The "domestic relations" exception is traced to dictum in an 1859
case, Barber v. Barber,30 7 in which Justice Wayne for the majority "dis-
claim[ed] altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States
upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony. ' 30 8 Dis-
senters in Barber linked that jurisdictional disclaimer to English equity
jurisdiction, described as similarly lacking power over "the subjects of
divorce and alimony. ' 30 9 The English limitation on jurisdiction over di-
303 See generally Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: To-
ward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 Hastings L.J. 571 (1984).
304 In addition to a domestic relations exception, some probate cases, otherwise jurisdiction-
ally proper, may not be heard by the federal courts. Like the domestic relations exception, line
drawing is an issue. While lacking jurisdiction to "probate a will" or to interfere with "prop-
erty in the custody of a state court," federal courts do have jurisdiction to consider suits be-
tween parties to an estate when they seek to establish rights to share in that estate or debts
from that estate. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); see also Allan D. Vestal &
David L. Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 13-23 (1956) (discussing probate); id. at 23-31 (discussing domestic relations
cases). As a consequence, "[a]lIthough it is true that a federal court may not directly probate a
will or undertake the administration of an estate, the statement that federal courts have no
probate jurisdiction is much too broad." 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Ed-
ward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3610, at 480-82 (2d ed. 1984) (footnotes
omitted).
305 See Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 370-72 (11th Cir. 1988).
306 See Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930), discussed at notes 327-37 and accompa-
nying text infra. "Domestic relations" also are offered to explain jurisdictional lines between
the federal courts and Indian tribes. However, in the 1992 Supreme Court ruling on Anken-
brandt v. Richards, 60 U.S.L.W. 4532 (June 15, 1992), the exception was limited to diversity
cases. Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-61 (1978) ("matters involv-
ing commercial and domestic relations" are essential to tribal self-governance and federal
courts should not interpret Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to grant jurisdiction to federal
courts to determine such issues); cf. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2059-66 (1990) (refusing
to recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 2999 (1989) (limiting tribal powers
to control reservation land owned by nonmembers); note 32 supra.
307 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
308 See id. at 584. Hiram Barber and Huldah Adeline Barber had been married in 1840 in
New York. A New York court found that he had abandoned and harmed her and ordered
separation and support. Id. at 584-85. Thereafter, he moved to Wisconsin. After additional
litigation in New York, she (via a "next friend") filed in the federal territorial court in Wiscon-
sin for past alimony. He defended on the grounds that as a "feme sole" she could not sue by a
"next friend" and that the equity court lacked authority to grant relief. Id. at 587.
309 Id. at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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vorce (to the extent it existed)310 was in turn tied to religious practices
under which marriage was not subject to dissolution. From the words of
the majority and dissent came the conclusion that federal courts have no
authority over cases, otherwise jurisdictionally proper, in which the sub-
ject of dispute is divorce, alimony, or child custody.311
The actual holding in Barber was that the federal court, in a diver-
sity jurisdiction case, could hear the claim of a husband's failure to pay
alimony awarded by a state court.312 In this sense, the case was a stun-
ning victory for the relatively small number of wives who could first ob-
tain recognition of their separate legal status and who also had the
resources to pursue enforcement of obligations of support.313 Subsequent
readings of Barber have recast it by using the disclaimer of jurisdiction
over divorce itself and by distinguishing the powers of federal territorial
(as contrasted with article III) courts in family law.3 14 The holding,
310 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing Supreme
Court's "constructive view of history" and citing examples of both English and colonial courts
granting divorces); see also Atwood, supra note 303, at 585-87.
311 See, e.g., Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545 n.14 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (invoking
Barber for proposition that "the federal courts in the States were incompetent to render di-
vorces; but in the territories, where the legislative power of the United States of necessity
extended to all local matters, the territorial courts took cognizance" over divorces) (citations
omitted).
312 The Supreme Court held that federal courts did have equity jurisdiction, "derived from
the Constitution, and from legislation in conformity to it," to enforce judgments of states and
that the existence of "a remedy under the local law" does not preclude federal court remedies.
See Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 591-92. Turning then to the question of whether diversity
jurisdiction had been established, the Court concluded that a husband's misconduct could re-
sult in the law's recognition of a wife's right (in this case, divorced "a mensa et thoro"-legally
separated but not free to marry again) to have a separate domicile. See id. at 593-96. "[A]
wife under a judicial sentence of separation from bed and board is entitled to make a domicil
for herself, different from that of her husband, and that she may by her next friend sue her
husband for alimony, which he had been decreed to pay as an incident to such divorce .... "
Id. at 597-98. Finally, while she could have gone to a state equity court, federal district courts
also had jurisdiction to hear the case. See id. at 599-600. The dissent, written by Justice
Daniel and joined by Justice Campbell and Chief Justice Taney, argued that Huldah Adeline
Barber's rights flowed as a "wife" and that a "married woman cannot during the existence of
the matrimonial relation, and during the life of the husband... become a citizen of a State or
community different from that of which her husband is a member." Id. at 600-02 (Daniel, J.,
dissenting).
313 Resources here included a "next friend"-George Cronkhite, in Huldah Barber's case-
who brought suit on her behalf. See id. at 583.
314 It is possible that quick readers of Barber viewed it (erroneously) as a territorial case. In
1836, Congress created the Territory of Wisconsin. See An Act Establishing the Territorial
Government of Wisconsin, ch. 54, § 1, 5 Stat. 10, 11-11 (1836). On May 29, 1848, Wisconsin
was admitted to the Union. See An Act for the Admission of the State of Wisconsin into the
Union, ch. 50, § 1, 9 Stat. 233, 233 (1848). Apparently, Huldah Barber also unsuccessfully
sought redress at law in the state courts in 1849. See Barber v. Barber, 2 Reports of the Cases
Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wisconsin and of the State
of Wisconsin 297, 300 (1874) (holding that decree for alimony "belongs to that numerous class
of decrees which, from their very nature, cannot be enforced in any other than a court of
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which concluded that "[a]limony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separa-
tion from bed and board is as much a debt of record, until the decree has
been recalled, as any other judgment for money is, ''315 has been ignored.
By 1890 in In re Burrus,3 16 the Court claimed that the "whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States. '317
The explanation, provided by the dissenters in Barber, of why the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction provides insight into nineteenth century
views about the respective spheres of the state and federal governments:
It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Gov-
ernment having its origin in causes and necessities, political,
general, and external, that it should assume to regulate the do-
mestic relations of society.... If such functions are to be exer-
cised by the Federal tribunals, it is important to inquire by what
rule or system of proceeding.., they are to be enforced.... The
Federal tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the
habits of the different members of private families in their do-
mestic intercourse. 318
The question, of course, is whether this explanation remains vital at the
end of the twentieth century.
The assumption of lack of federal judicial power over personal rela-
tions has been eroded by litigation over the course of this century about
reproduction and federal benefits, both of which structure relations
among "different members of private families in their domestic inter-
chancery, where one exists."). Huldah Barber thereafter, by her next friend, George Cronk-
hite filed her bill against Hiram Barber in the District Court of the United States for the
district of Wisconsin. See Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 583.
Subsequent cases, in which jurisdiction over divorce itself was permitted, relied on draw-
ing lines between territorial federal courts and Article III federal courts, and many cited Bar-
ber. See, e.g., De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1906) (noting that no
diversity jurisdiction existed because "husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different
States ... [and] a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value," but that federal
territorial court of the Philippines does have jurisdiction because the general rule that courts of
United States have no jurisdiction upon subject of divorce has no application); Simms v.
Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) (describing that, in the territories, Congress has "full legisla-
tive power over all subjects upon which the legislature of a State might legislate"); Cheely v.
Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 705 (1884) (discussing court for Territory of Colorado's grant of
divorce).
315 Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 595.
316 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
317 Id. at 593-94 (discussing Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847)); see also A.
Peeler, supra note 281, at 205-06 (stating in chapter devoted to "source and rule of decision of
legal and equitable rights" for "domestics relations," that "[t]he authority rests with the sev-
eral States to regulate the domestic relations, and to say who may and who may not marry
within their respective limits").
318 Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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course." Further, that assertion ignored nineteenth century federal ef-
forts to control polygamy and sexual relations, which in turn affect
family relations, albeit nontraditional ones. In 1862, 1882, and 1887,
Congress outlawed polygamy. 319 Fragments of these laws still remain.320
While this legislation was directed at federal governance of the territories
and was implemented by the federal courts in their capacity as "territo-
rial courts" (thus acting as "state courts" for these purposes3 21), other
federal legislation did bring the federal courts into the governance of
multiple marriages in the states. The "Mann Act"-involving federal
regulation of sexual aCtivity3 22-was used in prosecutions of individuals
319 See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (outlawing bigamy in territories "or
other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction"); Act of March 22, 1882,
ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (outlawing polygamy "in a Territory or other place over which the United
States have exclusive jurisdiction" and prohibiting polygamists from voting in territorial or
other elections), amended by Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (providing for compe-
tency of witnesses of spouses "but [spouses] shall not be compelled to testify... without the
consent of either husband or wife, as the case may be... "; prohibiting "adultery"-when "act
is committed between a married woman and a man who is unmarried, both parties to such act
shall be deemed guilty... ; and when such act is committed between a married man and a
woman unmarried, the man shall be deemed guilty... "; and providing for marriage ceremo-
nies to be certified as such); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878)
(upholding constitutionality of 1862 Act and declining to find religious exception); Carol Weis-
brod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26
J. Fam. L. 741, 754-59 (1987-1988) (analyzing absence of religious exemption for Mormons of
laws barring polygamy). For discussion of how this federal regulation of families blocked the
legal recognition of "alternative forms of marriage," see Carol Weisbrod & Pamela Sheingorn,
Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth-Century Forms of Marriage and the Status of Women,
10 Conn. L. Rev. 828, 857-58 (1978).
320 Section 9 of the 1882 Act was repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 634 (1966);
Section 8 of that Act was codified originally at 48 U.S.C. § 1461 but was then repealed by Pub.
L. No. 98-213, 97 Stat. 1463 (1983). Insofar as I can tell, the 1862 antipolygamy statute has
not been repealed. Further, federal law prohibits the "contracting of polygamous or plural
marriages" in the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (1988).
321 See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828). Reynolds involves
federal governance of a territory in which federal power to regulate family relations is less
debatable than in the context of states. Regulation of family relations within Indian tribes was
addressed in United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). In Quiver, South Dakota had
prosecuted a Sioux for adultery; the Court held that a state could not regulate the "domestic
relations of the Indians with each other." Id. at 604. Further, absent express congressional
authorization, "the relations of the Indians, among themselves-the conduct of one toward
another-is to be controlled by the customs and laws of the tribe." Id. at 605-06. See also
G.W. Bartholomew, Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in America, 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
1022, 1033-68 (1964) (noting that federal law was more accepting of polygamous marriages
among tribal members). Federal deference to tribal decisions might stem from respect for
tribal sovereignty; an alternative view, suggested by Weisbrod & Sheingorn, supra note 319, at
857 n.152, is that federal law regulated non-Christians less than Christians. See John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty, in the Essential Works of John Stuart Mill 249, 338 (Max Lerner ed., 1965)
(polygamy "though permitted to Mohammedans, and Hindus, and Chinese, seems to excite
unquenchable animosity when practiced by persons who speak English and profess to be a
kind of Christians").
322 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988).
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who transported women in "interstate commerce. ' 323 In one of the cases
prosecuted under the Mann Act, the Court expressly endorsed Con-
gress's authority to "defeat what are deemed to be immoral practices; the
fact that the means used may have the 'quality of police regulations' is
not consequential. ' 324 Despite a claim of noninvolvement in interper-
sonal relations (some of which might bear the title "family"), federal law
and federal courts have, on selected occasions, taken on these issues.
The Barber majority did not fashion an opinion that had to be read
as disclaiming power over relations among former family members. The
opinion discussed at length the capacity of a legally separated wife to
have a separate domicile,3 25 qualifying her as a diversity litigant capable
of enforcing a debt, and the dissent objected to the exercise of that
power. 326 Since Barber, the article III federal judiciary has from time to
time exercised its jurisdiction in certain spheres of "family life"-taken
by virtue of constitutional interpretation, congressional enactment, and
federal common-law interpretation. Acknowledgement of this jurisdic-
tion is necessary for accurate description of the respective spheres of fed-
eral and state governmental control over interpersonal relations. While
federal jurisdiction is by no means comprehensive, it has been a force in
family governance.
But the power (and appeal?) of the rhetoric of federal noninvolve-
ment has been so strong that the presumption of disengagement per-
suaded the Supreme Court to disavow jurisdiction of article III federal
courts even in cases of arguably exclusive federal court jurisdiction. The
prime example, Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler,3 27 is a case involving a
foreign official living in the United States. In Popovici, federal court ju-
risdiction was asserted on the grounds that one of the litigants, John C.
Popovici, who was stationed in Cleveland, Ohio, was a "vice-consul" for
the "Kingdom of Roumania, ' '328 and as such, a party over whom the
federal courts had jurisdiction "exclusive" of the states.3 29 When Helen
Popovici sued him in state court for "divorce and alimony,"330 he
323 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 (1946); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 486-89 (1917).
324 Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 19 (quoting Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) and
upholding the prosecution, under the Mann Act, of Mormons who practiced polygamy).
325 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 597-98 (1859).
326 See id. at 600-02.
327 280 U.S. 379 (1930). Popovici has recently been narrowed by the Court's ruling in
Ankenbrandt. See note 32 supra.
328 See Popovici, 280 U.S. at 382.
329 Id. at 382-83 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ("The Judicial Power shall extend.., to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.... .") and Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, §§ 24, 233, 256, 36 Stat. 1093, 1156, 1160 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251,
1351 (1988)).
330 Id. at 379.
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claimed immunity from suit on the grounds that the federal courts had
exclusive jurisdiction. 331 Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes stated that, even when meeting the requirements for federal ju-
risdiction, "domestic" disputes were not to be heard by the federal
courts. 332 While noting the possible foreign relations implications,
Holmes relied on Helen Popovici's "position" as a United States citi-
zen, 333 and thus invoked the court-made rule that the federal courts did
not speak to the issue of the termination of marriage.334
Holmes's view might be understood as rejecting claims of immunity
from suit by foreign officials, and thereby as enabling women (assumed to
be the spouses of a male corps of "ambassadors, other public ministers
... counsuls or vice-counsuls") to have access to state courts, and thus as
a victory for women. But he also blocked women from access to the
federal courts. Holmes had another option. Had he acknowledged even
their limited role as territorial courts in domestic relations, Holmes could
have permitted federal courts to consider divorce actions when foreign
officials were parties. 335 This struggle about jurisdictional boundaries in
family law cases used to be a part of the literature of federal courts. Po-
povici, like Happersett, was available to prior generations of federal
331 Id. at 380.
332 See id. at 383 (citing Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593, 594 (1890); Barber v. Barber,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 597-98 (1859); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); and De La
Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906)). Justice Holmes read the congressional
statute, that granted exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts "[o]f all suits and proceedings
against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, or
against consuls or vice-consuls" in light of "the tacit assumptions upon which it is reasonable
to suppose that the language was used"-that it is "true as has been unquestioned for three-
quarters of a century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce."
Id. at 383.
333 Id. at 384.
334 See id. For another instance in which domestic relations concerns were invoked to limit
federal jurisdiction in a case involving international law, see Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d
625, 632-34 (6th Cir. 1978) (refusing jurisdiction over case filed, under international law, fed-
eral treaties and constitutional and statutory provisions, by relatives of Vietnamese children
who had been brought to the United States on a "babylift").
335 See, e.g., 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1652,
at 519-21 (Boston 1833) ("[lIt is obvious that every question in which these rights, powers,
duties, and privileges [of public ministers and counsuls] is so intimately connected with the
public peace, and policy, and diplomacy of the nation, and touches the dignity and interest of
the sovereigns of the ministers concerned so deeply, that it would be unsafe that they should be
submitted to any other, than the highest judicature of the nation.").
A "standard" federal courts question is whether Holmes had the option of finding concur-
rent jurisdiction and leaving the plaintiff with the initial choice of forum. See, e.g., Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 798 (1992) (finding original Supreme Court jurisdiction appropri-
ate, but cautioning that grant of original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1) is "obliga-
tory only in appropriate cases," defined by reference to the "'seriousness and dignity of the
claim... [and] the availability of another forum' ") (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 93 (1972)).
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courts students. In a 1931 publication, Cases and Other Authorities on
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure336 Felix Frankfurter and Wilber Katz
entitled a section "Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction in Probate and
Domestic Relations," and included the text of Popovici.337
The point here is not that federal law in fact governs all aspects of
family life. Reviewing the occasions upon which the federal courts have
exercised jurisdiction over family relations, one does not unearth a com-
prehensive federal law of domestic relations. Rather, one finds a pattern
of interaction between the national government and individuals, some
but by no means all of whom reside in federal territories, about discrete
issues relating to family life, marriage, sexuality, and economic relations.
When this history of sporadic federal intervention is coupled with the
many contemporary federal laws that affect and regulate family life, the
336 F. Frankfurter & W. Katz, supra note 301.
337 Id. at 469-70; see also A. Dobie & M. Ladd, supra note 301, at 855-57 (reproducing
Popovici in chapter entitled, The Relations of State and Federal Courts); Felix Frankfurter &
Harry Shulman, Cases and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 477-78
(rev. ed. 1937) (reproducing Popovici). Neither Medina's 1926 casebook, see note 301 supra,
nor McCormick & Chadbourn's 1946 casebook, see note 301 supra, include the case or discuss
the domestic relations exception. Frankfurter, when a Justice, described a "most important
aspect of our federalism" to be that "'the domestic relations of husband and wife .. were
matters reserved to the States'... and do not belong to the United States." Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 333 (1945) (quoting Popovici and citing Burrus).
Like the conclusion in Popovici, another line of federal cases disclaims power over child
custody, brought to their attention through habeas corpus jurisdiction. Some of these federal
"family law" cases provide jurisprudential statements about the "special solicitude" for states'
interests in this area. See, e.g., Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458
U.S. 502, 508-16 (1982) (declining habeas corpus jurisdiction to challenge state court termina-
tion of parental rights); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596 (1890) (stating that "the relations of
the father and child are not matters governed by the laws of the United States, and that the
writ of habeas corpus is not to be used"); In re Barry, 42 F. 113 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844) (denying
federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction in child custody dispute between New York resident
mother and Nova Scotia father), appeal dismissed sub nom. Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 103, 120 (1847) (noting lack of appellate jurisdiction because its appellate rights rested
on statutory amounts in controversy). Justices decline to disturb what they repeatedly de-
scribe as the parens patriae role of states in the lives of their citizens.
Federal courts also have declined to decide child custody disputes, in part on the grounds
that even were parents diverse, no amount in controversy could be established because the
dispute cannot be "reduced to monetary value." John W. Dwyer, The Law and Procedure of
the United States Courts 193 (1901) ("in such a case there is no pecuniary standard of value, as
it rises superior to money considerations"); see also Charles P. Williams, Jurisdiction and
Practice of Federal Courts: A Handbook for Practitioners and Students 100 (1917) ("the ines-
timable privilege of civil liberty, the value of the custody of a child, or of a severance of the
marriage relation, are too imponderable to be weighed and calculated in the ordinary method
of business transactions.... A jurisdiction over such matters, in so far as dependent upon the
amount in controversy, must be declined, in order to protect the limited jurisdiction of the
federal courts."). According to more recent commentary, the child custody disputes raise a
constitutional question: "If in fact the states alone have the power to act as parens patriae,
then the problem may be one not of statutory interpretation, but rather of the Constitution
itself." Vestal & Foster, supra note 304, at 36 (footnote omitted).
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idea that family law belongs to the states becomes problematic.
On some occasions, federal courts have deferred to state courts and
declined to hear "domestic relations" claims. In other cases, federal
courts take "domestic" issues to be part of their jurisdiction. In federal
family law, one finds a series of abstention doctrines,338 akin to the many
other abstention and comity doctrines that form the bases for a vast liter-
ature on federal and state jurisdictional lines. 339 Indeed, the whole of the
Barber opinion is an exegesis on roles-of state and federal courts, of
communities and the nation, of women as wives and men as husbands.
The majority opinion is an early (1859) statement of national courts'
powers, as well as of women's rights. The subsequent construction of
that case as about the disavowal of federal court authority, and the over-
lay of congressional regulation of family life might be a basis for teachers
and theorists of the federal courts to discuss the appropriate allocation of
authority between state and federal court systems, a centerpiece of fed-
eral courts' scholarship and teaching.
But instead of the presence of this issue, one finds silence. Only one
contemporary casebook of which I am aware reproduces a case that is
about the "domestic relations" exception.340 The rest,3 41 like many of
the earlier casebooks,3 42 either mention the issue in textual comments,3 43
338 These family law deference doctrines are labeled as such. See Paul M. Bator, Daniel J.
Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 1460-64 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing abstention domestic relations).
339 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pull-
man Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071 (1974); Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too
Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 Geo. L.J. 99 (1986); Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassess-
ment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983
Duke L.J. 987; see also Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1, 72-88 (1988).
340 See Martin H. Redish, Federal Courts: Cases, Comments and Questions 589-93 (2d ed.
1989). Redish reproduced a 1973 opinion by Judge Friendly, Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim
& Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973), in which a law firm brought a diversity
action against a client for fees on divorce work. One issue was whether Barber, as interpreted,
barred the lawsuit. While holding that the domestic relations exception had been "narrowly
confined" and did not apply, Judge Friendly used the occasion to decry diversity jurisdiction
over the issue that involved New York contract law. See Rosentiel, 490 F.2d at 514-16. Pro-
fessor Redish also describes the probate exception and questions whether special jurisdictional
rules for probate and domestic cases are appropriate. See M. Redish, supra, at 594-95. His
questions do not link the domestic relations exception with any attitudes towards women.
341 The contemporary casebooks, of which the most recent editions were reviewed, include:
P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin & D. Shapiro, supra note 338; David P. Currie, Federal
Court Cases and Materials (4th ed. 1990); H. Fink & M. Tushnet, supra note 301, Ray For-
rester & John E. Moye, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: Cases and Materials (3d ed.
1977); Peter W. Low & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State
Relations (2d ed. 1989); Charles T. McCormick, James H. Chadbour & Charles Alan Wright,
Cases and Materials on Federal Courts (8th ed. 1988).
342 See, e.g., A. Dobie & M. Ladd, supra note 301, at 857 n.44 (quoting from Barber after
their reproduction of Popovici; C. McCormick & J. Chadbourn, supra note 301, at 399 n.26
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in notes, 344 or not at all.3 45 Further only one other teaching book notes
the history of married women's domicile as linked to that of their hus-
bands and questions the constitutionality of that rule in light of recent
cases on women's rights.34 6
Of course, only in 1992 has the Supreme Court raised the doctrinal
(referring to Burrus); H. Medina, supra note 301, at 15-19 (first chapter, called "Nature,
Source, and Extent of the Federal Judicial Power," included In re Barry, noted In re Burrus,
and included footnote reference with brief excerpts from majority and dissent in Barber v.
Barber).
343 See, e.g., P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin & D. Shapiro, supra note 338, which includes
a "Note on Federal Jurisdiction in Matters of Domestic Relations" with a few quotes from
Barber and Burrus, and describing Popovici. The litigants in Barber are described as a "wan-
dering husband" and a "home-staying wife." Id. at 1460.
The authors then explain that the "domestic relations exception is firmly established in
the lower courts, but its boundaries are unsettled." Id. The authors locate the roots of the
doctrine in the role of the state as parens patriae, see id. at 1461, and then review criticism of
the doctrine and suggest that it may be understood less as an absence of power and more as a
doctrine of "discretionary abstention." Id. at 1463. The authors also cite to Lehman v.
Lycoming Cty. Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982). See P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P.
Mishkin & D. Shapiro, supra note 338, at 1464. In addition, the authors note the existence of
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988) and the Court's
refusal to find federal court jurisdiction thereunder. See id. The authors also address the
"probate" exception. See id. at 1454-59. In the first edition, published in 1953, the authors
questioned the domestic relations disclaimer. H. Hart & H. Wechsler, supra note 301, at 1017
(noting that Burrus raised more narrow question of whether, via federal courts' habeas corpus
jurisdiction, child custody could be decided).
344 See D. Currie, supra note 341, at 324 n.6 (quoting Popovici and at 567, describing Barber
and Spindel, and examining the "probate" exception to federal court jurisdiction); R. Forrester
& J. Moye, supra note 341, at 194 (describing "doctrine that federal courts lack competence in
domestic relations" and citing to Barber and its critique by Judge Weinstein in Spindel v.
Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)); C. McCormick, J. Chadbourn & C. Wright, supra
note 341, at 150 n.2 (reviewing Rosensteil, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973)).
345 See, e.g., H. Fink & M. Tushnet, supra note 301; P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 341.
Some but not all of the contemporary treatises discuss the issue. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction 253-54 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (discussing domestic relations doctrine, diffi-
culty of line-drawing, and criticism of doctrine); 1 Moore's Federal Practice 0.71[5.-5], at
749-50 (1992) (explaining exceptions as evidencing "concern for comity, forcing the federal
courts to stay out of important matters of local concern," and noting importance of not over-
stating domestic relations exception, as "federal courts certainly do hear cases involving family
disputes"); Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial
Power 129-30 (2d ed. 1990) (describing doctrine); Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal
Courts 143-45 (4th ed. 1983) ("Today the [domestic relations and probate] exceptions may
more rationally be defended on the ground that these are areas of the law in which the states
have an especially strong interest and a well-developed competence for dealing with them.");
id. at 147 (noting that "a married woman traditionally has acquired the domicile of her hus-
band"); 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 304, § 3609, at 459-80 (Jurisdiction
and Related Matters) (giving detailed discussion of doctrine, its overstatement, and limits).
346 See D. Currie, supra note 341, at 240 n.5; see also 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, supra note 304, § 3614, at 555-58 ("Citizenship of Particular Persons-Married
Women" notes that while the rule remains that a married woman's domicile is that of her
husband, "small amount of time saved by having only one domicile to determine when a hus-
band and wife are parties to the same action is not sufficient to justify what essentially is a sex-
biased rule that certainly will fall eventually").
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issue again by granting review in the Ankerbrandt case. Moreover, over
the course of a century, interest in the legal questions posed by domicile
and diversity jurisdiction has declined, as commentators urge the aboli-
tion of diversity jurisdiction and as other issues take center stage. The
relative silence exemplifies the view that the issues of domestic relations
and married women as domiciliaries in their own right are simply not
high on the list of items to be "covered" when teaching about the al-
ready-too-vast materials within the "federal courts canon." 347
But there is something deeper at work than simply too many topics
to discuss in a semester of "federal courts" and too many examples of
abstention to use. Women and the families they sometimes inhabit are
not only assumed to be outside the federal courts, they also are assumed
not to be related to the "national issues" to which the federal judiciary is
to devote its interests.348 Jurisdictional lines have not been drawn ac-
cording to the laws of nature but by men, who today are seeking to con-
firm their prestige as members of the most important judiciary in the
country. Individual problems move lower on the federal courts'
agenda.349 Dealing with women-in and out of families, arguing about
federal statutory rights of relatively small value--is not how they want to
frame their job.3 50 As a consequence, while present-in federal statu-
tory, administrative, common, and constitutional law-the interaction
between federal courts and women is not a subject of discussion.351 And,
347 That absence from teaching materials and commentaries about the national courts fits
with Sylvia Law's comprehensive review of the founding of the United States. After reading
the debates and papers at the framing of the Constitution, Law concludes, "Virtually nothing
in the original constitutional debates directly addresses the situation of women and families.
." Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 583, 586 (1987).
34S Cf. DeShaney v. Winnegabo Cty. Dep't. Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1989) (holding
fourteenth amendment does not protect child from being beaten by his father after state social
services department returned him to his father's custody because compassion not compensated
by due process clause).
349 See generally Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 Law & Contemp. Probs.
5 (1991) (discussing increasing interest in large scale litigation and concomitant movement of
"small" cases to alternative dispute resolution and agency adjudication).
350 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
238 -39 (1976) (address delivered at National Conference on Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with Administration of Justice, Pound Conference) ("someone far less qualified than a judge"
can decide cases arising under social security, food stamps, federal employers' liability, con-
sumer products, and other federal legislation); FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 55-60 (propos-
als to create article I disability courts); id. at 60-62 (proposal to authorize, with consent of the
parties, test program to send employment discrimination cases to arbitration).
351 The rhetorical overlay is sufficiently confusing that a scholar, writing "from a feminist
perspective," was unable to pierce the incoherency of the claimed division of jurisdiction, even
as she focused on federal adjudication of women's rights. See S. Mezey, supra note 56, at 3, 5
("Because the powers reserved to the state for regulation of health, safety, and public welfare,
matters of divorce, marriage, rape, battery and surrogacy are controlled by state law .... they
are for the most part outside the province of federal law and are omitted here except when they
conflict with federal statutes or constitutional protections.").
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when possible, federal courts divest themselves of "family issues."
C. The Image Created
To summarize, some of the early casebooks and treatises about the
federal courts mentioned women, as disabled litigants, without juridical
voice. In early teaching materials, court decisions, about whether
women were "citizens" and court-made limitations on federal jurisdic-
tion over domestic relations, were topics of discussion. "Early" Annual
Reports about the federal courts also made note of women in a few in-
stances. More recently, women have become less visible in writings
about the federal courts. An assumption of egalitarian treatment oper-
ates as a justification for an unwillingness to inquire into how gender
affects adjudication. Given the construction of domestic relations as out
of the jurisdiction and concerns of the national courts, it is not surprising
that women, so often identified in their roles in families, were similarly
understood to be only obliquely related to the federal courts. These
court-made jurisdictional rules and a limited scholarly interest in them
support an impression that there is something in "the nature of federal
law" that keeps "gender bias problems to a minimum." Such rules also
enable the current unembarrassed efforts by federal judges to resist juris-
diction over civil rights claims motivated by gender. Reports about the
federal courts also do nothing to point to women as litigants and work-
ers; equal employment data are not placed in the principle Annual Re-
ports but in a separate unpublished document, circulated upon request.
Instead of proving the actual absence of gender bias, reviewing the
materials of the federal courts supports the opposite conclusion. These
court-made rules and reports, coupled with a scholarly jurisprudence
that does not challenge the assumptions of the exclusion of family con-
cerns from the federal docket, demonstrate that in the very "nature of
federal law" are lines of jurisdiction, doctrine, and scholarship that
marginalize the "domestic" sphere, linked in this culture to women.
IV
CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENCE
A. Sharing the Field
Pointing out links between federal law and families raises a question,
traditional for federal courts scholars. While not discussed by federal
courts jurisprudence, a complex mosaic of federal regulation of economic
and social relations now overlays state laws on divorce, alimony, and
child support. What is to be made of this fact of joint governance of the
field? Because I hope scholars of federal courts will take seriously the
topic of federal family law, it is appropriate to consider how doctrinal
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developments-shaped by different images of what is on the national
agenda that federal courts implement and adjudicate-might take federal
courts' authority over family life into account. The central question is
what "business is the federal business," 352 and it is time to answer this
question by recognizing that there already is joint federal and state gov-
ernance of an array of issues, from land use and torts to families. Once
understood as a joint endeavor, the next issue is how to allocate
authority.
A first possibility is that federal court involvement in family life is
bad, per se, at a structural level. This claim takes seriously the argu-
ments made in the many cases espousing (slight pun intended) state con-
trol over family life and fearing that the federal courts would become
hopelessly "enmeshed" in family disputes.353 Under this vision, the
states (and Indian tribes) as smaller units of government are closer to
"the people" and thus a more appropriate level of government to deter-
mine matters affecting intimate life.
Possible justifications for this view exist. Contemporary invocations
of the domestic relations exception discard arguments based on ecclesias-
tical authority, the alleged lack of jurisdictional diversity between mar-
ried couples, and the claim that divorces lack monetary value-all in
favor of a "modern view that state courts have historically decided these
matters and have developed both a well-known expertise in these cases
and a strong interest in disposing of them. '3 54 Whether based in nine-
teenth-century or twentieth-century conceptions, 35 the claims of affilia-
tion and expertise require consideration. "Communitarianism" has
strong adherents in contemporary debates on political theory; respecting
groups' self-constitution may entail state governance of the family.3 56
352 Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962).
353 See, e.g., Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that federal court
can decide enforcement of state domestic relations judgment without becoming "enmeshed in
the factual details of the underlying dispute") (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 232-33 (1945)). A related claim is that, as a matter of constitutional law, federal courts
lack "parens patriae" authority. But see Atwood, supra note 303, at 595-98 (disputing this
theory).
354 Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (diversity
suit attempted for nonpayment of alimony). But see id. at 1030 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that there was "nothing 'domestic' about the financial dispute").
355 It is not clear how "modem" to call this position. According to Michael Grossberg,
state "judicial dominance of domestic relations grew out of an abiding commitment to local
control that lay at the heart of nineteenth-century American family law... [and] stemmed
from the deep-seated republican aversion to centralized government in general .. " Michael
Grossberg, Covering the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 295
(1985).
356 Federal court refusal to entertain a claim, brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, that Santa Clara Pueblo illegally refused to recognize as tribal members the children of a
Santa Claran woman who married a Navajo, was based on a similar view that "intratribal
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Further, the existence of some form of an exception to federal court juris-
diction based on probate357 reveals another justification for state con-
trol-an implicit sense of marriage as a status existing within the state's
borders and an ongoing link between sovereign authority and territorial
borders. 358 Holding aside the ever-present question of boundaries, 59
doctrine might shift in a variety of ways when ideological claims about
the relationship between federal courts and family are revised.
First, one could insist that, despite recognition of federal laws of the
family, the claim of deference to state governance remains strong and, as
a matter of doctrine, complete abstention (a form of reverse preemption)
is desirable.36° To the extent recent federal law in bankruptcy, pensions,
and benefits law points in the other direction, that erosion should be
stopped-by legislation or judicial interpretation. But were one to really
press this claim-that states are specially situated and should be control-
ling family life--one would not seek only to cabin the federal courts.
This position would also require urging Congress and agencies to avoid
defining families by rewriting statutes and regulations to incorporate
state law, so as to permit state governance of interpersonal relations. An
array of federal statutes would have to incorporate state definitions of
families, and what would be lost in uniformity and national norms would
be gained in recognition of the special relationship of states in defining
disputes" were particularly appropriate for self-governance. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-61 (1978). But see Resnik, supra note 155, at 702-29 (arguing that inter-
action between cultures of United States and tribes shapes membership rules).
357 See note 304 supra.
358 This justification is supported by the recent Supreme Court decision upholding jurisdic-
tion based on the fleeting presence of a person within a state's borders. See Burnham v. Supe-
rior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990). Burnham, like Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978), involved an interpersonal family dispute that prompted federal adjudication on the
permissible reaches of state court jurisdiction.
359 For example, does state or federal law govern abortion rights? Note that the current
domestic relations exception is invoked in an array of situations, in which courts have accepted
jurisdiction and others in which courts have not. See, e.g., Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 372
(I th Cir. 1988) (exercising jurisdiction over declaratory relief action on claim that state had
denied due process in support proceedings); Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.
1983) (declining jurisdiction in prisoner's effort to obtain right to have his child visit him in
prison); Mauro v. Mauro, 762 F. Supp. 173, 175, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (finding that cause of
action depended on "marital relationship" and declining to find jurisdiction); McCullough by
Jordan v. McCullough, 760 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (making effort to "determine
the true character of this litigation"). See generally Barbara Freedman Wand, A Call for the
Repudiation of the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 307,
335-56 (1985).
360 For exploration of the application of current abstention doctrine to this area, see
Atwood, supra note 303, 605-27; Rebecca E. Swenson, Note, Application of the Federal Ab-
stention Doctrines to the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,
1983 Duke L.J. 1095, 1105-20; see also Congleton v. Holy Cross Child Placement Agency, 919
F.2d 1077, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing abstention and whether claim need only have
family "overtones" rather than be centrally about domestic relations).
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family life.
Alternatively, one might instruct the federal courts to adopt a some-
what weaker form of deference, reminiscent of eleventh amendment doc-
trine361 and conscious of the many instances of congressional silence.
Under such a rule, it would be for the Congress and not the federal
courts to decide when state governance is exclusive. Absent express con-
gressional legislation preempting state authority, federal courts would
permit state rules to govern whenever issues relating to family life are
raised.362 The cases involving federal pension and benefits laws, in which
federal courts have acknowledged states' roles yet held that congressional
intervention overrides the presumption of state governance, could be
read as exemplifying this approach.363 One thus might have a "domestic
relations" exception to diversity jurisdiction, in which no federal claim is
presented, and ask in all federal question cases: what law has Congress
instructed the federal courts to apply?
Yet a third alternative is to have selective federal court interpreta-
tion of congressional silence as a basis for federal law to override state
law. For example, federal courts could construe silence as permitting
state laws to govern except when special federal interests (such as mili-
361 The rule is that congressional alteration of states' immunity needs to be clearly stated in
the statute. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); see also
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (citing Atascadero for proposition that congres-
sional intent must be "unmistakably clear"); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 10
(1989) (same).
362 See, e.g., Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1464 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
("[The] 'Supreme Court has instructed us that when courts face a potential conflict between
state domestic relations law and federal law, the strong presumption is that the state domestic
relations law is not preempted'... .") (quoting Saving & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employ-
ees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038, 1041-43 (7th Cir. 1983)). As illustrated by the dispute about the
reach of ERISA's preemption between majority and dissent in Ablamis, this test still results in
questions of interpretation. See also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989) (ruling
Court will find preemption in domestic relations only when "'positively required by direct
enactment' ") (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 305-06 (1942) (Frankfurther, J., concurring) (stating that if appropri-
ate to have "national authority over marriage and divorce," Congress, not the courts, should
create it; only appropriate role "within its traditional authority and professional competence"
for federal courts is in decisions on full faith and credit).
363 See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 & n.24 (1979) (holding that retire-
ment benefits under Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 may not be divided under California
community property law, but noting that "different considerations might well apply where
Congress has remained silent"). The Court, however, sometimes has declined to find federal
jurisdiction over federal statutory rights. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187
(1988) (holding that Parental Kidnapping Protection Act creates federal law of interstate en-
forcement of custody decrees but not jurisdiction). However, some lower courts take jurisdic-
tion over torts of interference with custodial arrangements, and the 1988 Convention on
International Child Abduction does provide for federal jurisdiction. See also Letter from Pro-
fessor Atwood to author (June 14, 1991) (on file with author).
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tary benefits) are at issue.364 All of these doctrinal positions rely on the
view that states are situated differently from the federal government in
family life; as a consequence, federal courts should prefer state-based ad-
judication and defer to the political legitimacy of state decisions in this
sphere.
A different conception rejects a view that the states are the embodi-
ment of communities that legitimate state governance of intimate life.
While a few states may be relatively homogeneous, the vast majority
have no special claim to a communitarian vision. Therefore, federal
court involvement in family life is not bad, per se, as a matter of federal-
ism. Nonetheless, federal court jurisdiction might still be undesirable,
given federal judicial history-either of noninvolvement or of disclaimers
of such involvement with domestic life. Here the question of the "quality
of the federal bench," as well as that of the "nature of federal law,"
reemerges. 365 Arguments in support of this approach could be tied to
two other strains in the case law claiming a "domestic relations" excep-
tion to federal court jurisdiction. First, in light of this "time-honored
boundary, ' 366 the federal courts lack the requisite knowledge and "are
not, as a matter of fact, competent tribunals to handle" typical domestic
relations cases. 367 Translated, the claim is that federal judges are neither
selected on the basis of knowledge of family law nor trained, once judges,
to become knowledgeable and also lack support staff who might mitigate
these problems. Moreover, given the composition of the docket, federal
courts would be unlikely to gain expertise because their involvement
would be sporadic. Second, the federal courts are too important or the
issues of family law too unappealing, trivial, and "non-national" for fed-
eral court decisionmaking. 368
364 See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) ("Before a state law governing domestic
relations will be overridden, it must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal inter-
ests.") (citations omitted).
365 See FCSC Report, supra note 16, at 169.
366 Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1982).
367 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (upholding
diversity jurisdiction in case involving tortious interference with child custody, but stating that
"alimony, custody, visitation, and child support-often entail continuing judicial supervision
of a volatile family situation. The federal courts are not well suited to this task. They are not
local institutions, they do not have staffs of social workers, and there is too little commonality
between family law adjudication and the normal responsibilities of federal judges to give them
the experience that they would need to be able to resolve domestic disputes with skill and
sensitivity."); see also Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 718 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that fed-
eral courts are "ill-equipped" to make child custody determinations); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F.
Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) (discussing state court development of "a proficiency and expertise
in the area that is almost completely absent in the federal courts") (citing Solomon v. Solomon,
516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975)).
368 See, e.g., Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) ("[W]e do not believe that the Supreme Court today would demand
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The competency claim, at least in the subset of family law dealing
with interpersonal familial relations, has some appeal.3 69 In the words of
one federal court, some questions are:
too hard and too remote from the experience of federal judges
.... Our experience and sense of fairness teach us that this is
not a case where the application of a federal rule ... is likely to
provide the best answer. We must rely on a judge in a court of
family law-with its more flexible standards.. .- to balance the
equities and seek compromises that best accommodate the inter-
ests of the parties.370
Feminism similarly counsels attention to experience, to the knowledge
gained by first-hand understanding of problems. But the imagined state
competence is undermined to some extent by the many state gender bias
task forces that found state judges were biased in this very area of the
assumed expertise-family law cases.3 71 Further, some of those reports
that federal judges waste their time exploring a thicket of state decisional law .... ); Thrower
v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) (domestic relations "vexatious;" federal courts
should allow state courts that "dubious honor exclusively"); cases reviewed in Wand, supra
note 359, at 385-86 (section entitled "The Hidden Reason-Distaste for Domestic Relations
Disputes").
This strand is often coupled with concern about docket congestion. See, e.g., Jagiella v.
Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding diversity jurisdiction over failure to
pay alimony arrears but not over counterclaims for alienation of children's affection). "Judicial
economy" is also an explanation given for the probate exception. See, e.g., Dragan v. Miller,
679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
369 But see Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1978) (case involving "little
more than a private contract to pay money to persons long since divorced" raises no problems
of competence other than those always found in diversity litigation).
370 Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 634 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing generally Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976))
(emphasis in original). Note the two elements of this claim; the first that judges lack experi-
ence, and the second that federal law is intrinsically less flexible that state law. As to the first,
once federal laws of the family are acknowledged as such, then federal judges also will have to
acknowledge that they have had some experience with some aspects of family law. As to the
second claim, federal constitutional remedies, including structural injunctions, make it difficult
to believe that federal judges could not, should they choose, develop the "flexible standards"
required for a particular area. Indeed many of the federal justiciability doctrines are criticized
precisely because of their malleability. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
15-20 (1964) (critiquing Alexander M. Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch-The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (1961)).
371 See, e.g., Maryland Task Force Report, supra note 39, at v-viii (noting victims of domes-
tic violence discredited, blamed, and badgered; many judges "lack understanding" of domestic
violence); id. at xiv (noting gender bias in custody decisions); Utah Task Force Report, supra
note 39, at S-4 ("women and men do not have equal access to the courts ... ; [g]ender-based
stereotypes about proper roles for men and women serve to disadvantage mothers in some
situations and fathers in others"). For an argument that the federal courts' experience in fam-
ily issues as they arise in tax and immigration law gives those courts sufficient knowledge, see
Wand, supra note 359, at 363-66.
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also detail a parallel devaluation of family law.372 Trivialization of fam-
ily life is a problem that defies jurisdictional boundaries. While the fed-
eral courts may lack the experience, the lesson from state bias studies is
that experience alone is insufficient.
This disheartening news from state courts does not, however, end
the discussion. To the extent federal judges think family law beneath
them or not interesting, they either will not or cannot do it wisely.373
But that problem goes beyond the question of whether the federal courts
might take on new areas of jurisdiction and rewrite the "domestic rela-
tions" exception. Many federal statutes already involve federal judges in
family life. The express disinterest or claimed incompetence in domestic
relations may spill over to disdainful or uninformed decisionmaking in
cases pending under current doctrinal parameters. To the extent that
such federal judicial disinterest is widespread, one might urge Congress
to rewrite statutes-to locate enforcement of some of its legislation that
involves family life in the state courts, which (according to federal
judges) are better equipped to handle them.
Yet a problem remains. The current hierarchy stipulates the federal
courts as most powerful; the supremacy clause confirms that sense of
authority. Further, federal courts theorists might affirmatively argue
that federal courts are needed in this area-either because of their spe-
cial capacity to protect the politically disfavored374 or because federal
372 See Draft California Task Force Report, supra note 44, at 55 ("Judges rate the family
law assignment as their lowest preference by a wide margin"); Florida Task Force Report,
supra note 39, at 77 (noting strong "dislike" by judges of family law assignments); see also
Connecticut Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 39 ("Some attorneys felt that because
women attorneys... practiced juvenile or domestic law," they were less likely to be selected by
Judicial Selection Commission for judgeships); Maryland Task Force Report, supra note 39, at
100 (noting that when applying for judgeships, experience with domestic relations law not
likely to be valued as highly as experience with jury trials and criminal prosecutions).
373 For concern about bias in judicial judgments and discretion in this area in general, see
Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibili-
ties, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1483, 1518-20 (1991).
Thus, proposals for outright abolition of the domestic relations exception so as to treat
such cases like any other federal case ignore the problems of transition and the potential short
shrift that federal judges may give to such cases. See, e.g., Mark Stephen Poker, A Proposal
for the Abolition of the Domestic Relations Exception, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 141, 162-64 (1987);
Wand, supra note 359, at 385-401.
374 See R. Posner, supra note 157, at 180. Posner's concerns also would mandate that fed-
eral judges and not state judges make decisions in cases in which politically unpopular family
ties are sought. See id. Unfortunately, many article III judges have not been protective of
such relations. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (upholding Geor-
gia sodomy statute in face of argument that it violated federal constitutional rights of gays and
lesbians). But cf. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 705-11 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding army
estopped from denying reenlistment to Watkins on the basis of his acknowledged
homesexuality).
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sovereign and administrative interests are at stake.375 While neither the
appeal to the community envisioned by the claim of closeness of the state
to the family nor the concern about attitudes and knowledge of federal
judges should be discounted, the "inevitability of federal involvement" 376
in family life remains, as does a sense that the rejection of that role by
federal courts reconfirms the marginalization of women and families
from national life.
Federal involvement emerges here, as it does in torts, land use,
health regulation, criminal law, and other areas, because of the wealth of
interactions that make the imagined coherence of the very categories
"federal" and "state" themselves problematic. Whether looking at the
problem from the top down, and seeing "joint governance" or consider-
ing the issue from the perspective of individuals and speaking of "mem-
bership in multiple communities," the point is the same: an interlocking,
enmeshed regulatory structure covers the host of human activity in the
United States. There is no a priori line one can invoke to separate legal
regulation into two bounded boxes "state" and "federal.1 377 Uniform
state laws demonstrate the limits of state court borders and the need for
regulatory structures that bridge them. State and federal court interpre-
tations of "family" are unavoidable.
Thus, a third model of federal/state relations, one named by Robert
M. Cover and T. Alexander Alienkoff as "dialectical federalism," be-
comes appropriate to explore.378 Their context was joint federal/state
governance of criminal law, by virtue of federal courts' occasional in-
volvement in habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners. 379 Cover
and Alienkoff's aspiration was for a dialogue in which state and federal
judges, working on the same problems from differing perspectives, might
375 See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 167, at 80-85.
376 Harry D. Krause, Family Law: Cases, Comments, and Questions (3d ed. 1990), at 299
("question thus is not whether the tax, welfare, or family law should be the vehicle for social
policy, they are that simply by their existence") (emphasis in original); see also Vestal & Fos-
ter, supra note 304, at 31 ("The federal courts should refuse to exercise jurisdiction in domestic
relations cases only where a problem of status arises. where only property rights are involved,
jurisdiction should be taken.") (footnote omitted).
377 Another way to put this is to ask whether there are any constitutional limits on congres-
sional authority to regulate family life. See, e.g., Lewis Mayers, Ex Parte Divorce: A Pro-
posed Federal Remedy, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 54, 59-64 (1954) (arguing for federal regulation of
"ex parte divorces").
378 See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Alienkoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035 (1977); see also Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 639 (1981) (analyz-
ing utility of concurrent jurisdiction and of the conflict that sometimes emerges). Because the
Supreme Court has just limited the exception to diversity cases involving divorce, alimony, or
child custody decrees (see Ankenbrandt, note 32 supra), the federal and state courts may well
have the opportunity to engage in such interrelated work.
379 See Cover & Alienkoff, supra note 378, at 1035-36.
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enhance the development of norms and obtain new understandings by
watching parallel systems generate legal rules.380 In this context, over-
lapping issues-of defining families, of how many heads of households
may exist, of whether to support co-parenting obligations, of how savings
and pensions are to be allocated among the workers who comprise the
family unit, of what remedies should be available for violence occurring
in the home-provide occasions for overlapping decisionmaking. To the
extent that two court systems are populated by judges empowered by
different institutional arrangements (life tenure, appointment, and elec-
tion) and working in contexts with differing ideologies, their simultane-
ous and, to some extent, redundant exploration of issues of family life
provide opportunities for confirmation of shared norms, as well as for
dialogue about the disjunctions that emerge.
Yet a fourth option is to imagine a world of literal joint work and
pooled resources. Rather than choosing either federal or state court as
the dominant jurisdiction or having them work sequentially in conversa-
tion, why not have them work together, simultaneously? In some large-
scale tort cases, in which state and federal courts have overlapping juris-
diction, federal and state judges have literally shared jurisdiction-sitting
together and issuing joint orders. 381 Proposals for "pooling resources"
and sharing information, as well as for joint governance, have been put
forth in the criminal context as well. 382 Transferring these insights to the
family law arena, one might imagine a federal trial judge (aware of state
court decisionmaking about particular litigants in a "family" case in
which federal issues also arise) seeking the kind of intercourt cooperation
used in some of the mass torts cases. But to devise either such informal
or formal coordination 383 requires first that both state and federal judges
acknowledge the legitimacy of their exercise of jurisdiction and second
that they perceive the issues at stake as worth the effort and time.
380 See id. at 1036.
381 Two well-known examples are the New York asbestos litigation in which Judge Helen
E. Freedman, of the Supreme Court of New York, and Judge Jack Weinstein, of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sat together, see In re Joint E. & S.
Dists. Asbestos Litigation, No. 40000, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7578 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (docu-
ments on file with author), and the work of federal and state judges in the collapse of a building
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, see Lucy Katz, The L'Ambiance Plaza Mediation: A Case Study
in Judicial Settlement of Mass Torts, 5 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 277 (1990) (describing efforts of
Judges Robert C. Zampano of United States District Court for District of Connecticut and
Frank S. Meadow of Connecticut Superior Court to resolve L'Ambiance Plaza tort litigation).
382 See Chief Justice McKusick, Combining Resources, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1990, at 13
(describing creation of National Federal-State Judicial Council by Conference of Chief Justices
and Judicial Conference of United States, and suggesting that "war on drugs" and mass-tort
cases might be arenas in which to work cooperatively).
383 See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 349, at 36-39 (discussing judicial
and lawyer innovations that permit informal aggregate processing of cases).
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These are some of the doctrinal possibilities, but potentially creative
opportunities cannot be taken under current circumstances. Given the
history of federal judicial disdain for family law issues, federal judges
have been reluctant to acknowledge their capacity to work in this area.
While some who believe that the federal judiciary is now hostile to civil
rights enforcement might be eager to hide behind any label that divests
federal courts of jurisdiction, for me the "domestic relations" exception
no longer suffices to code activity as outside federal court authority. The
burden of reasoning (imposed in other areas when federal courts decline,
in the name of comity and "our federalism," the exercise of jurisdic-
tion3S4) is required.
B. A State-Federal Dialogue on Gender
Doctrinal shifts cannot happen without a concomitant documenta-
tion of women's presence as federal litigants, of women's presence as fed-
eral workers, mostly at the lower echelons of the courts, and of women's
absence from contemporary materials about the federal courts, all of
which might result in sustained inquiry about discrimination against
women in federal courts. While state court gender bias studies have as-
sumed women's presence and moved on to explore the implications,
studies in the federal system will have to trace women's presences and
absences to understand the operation of gender in the federal courts.
Federal courts will have to confront not only the data about workplaces,
courtroom interaction, and substantive law, but also the very nature of
their jurisdictional rules and the separate spheres ideology to which those
rules are wedded.
Federal court inquiry into gender bias may take the courts deeper
into an understanding of their own limits, for part of that inquiry re-
quires asking about the past disinterest in raising such questions. I began
by considering why states moved ahead of the federal courts in gender
bias studies, but thus far I have answered only by explaining why the
federal courts were behind. I can only suggest paths of inquiry about
what, in the "nature" of state law, jurisdiction, and ideology or in the
394 One approach, explored to some extent in the Court's decision in Ankenbrandt, 60
U.S.L.W. at 4537, and in Justice Blackmun's concurrence, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4537, 4539-40,
would be to consider whether to abstain under the current doctrinal parameters of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (used when there are pending state court or administrative
proceedings that are "judicial in nature"); or New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. Council of the City of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1959) (invoked as so-called "administrative abstention" in
which areas of particular interest to the states-like eminent domain or natural resources-
might form a predicate for federal court inaction); or Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
390-91 (1974) (relied upon in a diversity litigation in which state legal rules were hard to
foresee).
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selection of state judges, enabled those judiciaries to be more responsive
to concerns of discrimination. Perhaps state judges are more open to
perceiving themselves as in need of education (in general) than are article
III judges. Perhaps state judges, many of whom are elected, are more
concerned about the administration of justice and the perceptions of jus-
tice in their courts. Perhaps state judges are more committed to equality
norms. Perhaps the activity of ruling on events so vividly bound up with
gender construction generated interest. Perhaps the work did not initiate
with the judiciary but from outside it. Because state and local govern-
ments include more women and men of color and white women, those
voices might have been heard more easily. Perhaps law firms, public sec-
tor lawyers, law professors, and litigants have played critical roles. Per-
haps the women and men who organized to oppose discrimination in and
by courts thought state judiciaries more accessible than the federal
courts.
Federal court investigation of gender permits not only self-reflection
and structural comparisons with state court systems but also an opportu-
nity to decide what aspects of gender to consider. Once the troubling
equation of "women" with "families" and the accompanying assumption
of the absence of family matters from the federal courts are underscored,
the question of what stance to take about the linkage of women and fam-
ily life emerges. Women, by law, have been specially disabled when in
families; until relatively recently, with marriage came the loss of a
woman's juridical voice. Thus, linking women to their roles in families is
fair when seeking to understand the impact of many laws on women.
However, families are by no means the totality of women's existence
nor of their relationship to law. Moreover, the world of "domestic rela-
tions," equated in jurisdictional rules with issues of heterosexual mar-
riage, support, and child custody, and framed by implicit assumptions
about class and race, is itself too narrow. Domestic relations encompass
much more, including the interaction between federal and state economic
and constitutional regulation of the relations among current and former
family members.3 8 5 Those coming from the perspective of family law as
an academic discipline recognize that federal law now "mandate[s] na-
tionally uniform, federal answers to many basic policy issues in family
385 See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Carol Glowinsky, Cases and Problems on Domestic
Relations%(4th ed. 1990) (including discussions of law of procreative choice, child abuse, legal
status of married women, and impact of federal taxation on divorce); Krause, supra note 375
(discussing tort and criminal law in context of family relations, bankruptcy, "the inevitability
of federal involvement" in federal policy, and legal rights of women); Walter Wadlington,
Cases and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (2d ed. 1990) (including discussions on
procreation, abuse, bankruptcy, social security benefits, and tax laws).
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law."' 386 However, federal courts jurisprudence has not yet seen through
the nineteenth-century layers (women in families, families constituted
narrowly, state courts' governance of families) that continue to obscure
twentieth-century federal court involvement with the family.38 7
But the federal courts do not alone shoulder the responsibility for
having failed to see the changing governance of family life. Not only
have federal judges and federal courts scholars assumed the absence of
federal laws of the family, state courts have claimed a corresponding spe-
cial relationship to family life, and that claim is grounded in both prac-
tice and ideology. While I have spent many pages emphasizing the ways
in which state and federal courts share control over family life, the pur-
pose was not to conflate the two. Federal judges do not regularly decide
the custodial relations of children of divorcing parents; federal judges do
not see many of the problems common in juvenile detention; and federal
judges do not determine adoption or the rules, at first instance, of the
allocation of property at divorce.
Moreover, gender bias studies in state courts themselves have as-
sumed and underscored the special relationship between state law and
families. Although gender bias studies are relatively new, a "tradition"
has emerged, in large measure guided by a 1986 Manual for operating
gender bias task forces. 388 One aspect of that effort is heroic. All of
these task forces break with the conventional understanding of the ad-
ministration of justice in the United States, which has been reluctant to
consider discrimination by the legal system against categories of individ-
uals and its effect on individual cases.389 While invoking the aspirations
396 H. Krause, supra note 376, at 294 (emphasis in original).
387 See generally M. Grossberg, supra note 355, at x, 289-307 (tracing role of 19th-century
state appellate judges in creating body of law and policies "spacious enough to accommodate
the diversity of interests.., yet cohesive enough to establish a national standard of domestic
governance."). Today's "buzz" word "diversity" may have special meaning within debates
about the breadth and role of "diversity jurisdiction" in that excluding cases in which domestic
relations issues are raised is a way to make "diversity jurisdiction" less "diverse."
That federal courts jurisprudence clings to earlier images is not surprising, nor unique to
this context. This critique of federal courts jurisprudence, with its difficulty in taking into
account the altered role of the federal government, parallels the history of the contemporary
course, as described by Akhil Amar, who, in his review of the 1988 edition of the Hart and
Wechsler casebook described the first edition's 1953 framework and its 1973 revision for fail-
ing to take into account the transformations of first the New Deal and then the federalism of
the post-Brown v. Board of Education era. See Amar, supra note 155, at 702-11.
388 L. Schafran & N. Wilder, supra note 43. The manual provides a wealth of suggestions
about how to enlist support, collect data, disseminate findings, and set up a structure for ongo-
ing distribution of information, for implementation of reform, and for monitoring of changes.
See id. at 5-8 (summarizing the suggestions). For commentary on its approach, see generally J.
Entmacher, supra note 67.
389 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987) (refusing to recognize systemic
racial prejudice in sentencing and insisting on proof of discrimination in individual cases).
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of impartial justice, gender bias task forces challenge that assumption
and obtain admissions by senior court officials of partial justice.390
But, at the same time and perhaps in part because of the nature of
the challenge made, state task forces have kept a limited focus; much of
the work is about women in families. That Manual highlights topics to
be addressed by several state task forces; in addition to courtroom inter-
action and the court as employer, the substantive legal issues proposed
are "domestic abuse," "alimony," and "juvenile justice. ' 391 State task
force reports echo that emphasis. All of the chapters of Maryland's re-
port (other than those dealing with courtroom interaction, selection of
judges, and treatment of employees) address issues of domestic life and
violence.392 Connecticut's Task Force created subcommittees on court-
room interaction, women attorneys, public hearings, and court adminis-
tration; the areas of law addressed were "family law" and "domestic
violence. '393 Utah's and Nevada's Task Forces have taken similar ap-
proaches.3 94 While several state reports (particularly the more recently
published ones) have pushed beyond these parameters, to consider civil
damage awards,395 employment law,396 prostitution, 397 sentencing,398
390 See, e.g., Sol Wachtler, The Lady in the Harbor and the Lady in Albany-Two Symbols
of Freedom, 15 Fordham Urb. L.J., 3, 3 (1986-1987) (Chief Judge of New York Court of
Appeals analogizing between legal reforms and Statute of Liberty in their common aspirations
to "eradicate ethnic prejudice," and their common inability to remove all bias).
391 L. Schafran & N. Wikler, supra note 43, at 24-25.
392 See Maryland Task Force Report, supra note 39. Table of Contents ("Chapter I. Do-
mestic Violence; Chapter II. Child Custody and Visitation; Chapter III. Child Support; Chap-
ter IV. Alimony; Property Disposition and Litigation Expenses").
393 See Connecticut Task Force Report, supra note 11 (List of Task Force Subcommittees
on unnumbered prefacatory page).
394 Justice for Women, Nevada Supreme Court Gender Bias Task Force i-ii (1988) [herein-
after Nevada Task Force Report] (addressing divorce, domestic violence and courtroom inter-
action); Utah Task Force Report, supra note 39, at iii (addressing courtroom interaction and
employment).
395 Gender and Justice in the Colorado Courts, Colorado Supreme Court Task Force on
Gender Bias in the Courts 104-05 (1990) [hereinafter Colorado Task Force Report]; Illinois
Task Force Report, supra note 76, at 177-97; Equal Justice for Women and Men, Kentucky
Task Force on Gender Fairness in the Courts 40-41 (1992) [hereinafter Kentucky Task Force
Report]; Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts 135-39 (1989) [hereinafter Massachussetts Task Force Report]; Minnesota Task
Force Report, supra note 44, at 913-17; New Jersey Task Force Report, supra note 9, 25; New
York Report, supra note 11, at 81-83; Rhode Island Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 31;
Vermont Task Force Report, supra note 76, at 148 -54; Final Report of the Washington State
Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts 83-107 (1989) [hereinafter Washington Task
Force Report]; Wisconsin Equal Justice Task Force Final Report 25-28 (1991) [hereinafter
Wisconsin Task Force Report].
396 See Minnesota Task Force Report, supra note 44, at 917-22; Wisconsin Task Force Re-
port, supra note 395, at 34-39.
397 See Florida Task Force Report, supra note 39, at 162-82; Kentucky Task Force Report,
supra note 395, at 36; Wisconsin Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 89.
398 Draft California Task Force Report, supra note 44, § 7; Florida Task Force Report,
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correctional facilities,3 99 and court awarded attorneys' fees,4° even in
those reports the bulk of the discussion remains on domestic and crimi-
nal law.4° While federal judges might have seen the obviously shared
concerns about courtroom interaction, treatment of women lawyers, and
employment, both the Manual's topics and reports from many states may
reinforce the federal judiciary's sense that the substantive law covered as
"women's problems" are not ones relevant to the federal courts.
Thinking about gender bias in the federal system may help the state
court task forces to move beyond their emphases on families, criminal
justice, and violence. While laudable to start with issues central to the
daily experiences of women, state task forces have sometimes stopped
with the placement of women in families and have not explored bias
much beyond those parameters. The social construction of gender and
the intersections of race and gender are not uniformly pursued; most data
are provided about "women" rather than about groups of women identi-
fied by race,40 2 class, and sexual orientation. 403 Families themselves are
supra note 39, at 91; Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of
Georgia 133-45 (1991) [hereinafter Georgia Task Force Report]; Kentucky Task Force Re-
port, supra note 395, at 34; Massachussetts Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 117-21;
Minnesota Task Force Report, supra note 44, at 906-07.
399 Draft California Task Force Report, supra note 44, § 1, at 20; Florida Task Force Re-
port, supra note 39, at 209; Massachussetts Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 153; Michi-
gan Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 88; Minnesota Task Force Report, supra note 44, at
920; New Jersey Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 18-19; New York Task Force Report,
supra note 11, at 150; Utah Task Force Report, supra note 39, at 101; Washington Task Force
Report, supra note 395, at 99-104.
40 See Washington Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 99-102.
401 See Appendix I (Topics Addressed by State Gender Bias Task Forces) and Appendix V
(Topics Addressed by Race and Ethnic Bias Task Forces).
402 The National Conference of Chief Justices urged that states create two task forces, one
devoted to gender and the other devoted to race/ethnic bias. See Resolution XVIII, supra
note 38. This proposal conforms to the Manual for Action, see L. Schafran & N. Wikler,
supra note 43, at 6-7, which urged gender task forces to be sensitive to issues of race and
ethnicity, and the like, but not to dilute their focus by studying too many kinds of discrimina-
tion at once.
Task forces have responded in a variety of ways. Only the California Task Force Report
has a section devoted specifically to the distinct issues of women of color. Draft California
Task Force Report, supra note 44, § 10. A few other reports also discuss the topic. For
example, the Kentucky Task Force Report found that "minority women law professors en-
counter even greater barriers to advancement [than white women professors]," "black women
were less likely to receive alimony than white women" and describing one study that found
that while 42% of black women apprehended for shoplifting were officially charged, only 8.8%
of white women so apprehended were charged. Kentucky Task Force Report, supra note 395,
at 8, 22, 35. The Connecticut Task Force Report examined sentencing to determine whether
gender and race had any impact and found that "holding constant the relevant control vari-
ables, black and latin defendants were more likely than whites to receive a fair sentence" and
"black women's average sentence length was 10.5 months longer than white women's." Con-
necticut Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 82-83.
Other reports, while not exploring the issues of women of color, make note of the prob-
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understood in only traditional terms. Thus far, state task force reports
have not taken on the interdependency of gender bias and of discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, which often cabins women and men in
lem. See, e.g., Illinois Task Force Report, supra note 76, at 224 (noting testimony received
that "this problem [derogatory comments by judges] is even more severe for African-American
women, who suffer from the double burden of race and gender bias."); New York Task Force
Report, supra note 11, at 121 (noting anecdotal evidence that race and economic status nega-
tively affect credibility and respect in the courtroom); Maryland Task Force Report, supra
note 39, at 1 ("While the Committee's mandate was to investigate gender bias, evidence of
racial bias also came to the attention of the Committee."). In both the Draft California Task
Force Report and the Massachusetts Task Force Report, the gender bias task forces proposed
creation of race/ethnic bias task forces. See Draft California Task Force Report, supra note
44, § 10, at 3-4; Massachusetts Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 166. The California
report stressed its concerns with the "limitations" of its focus. See Draft California Task
Force Report, supra note 44, § 10, at 3.
Michigan and Washington had Task Forces, operating at the same time, on gender bias
and on race/ethnic bias. See Michigan Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 1; Washington
Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 3.
As of this writing, five state task forces on race have published reports: Florida Racial and
Ethnic Bias Study Commission Report (Part I, Dec. 11, 1990; Part II, Dec. 11, 1991); Michi-
gan Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Courts (Dec. 1991); New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns (Interim Report, Aug. 1989), Report of the
New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities (in four volumes, Apr., 1991); Washing-
ton State Minority and Justice Task Force Report (Dec. 1990). Of these, three identify the
problems of women of color. See, e.g., Florida, Part I at 8-9 (identifying topic for future
reporting); Part II at 49-60 (report on status of minority women attorneys in Florida in rela-
tion to male and white female attorneys); Michigan, at 22-30 (dual burden of minority female
attorneys in comparison to minority male and white female attorneys); Washington, at 65-67
(bar graphs and charts illustrate distinct burdens of minority women). See generally Appendix
V (Topics Addressed by State Race and Ethnic Task Forces).
403 Five reports mention lesbians and gays. See Draft California Task Force Report, supra
note 44, § 4, at 33, 62 (proposed rules of judicial conduct to prevent discrimination based on
sexual orientation, as well as race, gender, and ethnicity); Georgia Task Force Report, supra
note 398, at 185 (citing newspaper article that judges took "sexual lifestyle of custodial parent"
into account and tended to deny custody to gay women regardless of parenting skills ....");
Massachusetts Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 65, 76 n.56 (sexual activity of women
less relevant in child custody than it used to be but one fifth of lawyers answering questions
reported that judges discriminated against "lesbian or gay parents"), id. at 81, 90, 98 (finding
that victims of domestic violence "are still confronted with treatment reflecting racial and
ethnic bias, as well as bias against homosexuals" and recommending education against such
stereotyping); Vermont Task Force Report, supra note 76, at 45 (recommending that the Code
of Judicial Conduct be amended to prohibit judges from discriminating based on "race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socio-economic status" and not-
ing that House of Delegates of American Bar Association adopted model code with these
provisions); Wisconsin Task Force Report, supra note 395, at 156 (Domestic Abuse Subcom-
mittee Report stated: "Care must be taken to treat [litigants] who are gay or lesbian with the
same courtesy and professionalism as other parties. Wisconsin statutes do not differentiate
between opposite-gender and same-gender parties."); see also Susan H. Russell & Cynthia L.
Williamson, Demographic Survey of the State Bar of California 6-7 (Aug. 1991) (membership
survey, undertaken by the California Bar in spring of 1991, which asked: "Do you consider
yourself to be a member of the gay, lesbian, or bisexual community?"; 3% of respondents
answered affirmatively).
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stereotypical roles. 4° 4
The decisions to approach gender bias by focusing on women in
traditional roles have been founded not only on the import of legal con-
trol over families to women's lives but also on the relative ease of study-
ing such issues.4° 5 Keeping women in families remains politically safe
and sometimes palatable.406 The task forces have not chosen the "op-
pression of women" or the "patriarchy" as their topics. Rather, the fo-
cus has been on courtroom interaction, the court as employer, and on the
substantive laws of the family and criminal justice.4°7 Given the family
orientation of state gender bias task forces, work on gender bias in the
federal context-seen to be far away from family life-may provide an
opportunity to locate women in many settings, of which the family is
404 See generally Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
Wis. L. Rev. 187 (roots of discrimination against lesbians and gays are based on patriarchal
attitudes towards women and insistence on gender-specific roles). The ongoing practice of
gender and class stereotyping by dress codes that prohibit women lawyers from wearing pants
(or "pant suits") also has not been discussed much by state reports. While one might debate
the importance of ceremonial dress in courts, it is difficult to make a claim that women must
remain in nineteenth-century garb to be appropriately dressed "for" court. In 1991, the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics of the New York County Lawyers' Association concluded that a
woman who wears "an appropriately tailored pants suit" has not violated the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. See Martin Fox, Bar Panel Tackles Sticky Issue of Appropriate Garb
for Women, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 1. In the 1970s, Florynce Kennedy, expelled by a
judge because she wore a pants suit to court, is claimed to have said: "What makes that man
in drag think he can tell me what to wear?"
405 Access to information plays a central role in agenda-setting. The study of the impact of
litigation is very difficult in a world of many variables and poor record-keeping. Getting infor-
mation on alimony awards and custody arrangements may be easier than finding sets of cases
less obviously gendered and attempting to understand the impact of gender roles on outcomes
or process. See, e.g., Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force Report, supra note 44, at 838 ("In
several areas of civil justice, suspected issues proved almost impossible to document. Informa-
tion about gender disparities in civil damage awards, based on undervaluation of women's
economic contributions or potential, either is not regularly compiled or is held by inaccessible
private sources."). This is not to say that any gender bias task force has an "easy" time; as
Lynn Hecht Schafran reports, alimony and custody records are often "non-existent or sealed
or both." Letter to author (Jan. 7, 1992) (on file with author). The lack of interest (until
recently) about gender bias has resulted in the absence of data collected in a manner that
permits ready access, even in those areas in which the possibility of gender-based discrimina-
tion is obvious.
406 The Manual for Action, see L. Schafran & N. Wilder, supra note 43, at 5, stressed the
importance of obtaining official judicial support for the effort. Chief justices of state courts
might not have readily embraced more explicitly radical approaches. Compare, for example,
the reception accorded to feminist theories sometimes labeled "cultural feminism" that con-
sider women's "differences," see, e.g., Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Develop-
ment, in Woman and Moral Theory (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987), with
those theories labeled "radical feminism" and challenging male "domination." See, e.g., Cath-
arine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32-45 (1987).
407 See J. Entmacher, supra note 67, at 12-14; Appendix I (Topics Addressed by State Gen-
der Bias Task Forces); Appendix II (Portions of Reports Devoted to Specific Topics in State
Gender Bias Task Forces).
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only one. Further, given the centrality of civil rights litigation to the
federal court persona, federal gender bias work might be able to focus
attention on the interaction between race and gender.
To the extent such an opportunity exists, impressing the federal
courts that they, like the states, deal with family law may prove to be a
diversion. Federal gender bias task forces might be led to mimic state
efforts and document women's worlds as family worlds, rather than ex-
pand both the range of topics addressed (to look at women as litigants in
environmental cases, as consumers, as creditors and debtors in bank-
ruptcy, as tort victims and alleged harmdoers, and as plaintiffs and defen-
dants throughout the civil and criminal docket) and the women
considered (to understand the distinctive and the shared experiences of
straight women, lesbian women, and women of color).
This acknowledgement of the full range of women's lives (and the
disputes that result) must include public and private worlds. Federal ju-
risprudence's rejection of jurisdiction on the domestic side limits its will-
ingness to inquire about the effects of federal law on women in all aspects
of life. That ideology haunts contemporary debates, once again framed
in jurisdictional terms, about women and the federal courts. Today's
leaders of the federal courts reaffirm their commitment to a legal system
in which they have no obligation for "domestic relations." In 1991 and
1992, spokespersons for the federal judiciary are lobbying hard against
the federal jurisdictional provisions of the Violence Against Women
Act408 that would give parties "federal questions" and thus presumptive
access to the federal courts.40 9 These same spokepersons stand silent
about the Act's provisions to educate them about gender bias.
It is not happenstance that these disputes are about federal courts,
women, and jurisdiction. Women's unexamined presence in the law and
jurisprudence of the federal courts bespeaks hostility to seeing women as
legitimate participants in the national world-in this context represented
by the federal courts. The debate about the pending legislation and the
arguments about the pending cases will be affected by disclaimers from
federal judges of knowledge, expertise, experience, and competency in
making decisions that affect family life. Federal courts' jurisprudence
helps hide both federal court jurisdiction over families and the role the
federal judiciary has played in limiting access to federal courts. While
408 See note 18 supra; see also Rorie Sherman, Fears Expressed on Proposed Bill to Aid
Women, Nat'l L.J., June 3, 1991, at 3 (noting lobbying against legislation by Department of
Justice as well). As of February of 1992, the American Bar Association had not taken a posi-
tion on the Violence Against Women Act. See Letter from Talbot D'Alemberte, President of
the ABA, to Senator Joseph Biden (Feb. 5, 1992) (on file with author).
409 See Meltzer, supra note 167, at 431 ("parties with federal questions belong in federal
court.").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 66:1682
HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766 1991
December 1991] WOMEN, JURISDICTION, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 1767
contemporary federal judicial distress about congressional efforts to en-
large federal courts' jurisdiction is in no way limited to women's
rights,410 no such "gender-neutral" explanation is available for the failure
of the federal judiciary to endorse the provisions of pending legislation
that fund judicial studies of and education about gender.411
Attitudes of the federal judiciary towards family law and towards
women's roles in the federal courts will not shift without self-conscious
decisions to reconsider both past and present. The federal judiciary and
its commentators must reclaim the history heretofore denied about the
ongoing relations of the federal courts with family life. Federal judges
need to turn to state courts for guidance and insight in exploring both
family issues and the bias that surrounds them. Federal judges will also
need support, from scholars of the federal courts, in development of theo-
ries of jurisdiction that incorporate and delineate roles for state and fed-
eral legislatures and courts as they work simultaneously on family life.
We need to take up the question of how federal and state courts share
jurisdiction over the family, just as these courts share jurisdiction over
civil rights, criminal law, land use, and other substantive areas.
Exploration of the "nature of federal law" thus illuminates the mul-
titude of roles for women in federal courts and the many roles of the
federal courts in women's lives. The imagined stability of state jurisdic-
tional control over family law is thus shaken. What remains is the diffi-
cult task of exploring the myriad ways in which the "nature of federal
law" is itself a source of bias against women and the ways in which the
"quality of the federal bench" fails to cushion that bias. The shared
work of clarifying how such bias works, in both state and federal courts,
awaits.
410 See Gwen Ifill, Rehnquist Opposes Bill to Replace Local Prosecution of Gun Crimes,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1991, at A8 (Chief Justice informed Congress that such measures
"would provide for Federal jurisdiction over offenses traditionally reserved for state prosecu-
tion"; accompanying that letter was Judicial Conference statement, complaining that so-called
"D'Amato legislation" would "swamp the Federal courts with routine cases that states are
better equipped to handle"); see also 1991 Year-End Report, supra note 25, at 3 (opposing this
legislation and stating that "additions [to federal jurisdiction] should not be made unless criti-
cal to meeting important national interests which cannot be satisfactorily addressed through
non-judicial forums, alternative dispute resolution techniques, or the state courts").
411 The Judicial Conference officially opposes Title III of the Violence Against Women Act,
which is the section devoted to new federal civil rights jurisdiction. See notes 22-26 and ac-
companying text supra. As of this writing, the National Association of Women Judges is
considering taking a position on the Violence Against Women Act, and to my knowledge, Title
V, which funds education on gender bias, has received no endorsements from any official judi-
cial organization or lobbying group that has commented on the act.
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